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ABSTRACT
Past Actions and Expertise: How States Infer Enemy Intentions
by Yu Aoki
Advisor: Peter Liberman
Whether and how a state’s past military (in)actions affect perceptions of its resolve and
intentions has been disputed. This dissertation argues that non-experts and experts in
governments use enemy past actions differently to infer enemy resolve and intentions. Experts
are those who have rich knowledge about enemies (e.g., country specialists and intelligence
analysts), whereas non-experts are those who do not (e.g., top policymakers). The theory argues
that non-experts are influenced by what psychologists call the “negativity bias,” which compels
them to pay more attention to negative information than positive information concerning
enemies. On the other hand, building on experimental findings that professional skills mitigate
biases, the theory argues experts’ professional knowledge about enemies mitigates the negativity
bias. As a result, faced with the same set of information concerning enemies, including their past
actions, these two groups reach different conclusions about their resolve and intentions. Utilizing
primary sources extensively, this dissertation shows the theory’s plausibility by examining how
US officials assessed their enemies’ resolve and intentions in three cases from the Cold War.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

In the early hours of June 25, 1950, the Korean People’s Army of the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea crossed the 38th parallel and began its invasion of the Republic of Korea. In
response, the United States had intervened in Korea, and President Harry S. Truman addressed
the nation in September: “If aggression were allowed to succeed in Korea, it would be an open
invitation to new acts of aggression elsewhere.”1 In unveiling his plan of Vietnamization in
November 1969, President Richard Nixon also declared to the nation: “Our defeat and
humiliation in South Viet-Nam without question would promote recklessness in the councils of
those great powers who have not yet abandoned their goals of world conquest.”2 Referring to
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, President George H. W. Bush similarly addressed Congress in
September 1990: “Had we not responded to this first provocation with clarity of purpose . . . it
would be a signal to actual and potential despots around the world.”3
What is in common in the above episodes is the notion that how the United States
responds to its adversaries’ challenge will affect how adversaries will see the US resolve and
intentions to use force over a dispute in the future. Historically, US leadership has believed that a
determined response to a military challenge can convince adversaries that the United States
would stand firm in the future, whereas yielding to a challenge would encourage them to believe
that it would retreat from a similar challenge.4 More generally, policymakers around the world

1

Quoted in Daryl Grayson Press, Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 2005), 2.
2
Quoted in Robert J. McMahon, “Credibility and World Power: Exploring the Psychological Dimension in Postwar
American Diplomacy,” Diplomatic History 15, no. 4 (October 1991): 467.
3
George H. W. Bush Presidential Library, “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Persian Gulf
Crisis and the Federal Budget Deficit,” https://bush41library.tamu.edu/archives/public-papers/2217 (accessed Apr
11, 2021).
4
McMahon, “Credibility and World Power.”
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have believed that how to act in the face of a military challenge from adversaries would create a
reputation for (ir)resoluteness, which affects how adversaries would infer their resolve and
intentions to use force in the future.5 Therefore, former Secretary of State and National Security
Advisor Henry Kissinger famously writes, “No serious policymaker could allow himself to
succumb to the fashionable debunking of ‘prestige’ or ‘honor’ or ‘credibility.’ ”6
Nevertheless, a position to dismiss the role played by resolute and irresolute reputations
in international politics is prevalent, as noted by Kissinger. Although different reasons to uphold
the view have been proposed, skeptics think that states infer adversaries’ resolve and intentions
from factors other than how they have behaved in past military crises. Thus, according to Keren
Yarhi-Milo, President Jimmy Carter seems to have thought and behaved as if he had not believed
in the importance of reputation.7 According to one journalist’s account, President Barack Obama
was more explicit. He secretly disdained the Washington foreign policy establishment because
they make a “fetish of ‘credibility’ ” and believe credibility can be purchased with the use of
force. Within the White House, Obama would argue that “dropping bombs on someone to prove
you’re willing to drop bombs on someone else is just about the worst reason to use force.”8
The foregoing discussion leads to the following questions: Do states infer their
adversaries’ resolve and intentions to use force from how they have behaved in the past? If so,

5

For examples of other countries’ policymakers’ views, see Danielle L. Lupton, Reputation for Resolve: How
Leaders Signal Determination in International Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2020), 2; Alex Weisiger
and Keren Yarhi-Milo, “What American Credibility Myth? How and Why Reputation Matters,” War on the Rocks,
October 4, 2016, https://warontherocks.com/2016/10/what-american-credibility-myth-how-and-why-reputationmatters/.
6
Henry Kissinger, White House Years, 1st ed. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979), 228.
7
Keren Yarhi-Milo, Who Fights for Reputation: The Psychology of Leaders in International Conflict (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2018), chap. 6.
8
Jeffrey Goldberg, “The Obama Doctrine,” The Atlantic 317, no. 3 (April 2016): 74. Experiments also show certain
individuals do not invest in reputation building, suggesting they do not believe in its importance. See Dustin H.
Tingley and Barbara F. Walter, “The Effect of Repeated Play on Reputation Building: An Experimental Approach,”
International Organization 65, no. 2 (April 2011): 343–65.

2

from what type of past actions do states infer resolve and intentions and why? Furthermore, as
the examples of the US presidents showed above, do different foreign policy officials treat the
importance of past actions differently? If so, why do they do so?
Answering these questions is both theoretically and practically important. As noted
below, even though substantial research has been done on reputation in international relations, or
more specifically reputation in security studies, its progress has been relatively slow. A heated
debate over the importance of reputation in international crisis initiation and bargaining lasted
for a while, and it was only recently that the literature has shifted its focus from whether
reputation matters to when and under what conditions it matters. Thus, another generation of
scholarship is needed to develop a theoretically and empirically informed answer to the whenquestion. In addition, scholarly interest in reputation in security studies has been drawn more to
examining under what conditions states fight to invest in reputation than investigating under
what conditions states use other states’ reputations to infer their resolve and intentions.9 As a
result, despite the growing accumulation of the knowledge about conditions under which states
fight to build reputation, we know relatively little about under what conditions states make
reputational inferences about enemy resolve and intentions. Given that these two questions are
on the two sides of the same coin, this imbalance should be rectified.
In the policy world, it is almost a reflex to argue that US credibility is at stake when the
choice of standing firm or backing down in the face of a challenge to US interests is discussed.

9

For this literature, see Joe Clare and Vesna Danilovic, “Multiple Audiences and Reputation Building in
International Conflicts,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 54, no. 6 (December 1, 2010): 860–82; Todd S. Sechser,
“Goliath’s Curse: Coercive Threats and Asymmetric Power,” International Organization 64, no. 4 (2010): 627–60;
Allan Dafoe and Devin Caughey, “Honor and War: Southern US Presidents and the Effects of Concern for
Reputation,” World Politics 68, no. 2 (April 2016): 341–81; Todd S. Sechser, “Reputations and Signaling in
Coercive Bargaining,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 62, no. 2 (February 1, 2018): 318–45; Yarhi-Milo, Who Fights
for Reputation; Ketian Zhang, “Cautious Bully: Reputation, Resolve, and Beijing’s Use of Coercion in the South
China Sea,” International Security 44, no. 1 (July 1, 2019): 117–59.
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Even where there is no express US commitment, it has often been argued that US credibility is
on the line. However, it is too costly for the United States to act anywhere and over any issue to
build and defend its reputation because not all disputes involve intrinsic US interests. A more
reasonable position is to carefully strike a balance between building up and maintaining a
reputation and defending intrinsic interests.10 This study will contribute to this important policy
issue by showing under what conditions foreign policy officials make reputational inferences
about enemy resolve and intentions, and why some foreign policy officials differ from others in
terms of how to assess enemy resolve and intentions.

Defining Key Terms
Before going further, I define key terms for this study. This study is about how policy officials
infer an adversary’s resolve and intentions to use force from its past behavior. I define policy
officials as policymakers and intelligence analysts who assess an enemy’s resolve and intentions
to use force by employing a variety of information about the enemy. I use “foreign policy
officials,” “policy officials,” and “officials” interchangeably. The term “policymakers” refers to
those who help make and implement foreign policies such as foreign ministry officials (e.g., US
State Department officials including the secretaries of state), heads of government (e.g., US
presidents), and their immediate staff (e.g., White House staff). The term “intelligence analysts”
refers to intelligence officials who produce finished intelligence products (e.g., US National
Intelligence Estimates). Although the primary responsibility for making assessments of enemy
threats lies with intelligence analysts, policymakers also engage in that endeavor.11

10

For an example of policy analysis based on such an endeavor, see Stephen Biddle, “Assessing the Case for
Striking Syria,” Council on Foreign Relations, September 10, 2013, https://www.cfr.org/report/assessing-casestriking-syria.
11
Richard K. Betts, “Intelligence Warning: Old Problems, New Agendas,” Parameters 28, no. 1 (Spring 1998): 30.
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Resolve is defined as the degree to which a state is willing to tolerate the costs and risks
of using force against other states to protect or advance its national interests.12 Reputation is
defined as policy officials’ beliefs about persistent behavioral characteristics and tendencies of
states based on their past behavior.13 Finally, intentions are defined as actions a state plans to
take under certain circumstances.14 It follows that if a policy official judges an adversary as
(ir)resolute or as having a (ir)resolute reputation from a past action, she will estimate that the
adversary is more (or less) willing to use force under a particular circumstance in the future.15
Here, past actions are an independent variable, policy officials’ assessments of enemy resolve are
an intervening variable, and those of enemy intentions are a dependent variable.

Current Academic Knowledge of Reputation for Resolve
Despite the broadly accepted importance of an enemy’s past actions in assessing its resolve and
intentions, the advance of academic knowledge of the issue has been relatively slow. One of the
oldest academic claims concerning the signaling effect of past actions can be found in Thomas
Schelling’s writings.16 Later, deterrence scholars incorporated Schelling’s claims into their
theories and put them to the test. In this respect, Paul Huth and his co-authors’ statistical studies

12

This definition is essentially similar to other definitions. For other definitions, see Jonathan Mercer, Reputation
and International Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 1–2; Joshua D. Kertzer, Resolve in International
Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), 8.
13
Robert Jervis, Keren Yarhi-Milo, and Don Casler, “Redefining the Debate Over Reputation and Credibility in
International Security: Promises and Limits of New Scholarship,” World Politics 73, no. 1 (January 2021): 169.
14
Sebastian Rosato, “The Inscrutable Intentions of Great Powers,” International Security 39, no. 3 (January 2015):
52.
15
As Sebastian Rosato argues, goals and objectives should be distinguished from intentions because “states devise
plans of action to achieve certain objectives” such as security, a piece of territory, or regional hegemony. Rosato, 52.
Goals contain both motives and interests. Motives refer to more abstract expression of objectives such as security or
greed, whereas interests refer to more concrete expressions of objectives such as acquisition of a particular territory
for security or greedy purposes.
16
Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 55–59, 123–24. See also
Glenn Herald Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System
Structure in International Crises (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), 185–89.

5

have made a prominent contribution. They demonstrate that a defender’s past actions in a prior
crisis with a challenger affect the likelihood of general and immediate deterrence success against
the same challenger in the future.17 However, a number of statistical studies also find evidence
that contradicts the above finding.18 Furthermore, Vesna Danilovic and Jo Clare find more
nuanced results than Huth and his coauthors. For example, Danilovic shows that reputations
developed in past crises only matter when past crises and current crises happen in the same
geographical region.19 Her study with Clare further shows that reputation only affects deterrence
outcomes when interests at stake in a current crisis are important because the reputational costs
of backing down in a low-stake crisis are small.20
In qualitative studies, the balance of evidence has tilted toward past-action skeptics.
Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing’s seminal case studies show only a single remark suggesting the
effect of past actions on assessments of enemy resolve. Thus, they famously conclude: “What
stands out is the discrepancy between the little evidence that statesmen do infer an opponent’s
resolve from his behavior in previous cases and the massive evidence that decision makers think

17

Paul K. Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988); Paul
Huth, D. Scott Bennett, and Christopher Gelpi, “System Uncertainty, Risk Propensity, and International Conflict
among the Great Powers,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 36, no. 3 (September 1, 1992): 478–517; Paul Huth,
Christopher Gelpi, and D. Scott Bennett, “The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes: Testing Rational
Deterrence Theory and Structural Realism,” American Political Science Review 87, no. 3 (September 1993): 609–
23.
18
Huth and Russett found no support for the effect of most recent deterrence attempt on a current deterrence
attempt. Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, “What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 to 1980,” World Politics
36, no. 4 (July 1984): 496–526. Huth also found that the use of the bullying strategy by extended deterrers in
immediately prior crises makes it more likely to result in immediate extended deterrence failures in the same dyads,
which contradicts reputation theory because the bullying strategy is supposed to be a signal of resolve. Huth,
Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War, chap. 5. Grieco found past victories by defenders make them more
susceptible to challenges by the same challengers than past defeats by defenders. Joseph M. Grieco, “Repetitive
Military Challenges and Recurrent International Conflicts, 1918–1994,” International Studies Quarterly 45, no. 2
(June 1, 2001): 295–316.
19
Vesna Danilovic, When the Stakes Are High: Deterrence and Conflict Among Major Powers (University of
Michigan Press, 2002). This supports a tentative hypothesis Snyder and Diesing presented over 40 years ago. See
Snyder and Diesing, Conflict Among Nations, 186–87.
20
Joe Clare and Vesna Danilovic, “Reputation for Resolve, Interests, and Conflict,” Conflict Management and
Peace Science 29, no. 1 (February 1, 2012): 3–27.
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such inferences are made.”21 Jonathan Shimshoni and Elli Lieberman respectively contend that
they have found some empirical support for a reputational effect in Israel’s deterrence
encounters. However, their evidence is hardly definitive because they mostly assume the
presence and effect of reputations from state behavior instead of examining policy officials’
beliefs.22 Jonathan Mercer, Shiping Tang, and Daryl G. Press are among the recent vocal critics
of the signaling effect of reputation. Mercer has presented a theory based on attribution theory in
psychology and has found in his cases that a state does not attribute to an enemy a reputation for
irresolution when the enemy backed down in a dispute with the state.23 Tang has taken a step
further from Mercer’s claims. He maintains that under anarchy where a worst-case analysis is a
necessity for survival, reputations for resolution and irresolution do not form because a worstcase analysis compels states to consider enemies as resolute regardless of their past behavior.24
Press’s most-likely case studies for reputation also have shown that states do not infer
adversaries’ irresolution in a current crisis from their record of backing down because what
matters for assessing the credibility of threats is the balance of capabilities and interests at stake
at present.25
21

Snyder and Diesing, Conflict Among Nations, 187.
Jonathan Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence, Israel and Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1988); Elli Lieberman, “The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate: Is the Dependent Variable
Elusive?,” Security Studies 3, no. 3 (March 1, 1994): 384–427; Elli Lieberman, “What Makes Deterrence Work?:
Lessons from the Egyptian-Israeli Enduring Rivalry,” Security Studies 4, no. 4 (June 1, 1995): 851–910. For similar
critiques, see Lupton, Reputation for Resolve, 11.
23
The other half of his claim is that an ally does not attribute to a state a reputation for resolution when the state
stood firm to support the ally. Mercer, Reputation and International Politics. See also Jonathan Mercer, “Emotion
and Strategy in the Korean War,” International Organization 67, no. 2 (April 2013): 221–52; Jonathan Mercer,
“Bad Reputation: The Folly of Going to War for ‘Credibility,’” Foreign Affairs, August 28, 2013,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2013-08-28/bad-reputation. For reviews of Mercer’s book, see Dale C.
Copeland, “Do Reputations Matter?,” Security Studies 7, no. 1 (September 1, 1997): 33–71; Patrick M. Morgan,
“Getting Respect Gets No Respect,” Mershon International Studies Review 41, no. 1 (1997): 117–19.
24
Shiping Tang, “Reputation, Cult of Reputation, and International Conflict,” Security Studies 14, no. 1 (January 1,
2005): 34–62. For a similar argument, see Snyder and Diesing, Conflict Among Nations, 188.
25
Press, Calculating Credibility. For other works critical of reputation theory, see Ted Hopf, Peripheral Visions:
Deterrence Theory and American Foreign Policy in the Third World, 1965-1990 (Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 1994); Christopher J. Fettweis, “Credibility and the War on Terror,” Political Science Quarterly
122, no. 4 (2007): 607–33.
22
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Although studies of various reputations have been constantly published in an
international security field,26 for some scholars, the publication of Press’s book seems to have
sealed the debate over reputation for resolve.27 Thus, Stephen Biddle maintained before Congress
in 2013: “Political scientists have studied reputation and credibility, and the results of a
generation of scholarship suggest that statesmen often overestimate the degree to which
reputation shapes others’ behavior in future crises.”28
However, recent studies have challenged this seeming consensus by presenting new
theoretical ideas and evidence with varying success.29 To begin, with more sophisticated research
design and analytical methods than the works by Huth and his colleagues, Alex Weisiger and
Keren Yarhi-Milo demonstrate that past actions are closely connected to the likelihood of
subsequent dispute initiation, and that reputations even affect the behavior of states that have not
involved in past disputes where reputations were formed.30 Thus, they have offered the

26

Anne E. Sartori, Deterrence by Diplomacy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005); Mark J. C. Crescenzi,
“Reputation and Interstate Conflict,” American Journal of Political Science 51, no. 2 (2007): 382–96; Douglas M.
Gibler, “The Costs of Reneging: Reputation and Alliance Formation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 52, no. 3 (June
1, 2008): 426–54; Gregory D. Miller, The Shadow of The Past: Reputation and Military Alliances before the First
World War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012); Mark J.C. Crescenzi et al., “Reliability, Reputation, and
Alliance Formation1,” International Studies Quarterly 56, no. 2 (June 1, 2012): 259–74; Brad L. LeVeck and Neil
Narang, “How International Reputation Matters: Revisiting Alliance Violations in Context,” International
Interactions 43, no. 5 (September 3, 2017): 797–821; Mark J. C. Crescenzi, Of Friends and Foes: Reputation and
Learning in International Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018); Neil Narang and Brad L LeVeck,
“International Reputation and Alliance Portfolios: How Unreliability Affects the Structure and Composition of
Alliance Treaties,” Journal of Peace Research 56, no. 3 (May 1, 2019): 379–94. For further empirical support for
Sartori’s claim about a reputation for honesty, see Roseanne W. McManus, Statements of Resolve: Achieving
Coercive Credibility in International Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).
27
Frank P. Harvey and John Mitton, Fighting for Credibility: US Reputation and International Politics (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2016), 17–21.
28
Biddle, “Assessing the Case for Striking Syria.” This does not mean Biddle believed there is no reputational
effect. In his testimony, he argued that the US leadership should strike a balance between reputational interests and
intrinsic interests.
29
For a review of these studies on reptation and credibility, see Jervis, Yarhi-Milo, and Casler, “Redefining the
Debate Over Reputation and Credibility in International Security.” They call this emerging scholarship a third wave
but this is inaccurate because although studies on a resolute reputation seems to be slowed down after the
publication of Press’s book as noted above, studies on reputation in general in international security—what they are
reviewing—has been constantly released after the publication of Press’s book, which they refer to a second wave.
For these works, see note 26.
30
Alex Weisiger and Keren Yarhi-Milo, “Revisiting Reputation: How Past Actions Matter in International Politics,”
International Organization 69, no. 2 (2015): 473–95. See also Weisiger and Yarhi-Milo, “What American
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reputation literature more solid empirical ground and even provided empirical support for
Schelling’s idea of the interdependence of commitments, which the early statistical studies could
not.31 Danielle Lupton has also broken new ground by presenting a theory that integrates the
dynamics of a state’s reputation and a leader’s reputation by specifying which matters when.32
She argues that a state’s reputation matters for a brief period from a leadership transition through
a time the leader forms her reputation by words and actions. As various scholars have long
argued,33 Lupton also argues that statements and other conditional variables (e.g., power and
interests) create expectations for how the leader will behave in the future, and whether the
leader’s action will live up to the expectation significantly affect her reputation later. Lupton’s
survey experiments and case studies then provide empirical support for these claims.34 Van
Jackson has identified an unnoticed tension between accumulating reputations for irresolution
and honesty when a state backed down without escalating a crisis because backing down yields
an irresolute reputation and honest reputation at once.35 Although his documentary evidence is

Credibility Myth?”; Danielle L. Lupton, “Reexamining Reputation for Resolve: Leaders, States, and the Onset of
International Crises,” Journal of Global Security Studies 3, no. 2 (April 1, 2018): 198–216. For a critique of
Weisiger and Yarhi-Milo’s finding, see Dianne Pfundstein Chamberlain, “Doubling Down on Reputation: Defining
State Resolve and Why It Matters,” War on the Rocks, October 12, 2016,
https://warontherocks.com/2016/10/doubling-down-on-reputation-defining-state-resolve-and-why-it-matters/.
31
Paul K. Huth, “Deterrence and International Conflict: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Debates,” Annual
Review of Political Science 2, no. 1 (1999): 41.
32
Lupton, Reputation for Resolve. However, Weisiger and Yarhi-milo found that leadership turnover does not
produce a clean reputational slate, which contradicts Lupton’s finding. See Weisiger and Yarhi-Milo, “Revisiting
Reputation,” 492.
33
Although Lupton has failed to give credit, scholars have long argued that a higher signaling effect or stronger
reputation formation when observers get caught by surprise by discovering that their expectations turn out to be
wrong. The idea was probably first presented by Glenn Snyder 60 years ago. See Huth Paul K. Huth, “Reputations
and Deterrence: A Theoretical and Empirical Assessment,” Security Studies 7, no. 1 (September 1, 1997): 86–87.
34
As Jervis and co-authors argue, Lupton’s survey experiments were not able to replicate information-rich realworld environment. Her surveys manipulated past actions and only one other contextual variable at a time. See
Jervis, Yarhi-Milo, and Casler, “Redefining the Debate Over Reputation and Credibility in International Security,”
183.
35
It is, however, counter-intuitive to think acquiescing to an adversary’s demand without escalating crises leads to a
reputation for honesty and more threat credibility in the future. When people judge other’s honesty, they seem to
look at cases where threats or promises were carried out than cases in which people remain honest by refraining
from making promises or threats because humans are terrible at recognizing non-events. In fact, to my knowledge,
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not strong, relying on this framework, Jackson tries to explain the unique pattern of the outbreak
and development of US-North Korea conflicts.36 Frank Harvey and John Mitton emphasize that
reputation is in the eye of the beholder and does not always matter, which is worth emphasizing
but hardly a new point. Their choice of more recent cases for empirical support is worth praise,
but the evidence provided is limited due to the unsatisfactory documentation and failure to
disprove rival hypotheses.37
The above new scholarship is a welcome contribution to the literature, but there are three
shortcomings. First, given their consensus that reputation is in the eye of the beholder, or, to put
it differently, each state attributes a different interpretation to the same past action, it is
unfortunate these works do not examine how each observer, group of policymakers, or policy
apparatus interprets adversary’s past actions and infers its resolve and intentions differently.38
Even Lupton’s work that emphasizes the importance of individuals in policymaking by focusing
on leaders’ reputations does not examine how each perceiver interprets past actions differently.
This omission is more surprising given the recent emergence of works that focus on individual
leaders as an important variable in international security.39 Furthermore, as Robert Jervis argued

there seems no historical anecdote showing policymakers saying their enemy is honest and their threats will be more
credible in the future because they backed down without escalating crises.
36
Van Jackson, Rival Reputations: Coercion and Credibility in US-North Korea Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2016).
37
Harvey and Mitton, Fighting for Credibility. Their critiques of the reputation skeptics’ works—Daryll Press,
Jonathan Mercer, and Ted Hopf (what they call “P-M-H”)—are generally correct, but they sometimes attribute a
point only one or two of the three argues to the collective P-M-H as if all the three agree on the point. As a result, PM-H seems to turn into a set of arguments nobody of the three argues. Furthermore, their documentary evidence is
limited and sometimes relies on logic without presenting any evidence on leaders’ beliefs, which two reviewers
(Lupton and Yarhi-Milo) on a roundtable for the book have pointed out. See Peter Feaver et al., “H-Diplo/ISSF
Roundtable on Fighting for Credibility: U.S. Reputation and International Politics by Frank P. Harvey and John
Mitton, Vol 10, No.3 (2017),” accessed December 8, 2019, http://issforum.org/roundtables/10-3-credibility.
38
Jervis, Yarhi-Milo, and Casler, “Redefining the Debate Over Reputation and Credibility in International
Security.”
39
For a review of the literature, see Stephen Benedict Dyson and Thomas Briggs, “Leaders and Foreign Policy:
Surveying the Evidence,” Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, September 26, 2017,
https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.281.
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almost twenty years ago, studies on signaling should integrate the question of how to send
credible signals and of how to interpret signals.40 From this perspective, no matter how
objectively credible signals are, whether signals are perceived as such depends on perceivers.41
In fact, scholarship reporting unexpected results of costly signaling has been recently emerging.42
In this respect, Yarhi-Milo’s study directly speaks to Jervis’s point by dividing policy officials as
the perceivers of signals into decision-makers and intelligence analysts, each group of whom
interprets different indicators as credible to assess enemy intentions. However, her work focuses
on political intentions (e.g., status-quo power or revisionist), or what Rosato calls goals, not
resolve and intentions to use force.43
Second, although Jervis and coauthors maintain that the shift has been made from
whether reputation matters to when and under what conditions reputation matters, this shift is
still elusive at best.44 Among the new scholarship on a resolute reputation, only Lupton’s work
specifies conditions under which whose reputation matters and provides empirical support. To be
sure, Harvey and Mitton maintain that a reputational inference is a function of other variables;
however, they present almost a laundry list of potential variables and fail to identify relations
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Robert Jervis, “Signaling and Perception: Projecting Images and Drawing Inferences,” in How Statesmen Think:
The Psychology of International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017), 107–24. The chapter was
originally published in 2002.
41
For few attempts to integrate these two questions, see Vaughn P. Shannon and Michael Dennis, “Militant Islam
and the Futile Fight for Reputation,” Security Studies 16, no. 2 (June 6, 2007): 287–317; Keren Yarhi-Milo,
Knowing the Adversary: Leaders, Intelligence, and Assessment of Intentions in International Relations (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2014); Julia Mary Macdonald, “Credibility in Crises: The Role of Leadership Beliefs in
State Threat Assessments” (Ph.D. dissertation, The George Washington University, 2016).
42
Tingley and Walter, “The Effect of Repeated Play on Reputation Building”; Seok Joon Kim, “Do Costly Signals
Matter? Unifying Theories of Signaling and Perceptions in International Politics” (Ph.D. dissertation, The George
Washington University, 2016), chap. 4; Kai Quek, “Are Costly Signals More Credible? Evidence of SenderReceiver Gaps,” The Journal of Politics 78, no. 3 (May 12, 2016): 925–40; Brandon K. Yoder and Kyle Haynes,
“Signaling under the Security Dilemma: An Experimental Analysis,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 65, no. 4 (April
1, 2021): 672–700.
43
Yarhi-Milo, Knowing the Adversary; Rosato, “The Inscrutable Intentions of Great Powers,” 53.
44
Jervis, Yarhi-Milo, and Casler, “Redefining the Debate Over Reputation and Credibility in International
Security.”
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between those variables.45 Jackson contends that rivalries are where reputational inferences are
more prominent, but he fails to prove this claim because the cases he examines do not include
non-rivalry cases.46 Thus, despite this new scholarship, the long-standing puzzle about under
what conditions reputational inferences are made by policy officials has not progressed much.
Third, now that the swing back from the skeptics’ position has been completed by the
new scholarship, it seems that the reverse has gone a bit too far at the expense of jettisoning
skeptics’ important insights.47 Critics’ central claim—fearful policymakers are preoccupied with
the balance of power and do not easily let their guard down by seeing an enemy back down—
goes beyond the reputation literature and has a long tradition that can be traced back to offensive
realism. Offensive realism has been criticized for its bold and sweeping claims, but most scholars
seem to at least admit that it correctly describes international politics in a particular
circumstance. In fact, recent experimental research has shown that as predicted by offensive
realism, reassurance or conciliatory signals do not work as expected by costly signaling under
certain conditions.48 In line with this finding, historians have shown that multiple opportunities
for mutual accommodation were missed during the Cold War.49 The preceding discussion
suggests that integrating the views of reputation skeptics and reputation proponents may be a
way forward for the next generation of reputation studies in international security.50
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Harvey and Mitton, Fighting for Credibility, 99–100. Jervis and co-authors also describe this as “long list of
potential variables [emphasis added].” See Jervis, Yarhi-Milo, and Casler, “Redefining the Debate Over Reputation
and Credibility in International Security,” 176.
46
Jackson, Rival Reputations, 7. In fact, almost 30 years ago, Huth and his coauthors tested reputation’s effect on
deterrence by focusing on rivalry dyads because reputational inferences are likely made in these dyads. See Huth,
Bennett, and Gelpi, “System Uncertainty, Risk Propensity, and International Conflict among the Great Powers.”
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Kim, “Do Costly Signals Matter? Unifying Theories of Signaling and Perceptions in International Politics,” chap.
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Melvyn P. Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War (New York:
Hill and Wang, 2007).
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In short, future scholars should identify scope conditions under which reputation matters,
examine the possibility that reputational beliefs and inferences can vary across perceivers, and/or
explore ways to integrate skeptics’ perspectives into the theory of reputation. This dissertation
attempts to accomplish them by presenting a new theory and its initial empirical support.

The Argument in Brief
This dissertation proposes a novel theory that explains how different groups of foreign policy
officials use past actions differently to make inferences about enemies’ resolve and intentions. I
provide the claim with empirical support by executing three case studies. My theory is an attempt
to bridge the gap between the reputation proponents and reputation skeptics by building on their
findings. In particular, the theory argues that there are two groups of policy officials in the
government —non-experts and experts—whose amount of knowledge on enemies differs and the
former assesses enemy threat roughly in the way explained by the skeptics and the latter roughly
in the way explained by the proponents.
Under the anarchic self-help system, policy officials have a strong bias toward negative
information at the expense of positive information (the negativity bias), and this bias compels
them to adopt worst-case thinking in assessing threats. This mode of thinking has three
consequences. First, policy officials assume the worst intentions from what enemies can
militarily do. Second, in learning from adversaries’ past actions about their level of resolve, the
bias induces policy officials to pay more attention to resolute behavior at the expense of
irresolute behavior. When an enemy shows caution by retreating in a military crisis, which is
positive information, policy officials do not feel safe judging this as evidence of the enemy’s
caution due to the negativity bias. On the other hand, when the enemy demonstrates its resolve
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by resorting to the use of force, which is negative information, this draws officials’ attention and
updates their assessments of the enemy’s resolve and intentions to use force upward. Third,
policy officials have a lower threshold for judging enemy behavior as resolute compared to those
who are not under the negativity bias because the bias exaggerates the significance of negative
information.
In the meantime, experts are relatively free from the worst-case thinking because their
rich knowledge of the enemy functions as professional skills and mitigates the negativity bias
that compels policy officials to adopt the worst-case thinking. Experts on an enemy country are
composed of two groups: intelligence analysts and enemy country specialists outside the
intelligence community. Among the examples of the latter is the Soviet expert George F.
Kennan. Relatively free from the worst-case thinking, experts assess enemy resolve and
intentions differently from non-experts.
First, even though relatively free from the negativity bias, experts also care about the
balance of power as non-experts do because in the anarchic international system, ignoring
adversaries’ capabilities is not a choice serious policy officials can choose. Second, unlike nonexperts who tend to be preoccupied with resolute actions by enemies at the expense of irresolute
actions, experts give more equal consideration to both resolute and irresolute actions in inferring
enemy resolve. Third, experts have a higher threshold for identifying resolve from enemy past
actions than non-experts, who are under the negativity bias.
Fourth, when the implications of an adversary’s statements on strategy match the
implications of its record of the use of force, experts use those statements as another guide for
the enemy’s future intentions. Mao Zedong’s famous injunction “we should despise all our
enemies, but tactically we should take them all seriously” is an example of these statements. The
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statement suggests the cautious use of force to pursue national interests, but it is not reliable on
its own due to the obscurity of costs leaders would incur when they fail to comply with the
statement and the presence of contradictory statements. However, when enemy leaders’
statements on geopolitical strategy match their past actions, this ensures the credibility of the
statement. Furthermore, these statements help experts contextualize and interpret the
implications of enemy past actions. As a result, experts use them as another source of
information about enemy resolve and intentions.
In short, there are two different groups in a government (experts and non-experts). They
use the information available to them differently to assess enemy intentions. Although the theory
cannot predict which group’s assessments prevail, it predicts that non-experts are unlikely to
assess in the way experts do unless they are exposed to experts’ assessments.
Three case studies provide the theory with evidence. The first case is US assessments of
Soviet intentions from the beginning of the Cold War through the outbreak of the Korean War.
This case demonstrates that although non-experts and experts judged the Soviet Union as not
intending to use force, they employed different indicators to reach the same conclusion. Nonexperts such as President Truman, Secretary of State George Marshall, Secretaries of Defense
James Forrestal and Louis Johnson almost exclusively relied on the balance of power in favor of
the United States to estimate Soviet reluctance to use force. On the other hand, experts such as
George Kennan and Charles Bohlen and intelligence analysts used the record of Soviet past
actions—the USSR had never initiated a war against a stronger state and backed down in the
series of the post-war crises with the United States—to infer Soviet cautious nature and
reluctance to use force in the face of the resistance by a more powerful country like the United
States. Furthermore, experts used Soviet leadership’s strategic texts urging caution in
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challenging stronger enemies to pursue socialism worldwide as another guide for Soviet
intentions because the strategic texts and Soviet past actions matched and uniformly suggested a
cautious Soviet nature in pursuing its interests. The chapter also demonstrates that when nonexperts were exposed to experts’ assessments and convinced of them, non-experts estimate
enemy intentions in a way experts do, with Secretary of State Dean Acheson as a prime example.
The second case is US assessments of Chinese intentions from the beginning of the
Korean War through the end of the Dien Bien Phu crisis of 1954. This case shows that when an
enemy unambiguously demonstrates its resolve, both non-experts and experts use the resolute
action to update their estimates of the enemy’s resolve. These two occasions provide a good
opportunity to conduct the method of difference to control for various confounding variables.
Despite the similarity of the values of important variables between the two occasions, US policy
officials assessed China’s intervention in Korea as unlikely, but a similar intervention as likely in
the Dien Bien Phu crisis. The analysis based on the method of difference suggests that it was
China’s past actions that had caused the divergent assessments. On the eve of the Chinese
intervention, US officials had no information about Chinese past actions because the communist
regime was just established a year earlier. At the time of the Dien Bien Phu crisis, however,
China had demonstrated its resolve to attack a superior power over border security in Korea,
where it had attacked and fiercely fought the US forces to a stalemate despite its mounting costs.
Given the comparable values of the other important variables between the two occasions, this
semi-controlled analysis suggests that the record of China’s past actions was the source of the
divergent assessments. Process tracing further strengthens this conclusion by showing how
policy officials updated their estimates of Chinese resolve after the Chinese intervention and how
they referred to it in discussing the Indochina crisis. This case study also shows that since
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Chinese strategic statements urging caution did not match the resoluteness demonstrated in
Korea, experts did not use those statements to infer Chinese intentions.
The third case is US assessments of Chinese intentions during the first Kennedy/Johnson
administration. This case demonstrates that in response to China’s changing record of past
actions, non-experts and experts reached opposite assessments. By the time President John F.
Kennedy came into office, the Chinese resolve demonstrated in Korea was followed by backing
down twice in the Taiwan Strait in 1954 and 1958. However, non-experts in the first half of the
1960s did not update their assessments of China’s resolve and kept fixated on the Chinese
resoluteness demonstrated in Korea. Furthermore, they reinforced their view of a resolute and
reckless China upon China’s attack on India in the fall of 1962. They did so even though the
attack was against a weaker power and had questionable information value when US officials
think about China’s intentions to challenge a stronger power like the United States. In the
meantime, experts updated their estimates of China’s resolve downward in response to China’s
behavior during the two Taiwan Strait crises. Furthermore, they did not take China’s decision to
attack India as informative for assessing China’s resolve to use force against a superior power.
This chapter also shows that when the implications of the record of an adversary’s past actions
match those of its geopolitical statements, experts use the latter as further information about the
adversary’s resolve and intentions to use force. Therefore, unlike in the second case, experts
started to use Mao’s geopolitical statements in conjunction with China’s cautious behavior
shown at the Taiwan Straits to estimate China’s resolve and intentions.
Taken together, the three case study chapters will provide my theory with initial
empirical support by demonstrating that with the same set of information available in hand, nonexperts and experts assessed adversaries’ resolve and intentions differently.
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Chapter 2: Why Non-Experts and Experts Infer Enemy Resolve and
Intentions Differently

In this chapter, I argue that policy officials have the negativity bias that compels them to adopt
worst-case thinking in assessing threats from enemies. Under this mode of thinking, policy
officials are biased to infer enemy intentions from balances of power and update their
assessments in response only to an enemy’s resolute actions by ignoring its cautious past actions.
However, those who have rich knowledge about the enemy, experts, are relatively free from the
negativity bias and worst-case thinking. As a result, they assess enemy past actions in a more
balanced manner. They also treat enemy statements about strategy as a guide for enemy
intentions when their implications are matched with those of past actions. In short, there are two
different groups (experts and non-experts) who assess enemy intentions differently. Although the
theory cannot predict which group’s assessments prevail, it predicts that non-experts are unlikely
to assess in the way experts do unless they are exposed to experts’ ideas.
The next section lays out the theory and deduces its observable implications. This is
followed by the discussion of its competing theories and their observable implications. Then, I
discuss the methodological approach I take for this dissertation.

Theory

18

Inferring enemy intentions in the anarchic international system is uncertain. There are six reasons
for this.1 First, states’ intentions are mostly unobservable.2 This is because little direct evidence
is available even through espionage,3 and most “evidence” is primarily based on logic (e.g., the
enemy has just mobilized its troops, so it must be intending to invade its neighboring country).4
Second, evidence based on logic is at best incomplete, ambiguous, and could be even
contradictory.5 Third, some information on enemy intentions may be correct, but the large
volume of incorrect information makes it difficult to distinguish signals from noise.6 Fourth, due
to human psychological tendencies, intelligence failure cannot be completely eliminated.7 Fifth,
states’ intentions may change in the future.8 Sixth, states have incentives to misrepresent their
intentions and deceive their enemies.9
In this uncertain and complex environment, what psychologists call the negativity bias
substantially influences the way policy officials handle information about enemies. The
negativity bias is a phenomenon in which “when equal measures of good and bad are present . . .

1

For different conceptualizations of uncertainty by paradigms, see Brian C. Rathbun, “Uncertain about Uncertainty:
Understanding the Multiple Meanings of a Crucial Concept in International Relations Theory,” International Studies
Quarterly 51, no. 3 (September 1, 2007): 533–57.
2
James D. Fearon, “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes,” American Political
Science Review 88, no. 3 (September 1994): 578.
3
Rosato, “The Inscrutable Intentions of Great Powers,” 85, n165.
4
In other words, foreign policy officials hardly have direct access to enemy intentions recorded in classified
documents or in policymakers’ mind.
5
David M. Edelstein, “Managing Uncertainty: Beliefs about Intentions and the Rise of Great Powers,” Security
Studies 12, no. 1 (October 1, 2002): 11.
6
Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962). For
the effect of transparency on intention-reading in crises, see Bernard I. Finel and Kristin M. Lord, “The Surprising
Logic of Transparency,” International Studies Quarterly 43, no. 2 (June 1, 1999): 315–39.
7
Richards J. Heuer, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1999). For a claim
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Attack: Failure and Success from Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and Beyond (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University
Press, 2013). For what causes intelligence success and failure, see Uri Bar-Joseph and Rose McDermott, Intelligence
Success and Failure: The Human Factor (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).
8
John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (W. W. Norton & Company, 2001), 31; Rosato, “The
Inscrutable Intentions of Great Powers.”
9
Fearon, “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes,” 578; Michael I. Handel,
“Intelligence and Deception,” Journal of Strategic Studies 5, no. 1 (March 1, 1982): 122–54.
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the psychological effect of bad ones outweigh those of the good ones.”10 To put it differently, the
negativity bias is that “in most situations, negative events are more salient, potent, dominant in
combinations, and generally efficacious than positive events.”11 Although psychologists have
discovered numerous biases which may look even contradictory to one another, the negativity
bias has been considered potentially a “general principle or law” of human psychology.12 To be
sure, there are contradictory biases, most typically overconfidence in IR literature; however,
overconfidence is usually an exception rather than the rule.13 Since the negativity bias is a
general principle of psychological phenomena, it represents itself through more concrete biases.
And these biases compel foreign policy officials to “search for negative information, fixate on
potential dangers, and overweight their magnitude.”14
Many biases for negative information have been reported in information processing,
which is relevant for policy officials’ attempt to infer enemy intentions. Susan Fiske shows that
people pay more attention to bad than good behavior when they form impressions.15 Andrea
Abele finds that people engage in more thinking and reasoning about bad than good events.16
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Felicia Pratto and Oliver John demonstrate that people had greater memory for bad than good
traits.17 Benjamin Hilbig shows that negative information is more likely to be perceived as true
because people spend more attentional resources on it.18 The public’s negativity bias also
motivates policy officials to pay undue attention to mere possibilities of danger. Miroslav Nincic
finds that “the penalties facing the leader found guilty of mistakenly underreacting to a Soviet
threat are far more severe than those inflicted on one whose error consists of wrongly
overreacting to that threat.”19 Furthermore, according to prospect theory, which is considered a
manifestation of the negativity bias,20 people tend to overweight small probabilities whereas
moderate and high probabilities are underweighted.21 One implication for IR is that this tendency
makes it difficult for policy officials to dismiss mere possibilities of rare phenomena such as war,
surprise attacks, and nuclear catastrophe. This tendency is further reinforced by policy officials’
sense of responsibility for their nation’s security, which compels them to think about every
possible danger to their nation and prepare for contingency plans. These findings suggest that
foreign policy officials are biased toward information that confirms enemy threats over
information that contradicts it.22
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There are three consequences of these biases in assessing enemy threats in an uncertain
and complex information environment. I call them collectively the worst-case thinking. First,
policy officials want to be on the safe side in assessing enemy intentions by focusing on the
balance of power and assuming the worst intentions from what enemies can do militarily.23 In the
anarchic international system where disputes could be ultimately solved by force, capabilities to
harm stand out most prominently as threatening and therefore negative information. Thus,
militarily powerful enemies are suspected or even assumed to be ready or willing to attack. To be
sure, some scholars argue that under incomplete information, states make use of as much
information as possible to infer state intentions because the scarcity of information makes them
valuable.24 However, this is not the case because policy officials’ worst-case thinking makes it
difficult for them to infer the cautious and reasonable intentions of a militarily capable enemy
even if available intelligence suggests so. Furthermore, a tendency among policy officials to
think what if he or she is wrong is difficult to overcome, which will be stronger as the ladder of
bureaucracy goes up due to more direct responsibility to their nation’s security.25 Therefore,
great powers have routinely engaged in internal balancing against each other since 1816.26
Furthermore, the presence or absence of capabilities to hurt are more easily observable with
certainty, whereas the presence or absence of intentions to hurt is difficult to pin down.27 In
short, there is a tendency among policy officials to assume the worst about enemy intentions
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from capabilities, instead of making the best guess about them by utilizing all the important
information.
Second, policy officials look at how the enemy has behaved militarily in the past to infer
its resolve, but they are biased toward the enemy’s resolute actions at the expense of irresolute
ones. States’ past actions are costly signals.28 Therefore, as opposed to some reputation critics,29
policy officials pay attention to the enemy’s past actions despite their obsession with its
capabilities. However, they do not give equal consideration to both resolute and irresolute
actions because of the negativity bias. As opposed to reputation proponents, when the enemy
shows caution by retreating in a military crisis, which is positive information, policy officials do
not feel safe judging this as evidence of the enemy’s caution. On the other hand, when the enemy
demonstrates its resolve by resorting to the use of force, which is negative information, this
draws officials’ attention and updates their assessments of the enemy’s resolve and intentions to
use force upward.
There are limited but important studies that make a similar argument. As noted above,
Mercer argues that states do not attribute a reputation for irresoluteness to the foes that backed
down, but they do attribute a reputation for resoluteness to the adversaries that stood firm. In
other words, Mercer argues that states learn from resolute behavior by enemies but dismiss the
implications of their irresolute behavior.30 Likewise, relying on the negativity bias, Seok Joon
Kim argues that states are prone to take other states’ aggressive actions as credible but are
skeptical of conciliatory gestures. Although his focus is more on signaling in general
circumstances (e.g., how to interpret the number of troops near borders) instead of focusing on
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the signaling effect of past military actions in crises, he has introduced the negativity bias into
academic studies of international relations maybe for the first time.31 On the other hand, focusing
on how militant Islamists assess US resolve, Vaughn P. Shannon and Michael Dennis challenge
Mercer’s argument by presenting an almost opposite claim. They argue that with a paper tiger
image in terrorists’ minds, their motivated biases lead them to learn from US irresolute behavior,
whereas the biases discourage them from learning from US resolute behavior.32 Although
Shannon and Dennis’s claim is opposite to mine, both claims are based on biased interpretations
of past actions. As will be made clear later, my theory departs from these studies by arguing that
different groups of policy officials are subject to the negativity bias to a different degree, so they
interpret and learn from the same past action differently.
Third, the negativity bias compels policy officials to have a lower threshold to identify
resolve from enemy past actions than those who are relatively free from it. The evidence
suggests that the salience of negative events grows faster than that of positive events when they
are approached in time and space.33 One implication is that negative events with relatively little
information value may loom more significant in their importance to those who are under the bias
than those who are not. For example, a state may attack a stronger state, or it may attack a
considerably weaker state. Here, attacking a stronger power may demonstrate resoluteness, but
attacking a weaker power may not because the costs and risks associated with it could be
considerably low. The negativity bias, however, compels policy officials to treat a relatively
costless and riskless use of force as if it were costly and risky because the bias exaggerates its
significance.
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One may question the above view by arguing that the worst-case thinking is a rational,
not a psychological, response to the anarchic international system. Offensive realism has argued
that rational states caring about survival in the uncertain anarchic world assume the worst about
their rivals’ intentions.34 Critics, however, have pointed out that offensive realism is logically
flawed. They argue that the worst-case thinking cannot be deduced from offensive realism’s
assumptions. In his book, Andrew Kydd has demonstrated formally that rational, benign states
can cooperate over time by employing costly signals that enable them to reassure one another no
matter how mistrustful they are of one another.35 Following Kydd, formal modelers Brandon
Yoder and Kyle Haynes assert, “As a rationalist theory, offensive realism is demonstrably
incoherent.”36 Critics, however, have also pointed out that offensive realism may be right as a
behavioral theory of international politics.37 This is roughly what I did above by deducing
implications similar to offensive realism from psychological findings. Furthermore, even if
offensive realism’s logical coherence is demonstrated in the future, one can still reasonably argue
that the negativity bias strengthens the implications of the worst-case thinking as a rational
response.
In short, the worst-case thinking compels policy officials to assume the worst possible
intentions from what enemies can militarily do. Furthermore, in learning from adversaries’ past
actions about their level of resolve, the bias induces them to pay more attention to resolute
behavior at the expense of irresolute behavior. Finally, policy officials have a lower threshold for
judging enemy behavior as resolute compared to those who are not under the negativity bias.
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Although the foregoing is a general tendency among policy officials, each official is not
equally subject to the worst-case thinking. One critical variable that affects the degree to which
each policy official is prone to the worst-case thinking is the amount of knowledge she or he
possesses about the enemy. I call those who have rich knowledge or expertise about the enemy
country experts. Their knowledge about the enemy and rich experience in inferring its intentions
function as professional skills, which enable experts to be relatively free from biases derived
from the worst-case thinking. This allows experts to infer the enemy’s resolve and intentions
from some information non-experts tend to ignore.
Before further developing the theory, let me address the validity of the assumption that
each policy official has a different amount of knowledge about an enemy country. This is
because one may argue that policy officials are professionals so that they are by and large
equally knowledgeable about the enemy, or that sharing information about the enemy has their
knowledge levels converge.38 Neither position, however, withstands logical and empirical
scrutiny.
First, given that policy officials have various backgrounds, and they may work in
domains that have nothing to do with countries their government considers enemies for the better
part of their careers, it is realistic to think officials have a different amount of knowledge about
enemies. If one consults historians’ works on US foreign policy, he or she will find that
historians have documented US presidents, secretaries of state, important aides, and ambassadors
had different amounts of knowledge about enemies. For example, Deborah Larson argues that
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presidents are often foreign policy novices.39 Truman, Lyndon Johnson, Jimmy Carter, and
Ronald Reagan are good examples of this claim. It is absurd to say that these presidents knew
about the Soviet Union as much as, say, George Kennan, a renowned State Department Soviet
expert, or Raymond Garthoff, a famous intelligence expert on the Soviet Union. Nor is it correct
to say that even presidents whose foreign policy expertise are relatively high such as John F.
Kennedy are as equally knowledgeable about the enemy as those who have spent their entire
career watching the enemy. The fact that JFK treated with respect such Sovietologists as Kennan,
Charles Bohlen, and Llewellyn Thompson and asked for their advice suggests that JFK knew
much less than them about the Soviet Union.40
Here, it is safe to say that those who know the enemy most are junior policy officials such
as country desk officers in a foreign ministry or enemy specialists in an intelligence community
because higher administrative positions require occupants to become more generalist by doing
more than just watching the enemy.41 These knowledgeable officials check every important
enemy country’s newspaper article, read all the cables, stay in touch with important internal
memoranda, learn the history, politics, economy, military, and culture of the enemy country
throughout their career, and may even have graduate degrees in subjects related to the enemy
country.42 Therefore, these experts may know about the enemy more than even secretaries of
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state with a major reputation such as Henry Kissinger.43 In short, it is simply wrong to argue that
all policy officials are equally knowledgeable about adversaries.
Second, sharing information and policy discussion among policy officials do not make
experts overnight. The existence of various professional training in human society contradicts the
effectiveness of such superficial and quick learning. Furthermore, the use of the terms such as
“Sovietologists” and “China Hands” even within the government suggests policy officials
themselves admit some know better than others about adversaries. Also, knowing something in
common does not mean their knowledge level is equal. Quick learning through sharing key
information does not provide officials with knowledge, confidence, and identity as experts.
If so, who are experts among policy officials? Experts on an enemy country are
composed of two groups: intelligence analysts in an intelligence community and policymakers
and diplomats outside the intelligence community. First, as opposed to policymaking
organizations such as the US State Department and the White House, an intelligence
community’s first and foremost job is to know the enemy. Their institutionally stored knowledge
about enemies and everyday attempts to infer enemy intentions function as professional skills.
This qualifies intelligence analysts as experts on the enemy country. Furthermore, unlike some
US officials, most intelligence officials are career professionals, not political appointees. This
makes intelligence analysts more trained than policymakers in terms of the amount of knowledge
about the enemy country. Finally, intelligence analysts’ foremost job is primarily to know the
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enemy instead of making policy so that they are relatively free from being biased to align their
estimates with their favored policy.
Second, the ministries of foreign affairs and offices of presidents or prime ministers also
have area specialists, although their number may be limited. Policymaking organizations’ duties
are to make policy. For this goal, policymakers often just accept intelligence organizations’
estimates as an assumption from which they make policies. For example, during the Eisenhower
administration, National Security Council’s meetings regularly started with the Director of
Central Intelligence’s briefings, and they were rarely challenged. However, this does not mean
policymaking organizations do not have enemy experts. Here, one of diplomats’ primary duties
is to report about and analyze the host country.44 Thus, diplomats who spent most of their careers
in one country have professional skills to assess the host country’s foreign policy. In the case of
the United States, area specialists are likely to reside within regional bureaus of the State
Department. However, assistant secretaries of state (head of regional bureaus) are not necessarily
specialists because they are politically appointed. The same logic applies to US ambassadors
assigned to enemy countries. For example, US ambassadors to the Soviet Union in the early Cold
War such as Averell Harriman, Walter Bedell Smith, and Alan Kirk were not considered Soviet
experts.45 Idiosyncratic factors may also make area specialists in short supply in policymaking
organizations. In the early Cold War, Soviet specialists were in short supply due to the abridged
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training program which ended in the 1930s.46 Furthermore, due to McCarthyism, China Hands
were swept from the State Department in the entire 1950s. Nevertheless, the State Department
had limited but recognized Soviet specialists such as George Kennan and Charles Bohlen and
China Hands who survived McCarthyism through the 1960s such as Edward Earle Rice.
Now, why does experts’ knowledge about the enemy mitigate the negativity bias? I argue
that rich knowledge about the enemy functions as professional skills and expertise and enables
individuals to be resistant to the effect of the negativity bias. It is surely wrong to argue that
laypeople are subject to biases, but professionals are free from them. The literature on
intelligence failure has demonstrated that even intelligence analysts, professionals in assessing
threats, are susceptible to various biases.47 However, these studies have little to say which group,
intelligence analysts as experts or policymakers as non-experts, is more subject to biases.48 In
this respect, recent experimental studies have shown, with few exceptions, that experience and
professional training allow individuals to be resistant to certain emotional and cognitive biases.49
This suggests that although both non-experts and experts are susceptible to biases, experts are
less biased than non-experts in exercising their professional skills.
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A number of recent experimental studies in law and economics have reported that experts
are relatively less susceptible to biases. Jeffrey Rachlinski et al. demonstrate that judges are not
influenced by a hindsight bias when making probable cause determination probably due to their
rich knowledge of case law.50 Dan Kahan et al. show that judges and lawyers are resistant to an
identity protection bias when exercising statutory interpretation.51 Susanne Schmitatt and Birte
Englich discover that legal experts are resistant to confirmatory information processing (i.e.,
selective exposure to and biased assimilation of information) when they exercise their domainspecific expertise due to their professional expertise and sense of responsibility.52 Sandra Baez et
al. also show that legal expertise partially mitigates biases linked to the assessment of others’
mental states (i.e., whether harm was intentional or accidental), the affective states induced by
verbal manipulation, and the physiological state of one’s own body.53 Peter Beattie and Danielle
Snider apply these findings to the international relations field and show that professional training
in IR induces relatively unbiased development of knowledge in IR professors and mitigates the
effect of blind patriotism on their favored policy.54 In economics, experimental studies have
shown that expertise and experience attenuate an anchoring bias (tendency to adjust judgments
toward the first piece of information) significantly.55 A series of experiments conducted by John
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A. List also shows that market experience plays a significant role in eliminating an endowment
effect (a phenomenon in which a good’s subjective value increases once it becomes part of one’s
endowment).56 In short, these findings suggest that although professionals are subject to biases as
laypeople are, the former are subject to relatively fewer biases than the latter in exercising their
skills.
The significant differences between experts and non-experts among foreign policy
officials were well understood by experts and non-experts themselves. For example, Secretary of
State Dean Acheson, a non-expert on the USSR, described Soviet experts as peddling
“uncommunicable” hunches that “must be accepted by those who have not the same occult
power of divination.”57 He wrote in his memoirs:
I recognized and highly appreciated the personal and esoteric skill of our Foreign Service
officers, but believed that insofar as their wisdom was “non-communicable,” its value,
though great in operations abroad, was limited in Washington. There major foreign
policies must be made by the man charged with that responsibility in the Constitution, the
President. He rarely came to his task trained in foreign affairs, nor did his personal
entourage. What he needed was communicable wisdom, not mere conclusions, however
soundly based in experience or intuition, what the man in the street called “educated
hunches.” I saw my duty as gathering all the wisdom available and communicating it
amid considerable competition.58
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Although Acheson accepted experts’ assessments more than he admitted, what the above
recollection practically meant to Acheson was to focus on Soviet capabilities.59 Since capabilities
are measurable whereas intentions are not, capabilities are more amenable to “educated
hunches.”
Acheson’s view about the gulf between non-experts and experts seems to be even shared
by the side of experts. George F. Kennan, a quintessential expert on the Soviet Union, wrote in
his journal after the outbreak of the Korean War:
the nervousness and consciousness of responsibility is so great around Washington that it
is impossible to get people to set their signatures to anything as risky and as little founded
in demonstrable fact as an analysis of Soviet intentions based on the subjective
experience and instinct and judgment of persons like Chip [Charles E. Bohlen] and
myself. Plainly, the government has moved into an area where there is a reluctance to
recognize the finer distinction of the psychology of our adversaries, for the reason that
movement in this sphere of speculation is all too undependable, too relative, and too
subtle to be comfortable or tolerable to people who feel themselves confronted with the
grim responsibility of recommending decision which may mean war or peace.60

As noted above, evidence for state intentions rests substantially on logic, or in Kennan’s words,
“too undependable, too relative, and too subtle.” On the other hand, capabilities look more real
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and concrete. Thus, only experts’ rich knowledge, confidence, and sense of responsibility enable
them to dare to infer enemy intentions in a more balanced way than non-experts.
Now, how do experts infer enemy resolve and intentions? First, even though being
relatively free from the negativity bias, experts also care about balances of power as non-experts
do. In the anarchic international system, ignoring adversaries’ capabilities is not a choice serious
policy officials can choose. Nevertheless, relatively free from the negativity bias and worst-case
thinking, experts take into account non-capability factors that question adversaries’ resolve and
intentions to use force. These factors, which will be discussed below, mediate experts’
assessments of what the enemy can do militarily under a given distribution of capabilities. Then,
they infer adversaries’ resolve and intentions.
Second, unlike non-experts who tend to be preoccupied with resolute actions by enemies
at the expense of irresolute actions, experts give more equal consideration to both resolute and
irresolute actions in inferring enemies’ resolve. As noted above, past military actions, both
resolute and irresolute, are costly signals, so they could function as credible information about
state resolve. Although non-experts tend to focus on resolute actions and ignore irresolute actions
due to the negativity bias, relatively free from the bias, experts learn about enemy resolve from
both resolute and irresolute actions in a more equal manner than non-experts.
It should be also noted that experts know more examples of irresolute actions (i.e., bluffs)
by adversaries than non-experts, especially top officials, because not every single threat is
reported to the top echelon to alarm them. Experts, intelligence analysts in particular, are
incentivized to distinguish credible threats from non-credible threats and report only the former
to the top echelon to avoid a crying wolf phenomenon. On the other hand, threats that have been
carried out become common knowledge among policy officials including both experts and non-
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experts due to their serious consequences. Thus, they tend to share information about how many
times enemies behaved resolutely by resorting to the use of force, whereas experts tend to know
more cases of bluffs than non-experts. This bureaucratic dynamic further makes these two
groups’ assessments of enemy resolve apart.
Third, experts have a higher threshold for identifying resolve from enemy past actions
than non-experts. As noted above, the negativity bias induces non-experts to be receptive to even
relatively costless and riskless actions as resolute actions because the bias exaggerates the
significance of the action. Relatively free from the bias, however, experts have a higher threshold
than experts to consider enemy actions to be resolute.
Fourth, when the implications of adversaries’ statements on strategy match the
implications of their past actions, experts use those statements as another guide for the enemy’s
resolve and intentions. State leaders articulate their geopolitical strategy that specifies how they
pursue national interests in various media, including official ideologies, public statements, and
military doctrinal writings. These statements contain more than military strategy, but some of
them may be part of strategic cultures. Strategic culture is defined as “patterns of common ideas
regarding strategy distributed across populations.”61 Studies have demonstrated that strategic
cultures help cause states to use military force in a particular manner.62 This suggests that
strategic statements intimately related to strategic culture could be important information about a
state’s intentions and resolve.
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However, it is difficult for experts to use these statements alone as credible sources of
information for enemy intentions because there may be multiple strategic cultures in one country,
and only one of them influences behavior. For example, scholars have argued that there are two
strategic cultures in China: the parabellum culture and the Confucius culture.63 As a result,
experts have to distinguish statements on strategy that do wield an impact on the way the enemy
uses military force from those that do not.
Here, past actions come in. As noted, past actions are an important source of information
because they reveal the persistent characteristics of actors. Therefore, if the implications of past
actions align with those of the statements on strategy, this suggests those statements are another
piece of evidence describing the persistent characteristics of actors. Furthermore, although it is
said that actions speak louder than words, words help observers interpret and contextualize
actions.64 As a result, when statements on geopolitical strategy are substantiated by enemy past
actions, the idea in statements can be used as a reliable guide for the future. In other words, those
statements alone are potentially useful but suspicious information concerning future intentions
but when matched with past actions, they become credible signals.
It should be noted that statements on strategy are different from costly signals for four
reasons, and as a result, they are not credible sources of information on their own. First, the costs
and risks of making statements on strategy are less clear than those of threats and promises made
directly to other countries.65 The audiences of statements on strategy are not necessarily enemies;

63

Alastair Iain Johnston, “Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China,” in The Culture of National Security:
Norms and Identity in World Politics, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 216–
69; Andrew Scobell, China’s Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2003); Huiyun Feng, Chinese Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy Decision-Making:
Confucianism, Leadership and War (London: Routledge, 2007).
64
Stacie E. Goddard, When Right Makes Might: Rising Powers and World Order, When Right Makes Might (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 2018), https://doi.org/10.1515/9781501730313.
65
For costly signaling and its related mechanism, see James D. Fearon, “Signaling Versus the Balance of Power and
Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 38, no. 2 (June 1, 1994):

36

instead, they are mostly for internal audiences (e.g., political subordinates and military leaders)
or transnational audiences (e.g., transnational communists in the case of Marxist-Leninist
ideology). For example, Mao Zedong famously said, “we should despise all our enemies, but
tactically we should take them all seriously.”66 This statement suggests that despite his gigantic
ambition for a world revolution, Mao meant to pursue the goal with caution, instead of becoming
an ideological zealot oriented toward drastic measures. However, it is not clear, especially from
the perspective of outside observers, what costs Mao would suffer if he failed to behave in line
with this statement.
Second, statements on strategy are not made during crises so their function to generate
audience costs are much weaker. Crises draw attention from domestic observers due to their
suddenness and urgency,67 but statements on strategy are made in much less dramatic times,
especially in the case of military doctrinal writings. As a result, its eye-catching effect is much
weaker.
Third, these statements may be made years before the time experts use them to infer
enemy intentions, and this also makes it difficult for audiences to impose costs on leaders for not
following through with the statements. Since statements on strategy’s information value rest on
its consistency with past actions, a much longer perspective is applied to the search for
information.
Fourth, honoring one statement may result in breaking other statements, which makes it
difficult for imposing costs on leaders who did not act according to their statements. As noted,
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there may be multiple strategic cultures in a country, suggesting that statements on strategy may
contain contradictory statements. This makes it difficult for audiences to impose costs on leaders
because a particular action that does not align with some statements may fit into other
statements. This is more so because observers can find more easily contradictory statements in
statements on strategy due to their longer timeline than that of costly signals as noted above. In
short, statements on strategy are based on a causal mechanism different from costly signals.
Now, if there are experts and non-experts on enemies in a government and they assess
enemy intentions differently, how do their assessments interact? Which groups’ assessment
prevails? At this point, my theory cannot answer these questions. However, the theory predicts
that non-experts are unlikely to assess in the way experts do unless they are exposed to experts’
ideas. Nevertheless, the theory cannot say how likely non-experts adopt experts’ assessments
when being exposed to their assessments. Some may accept experts’ estimates right away,
others take some time to do so, and still others may reject experts’ views and stick to their own
estimates. This may sound unsatisfactory, but at least this still ensures the theory’s
falsifiability—i.e., finding a pattern in which non-experts assess threats like experts do without
being acquainted with the latter’s ideas.
The above discussion yields the following five observable implications:
•

Non-experts infer the worst possible resolve and intentions from what enemies can do
militarily to their country, whereas experts combine assessments of capabilities and those
of resolve learned from other sources to infer enemy intentions.

•

In inferring enemy resolve from past actions, non-experts learn from resolute actions but
ignore the implications of irresolute actions, whereas experts give more equal
consideration to the implications of both resolute and irresolute actions.

•

Non-experts have a lower threshold of interpreting enemy past actions as resolute than
experts.
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•

When the implications of adversaries’ history of the use of force (do not) match the
implication of their statements on strategy, experts (do not) use statements as additional
evidence concerning adversaries’ resolve.

•

When non-experts assess enemy intentions as experts do, their assessments are likely to
be the result of their acquaintance with experts’ assessments.

Competing Theories
There are two rival theories to test along with my theory in this dissertation: the current calculus
theory and the past actions theory. In what follows, I discuss each theory and deduce the
observable implications for each.
First, the current calculus theory proposed by Press holds that what matters in calculating
threat credibility in crises is the balance of power and enemy interests at stake. Press argues that
the more capabilities an adversary has to carry out a threat to use force and the more important
interest of the adversary is at stake in the crisis, the more credible the adversary’s threat is.68 He
proposes two reasons for his claim.69 First, he contends that the “dangers inherent in anarchy”
force policy officials to “look beyond the simple heuristics that people use to assess situations in
daily life” such as the record of past behavior and instead focus on power and interests. Second,
he asserts that no two crises are sufficiently similar enough to be confident that current crises
unfold like past ones.70 He contends that even if there should be very similar crises, the outcome
of the past crisis may cause an adversary to behave differently in the present crisis—i.e., behave
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resolutely to recuperate the lost reputation.71 What is striking about Press’s theory is that the
theory explicitly rejects a eclectic position between him and the proponents—state use an
adversary’s past actions as well as its capabilities and interests to assess an adversary’s
credibility.
Although critics tend to overlook them, Press deploys experimental findings in
psychology to supplement his claim.72 Experimental psychologists have found that as the stakes
associated with decisions increase, the less likely people rely on simple heuristics to make a
decision and that such emotions as anxiety and fear cause people to abandon heuristics and
conduct a more thorough information search.73 Assuming these psychological mechanisms will
be substantially enhanced in crises where a state’s survival could be at stake, Press contends that
decisionmakers do not rely on heuristics such as the record of the adversary’s past actions. He
maintains that due to the profound seriousness of the situations, leaders carefully assess a
balance of power and interests at stake by collecting and analyzing a vast amount of information.
Press does supplement his theory with cognitive psychological findings, but his theory
essentially adopts a state-as-unitary assumption because the primary causal mechanism for his
theory is anarchy and implicit rationality. It follows that the current calculus theory predicts that
most policy officials assess an adversary’s credibility and intentions to use force in a similar
manner and that there is no clear pattern that distinguishes some policy officials’ style of
assessing threats from others’.
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Given that this study examines certain periods that include but also go beyond crises,
which will be discussed shortly, one may question whether this dissertation’s cases do not meet
the scope condition of Press’s theory because his theory is how leaders assess credibility in
crises. Applying his theory to non-crises or peacetime is a natural extension of his theory,
however. In his book, Press does not define crises, but crises in his framework seem to start with
verbal or military threats as the literature usually assumes. However, as opposed to costly
signaling literature, he does not attribute any causal power to these threats themselves.74 In other
words, in Press’s framework, these threats seem to merely allow researchers to find a “case” and
nothing more because credibility, the degree to which publicized or suggested intentions through
verbal threats or military movement is perceived as true, is primarily determined by power and
interests. Therefore, given that power and interests do not change between crises and peacetime,
there is no reason to think his theory does not apply to peacetime in which no verbal or military
threats are issued. Furthermore, Press’s claim that the “dangers inherent in anarchy” force policy
officials to focus on power and interests while ignoring past actions should apply to peacetime
because anarchy exists regardless of peacetime or crises. In short, there is no reason Press’s
theory is only applicable to crises.
In testing Press’s theory, one problem arises concerning the relationships between power
and interests. As Press himself admits, his theory cannot generate clear hypotheses (1) when the
state is militarily capable of carrying out threats and achieving its objectives but its interest at
stake is low, and (2) when the state is militarily not capable but its interest at stake is high. When
either of the above conditions is met, the theory is unfalsifiable. Thus, Press suggests that for a
given level of interest (or a balance of power), researchers investigate the effect of a change in
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the balance of power (or the interest at stake) on credibility. 75 In fact, contrary to what he
repeatedly contends throughout his book, what his book tests is only the capabilities element of
his theory because interests are constant in all his cases, and he fails to show that interest played
an important role in the decisionmakers’ beliefs.76 Therefore, unless a supplementary theory is
invented that explains under what condition the effect of strong capabilities prevails over that of
a low interest and the effect of a high interest prevails over that of weak capabilities, only each
element of his theory can be tested.
For this reason, in this study, I test Press’s prediction about capabilities alone. Therefore,
observable implications that will be tested are the following:
•

The more an adversary is militarily capable (or incapable) of carrying out a military
campaign to achieve its objective, the more policy officials will perceive it as willing (or
reluctant) to use force.

•

Policy officials do not learn from the adversary’s past actions about its resolve and
intentions to use force in the future.

•

Each policy official assesses the adversary’s intentions in a manner described by the
above two observable implications, and there is no clear pattern that distinguishes
experts’ manner of assessing enemy intentions from non-experts’.

Second, the past actions theory rests on claims made by various scholars about the effect
of a state’s past actions in crises on others’ perceptions of the state’s current or future intentions
to use force. A standard argument about the effect of past actions holds that if a state stood firm
(or backed down) in a military crisis, an observer will increase (or decrease) her estimate of the
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state’s willingness to use force in the future. This is because past actions reveal something about
the actor’s persistent characteristics. In particular, past actions in military crises reveal how much
cost and risk the state is ready to absorb to protect or advance its interests.77
Although it has been long argued that reputation is in the eye of the beholder,78 most
scholarships on reputation use a state-as-unitary assumption and ground their theories on a
rationalist assumption. Thus, the past actions theory posits that most policy officials think in the
way predicted by the theory and does not predict any systematic pattern of how each policy
official’s perceptions differ from others.
The foregoing discussion yields the following observable implications:
•

States that have backed down in the past will be more likely to be considered cautious,
whereas countries that stood firm will be more likely to be considered resolute.

•

There is no clear pattern that distinguishes experts’ manner of assessing enemy intentions
from non-experts’ when each group infers an adversary’s current or future intentions
from its past actions.

Methodology
Utilizing primary documents and rich secondary works, this dissertation conducts the following
three case studies on US policy officials’ estimates of adversaries: Soviet intentions between the
beginning of the Cold War and the outbreak of the Korean War (1945-1950), Chinese intentions
from the outbreak of the Korean War to the Dien Bien Phu crisis (1950-1954), and Chinese
intentions during the first half of the 1960s. There are two dependent variables for this study:
experts’ and non-experts’ assessments of enemy intentions. And there are three independent
variables: the balance of power, adversaries’ past actions, and a match or mismatch between past
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actions and statements on strategy. Below, I explain first how I conduct case studies in this
dissertation. Then, I discuss how I assess the above variables, which will be followed by a
discussion of case selection.
This dissertation executes case studies primarily through process tracing. Examining
primary and secondary sources extensively, I describe and trace the trajectories of the
independent, intervening, and dependent variables in the cases to see if the causal mechanism
stipulated by each theory was operational.79
In collecting and analyzing evidence, I perform strategically focused archival research.
Archival research allows political scientists to present stronger case study evidence than
exclusively relying on historians’ works. However, political scientists should not go through a
box after box at an archive as extensively as historians do because our purpose is to create and
test theories, which is different from theirs. Thus, I take the following three steps in conducting
archival research for this dissertation.80
First, I go over authoritative historians’ works on the cases I examine to understand their
interpretations of the variables of the theories tested in this dissertation. This allows me to avoid
prematurely concluding from isolated primary sources in a way that contradicts interpretations
by historians, who most likely know the cases better. Second, I meticulously track down the
sources that historians used to support their interpretations to get first-hand observations of the
variables recorded in the sources. In this way, I could present more tailor-made evidence for or
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against the theories than solely relying on historians’ interpretations. Finally, if these two steps
make me think historians have not paid enough attention to the variables of the theories in
question, I expand my archival research with a hint from historians’ works about where to look
further. In doing so, I carefully consider the possibility that historians did not pay attention to the
variables because they judged the variables as not significant. Only when I could make a case
that historians overlooked the importance of the variables, I present a new interpretation based
on further research. In doing so, I carefully situate my interpretations in historians’ works and
explain how and why my interpretations differ from theirs.
In collecting and analyzing documentary evidence, I will prioritize private and
declassified records instead of public ones because public documents may not represent policy
officials’ true beliefs. When policy officials make speeches in public, there are more audiences
such as the leaders of their adversaries and their citizens than on private occasions where their
audiences are mostly their coworkers. As a result, policy officials may want to exaggerate or
hide their true beliefs for internal or external purposes. Therefore, I will use public records only
when there is consistency between private and public ones because the consistency suggests
policy officials express true beliefs on public occasions. The same rule applies to the use of
recollection recorded in documents like memoirs and oral histories because the passage of time
may distort policy officials’ memories through such bias as a hindsight bias.81 Furthermore, in
describing private remarks, I will try to provide policy officials’ beliefs on multiple occasions
rather than on a single occasion to make sure it is not an isolated example.
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The dependent variable of this study is policy officials’ assessments of their enemies’
intentions to use force against their country’s interests. In particular, I go after assessments or
estimates (I use these terms interchangeably) that contain policy officials’ explanations for how
they reached their evaluations of enemy intentions.82 The following is an example of
explanations and evaluations: “it is unlikely for the Soviet Union to initiate war in the coming
year (evaluation of enemy intentions) because the Soviets have been cautious in using military
forces in the past (explanation about how policy officials reached the evaluation).” This type of
evidence that contains both evaluations and explanations is the strongest and primary form of
evidence for this study.
The above type of evidence will be supplemented by examining policy officials’
evaluations of enemy intentions before and after the change of an independent variable. Even if I
can only find evidence that contains evaluations but not explanations, synchronous change
between an independent variable and dependent variable suggests that either variable affected the
other, or a third variable affected the two. Careful process tracing can identify such change and
determine whether the third variable caused the change with the other two, and, if not, which
variable affected which.
A semi-controlled analysis will be also utilized if situations permit. Although case studies
are not good at controlling for confounding variables,83 researchers can still reach relatively
reliable conclusions about the validity of the theory in question by carefully analyzing and
disproving rival theories and other possible explanations. For example, even if one cannot find
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assessments that explain why policy officials reached their evaluation, he or she can make a
plausible conclusion about what caused policy officials’ assessments if only one hypothesis fits
into the outcome.84 The method of difference is particularly useful for this purpose.85 Therefore,
when possible, I will make a comparison between situations where all or most independent
variables (e.g., power and interests) are the same except for one independent variable and the
dependent variable to make causal inferences. Although this method is not always feasible, if it
is, it can shed light on policy officials’ assessments not explicitly recorded in documents. In
short, combining the above three forms of evidence, I will test the observable implications of my
theory and its rival theories.
Now, let me discuss how I identify non-experts and experts for this study. This study
examines assessments made by two different groups of policy officials: experts and non-experts.
As noted above, experts are policy officials who are knowledgeable about enemies, composed of
(1) intelligence analysts and (2) diplomats and policymakers outside an intelligence community.
On the other hand, non-experts are the rest of policy officials in a government. Here, intelligence
analysts can be easily identified due to their formal status. However, there is no easy way to
identify non-intelligence-analyst experts because, as noted above, no formal status guarantees the
amount of expertise due to political appointments and bureaucracy’s preference for generalists.
I identify experts outside an intelligence community by looking for those who have a
reputation as experts among their peers. This dissertation is to present a new theory. Given that
testing theory takes a lot of time and effort, this dissertation’s case studies are a plausibility
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probe for the new theory to encourage further tests. For this goal, the most renowned experts in a
government are a good starting point because the hypothesized causal mechanism will be most
clearly manifested.86 If my empirical analysis is convincing, future researchers can test the
theory in a more nuanced way.
Now, I turn to the way I assess the independent variables in conducting case studies. The
first independent variable is a balance of power. In order to identify a balance of power for each
chapter, I use the National Material Capabilities dataset to describe the material balance of power
between the United States and its enemies. This will be followed by describing how US policy
officials perceived the material balance of power. I also examine what outcomes US policy
officials expected from hostilities between the United States and its enemies, how they expected
the hostilities to unfold, and at what costs they expected to achieve the outcomes.
The next issue is how I assess states’ past actions. My theory and the past actions theory
predict that policy officials learn from enemy past actions (independent variable) about enemy
resolve (intervening variable), from which they infer enemy intentions (dependent variable). To
test this proposition, I must determine from what past actions policy officials learn what degree
of (ir)resoluteness to do what. The important thing here is to show how policy officials determine
the transferability of learning or of reputation from past cases to present or future cases. In this
respect, the literature agrees that the more similar past crises and current or future crises, the
more policy officials apply their lessons from the former to the latter.87 In other words, to
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conduct effective tests for this dissertation, it should be determined how similar past and current
or future crises need to be when policy officials transfer lessons from one to the other.
Given that the similarity between the past cases and future can be measured in many
dimensions,88 taking into account the similarity is especially challenging for case studies because
of its limited degree of control for variables. Nevertheless, case studies can still get some
leverage over the transferability of reputation. I argue that policy officials look at cases in the
following three dimensions to determine whether the past can be a guide for the future.
First, policy officials look at whether an opponent is a challenger or defender of the status
quo and look for past relevant cases according to the identified role. For example, if the opponent
is a challenger, the state looks at past cases in which the opponent was involved as a challenger.
This is because challenging a status quo through compellence is harder than defending it through
deterrence due to a variety of reasons such as a stronger motive needed for the former.89
Second (and third), policy officials determine whether the opponent is stronger or weaker
than their state and over what interests they have disputes with the opponent and look for similar
cases in the past. I focus on these two dimensions (power and interests) because arguably they
have been tested most extensively by the studies of the signaling effect of past actions. To be
sure, whether the opponent’s country is still governed by the same leaders as in the past cases has
recently emerged as an important dimension for reputation transferability,90 but, as will be noted
later, the case selection for my cast studies is designed to control for this variable.
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To consider how the above two dimensions affect the transferability of reputation, an
inference method proposed by Snyder and Diesing is useful. They argue:
A state that yielded on one issue would then be expected to yield again when confronted
with a similar level of risk on issues at the same level or lower in its interest hierarchy.
But no reliable inferences could be drawn about its probable resolve on higher valued
interests. Conversely, a firm stand on a particular issue would imply firmness on other
interests at the same level or higher in the hierarchy, but not necessarily for lesser
interests.91

The above inference method allows policy officials to learn from one case as much as they
could. I further develop the above inference by introducing the capabilities dimension into the
equation. The result is described by Figures 2.1 and 2.2 for the cases in which the opponent
attacked and yielded to other states respectively. In line with how to assess the balance of power,
I determine the power status of the opponent by using the National Material Capabilities dataset.
To assess the levels of interests at stake, I use Press’s framework. Press identifies three levels of
interests: vital interests, important interests, and concerns. “Vital interests” are “those related to a
state’s survival,” and, more specifically, to prevent “power shifts near borders” and to “ensure no
country consolidates control of major economic regions” in the world. “Important interests”
contain “a broad set of material concerns that are not vital to a country’s survival” or “real
material value that do not significantly threaten the state’s survival.” Finally, “concerns” are
“nonmaterial interests” that reflect countries’ values.92 For simplification, I transform this threelevel classification into a two-level classification by considering vital interests as high interests
and important interests as low interests and ignoring what Press calls concerns. Using these two
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figures in the following empirical chapters, I classify past actions by enemies and then deduce
case-specific predictions.
Attacked a weaker power in the past

over a low
interest

(2) resolute
• expected to attack a weaker power over both a low
interest and high interest
• not sure if the enemy will attack a stronger power
over a low interest
• may attack a stonger power over a high interest

(1) least resolute
• expected to attack a weaker power over a high
interest
• not sure if the enemy will attack a weaker power
over a high over a low interest
interest
• not sure if the enemy will attack a stronger power
over a high interest
• not sure if the enemy will attack a stonger power
over a low interest

Attacked a stronger power in the past
(3) most resolute
• expected to attack a stronger power over both a
low and high interest
• expected to attack a weaker power over a low
interest
• expected to attack a weaker power over a high
interest

(2) resolute
• expected to attack a stronger power over a high
interest
• not sure if the enemy will attack a stronger power
over a low interest
• expected to attack a weaker power over a high
interst
• may attack a weaker power over a low interest

Figure 2.1: Policy Officials' Inferences Based on an Enemy’s Use of Force against Other States in the Past

Yielded to a weaker power in the past

over a low
interest

(2) resolute
• expected to yield to a weaker power over a low
interest
• may not yield to a weaker power over a high
interest
• expected to yield to a stronger power over a low
interest
• not sure if the enemy will yield to a stronger power
over a high interest

(1) least resolute
• expected to yield to a weaker power over both a
low and high interest
• expected to yield to a stronger power over a high
over a high interest
interest
• expected to yield to a stronger power over a low
interest

Yielded to a stronger power in the past
(3) Most resolute
• expected to yield to a stronger power over a low
interest
• may not yield to a stonger power over a high
interest
• may not yield to a weaker power over a low
interest
• may not yield to a weaker power over a high
interest
(2) resolute
• expected to yield to a stronger power over both a
low and high interest
• may not yield to a weaker power over a high
interest
• not sure if the enemy will yield to a weaker power
over a low interest

Figure 1.2: Policy Officials' Inferences Based on an Enemy’s Yielding to Other States in the Past
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Statements on strategy will be assessed by examining an adversary’s political and
military leaders’ statements and writings on how to pursue national interests in international
politics and when to resort to war. For this goal, I consult authoritative works on Soviet and
Chinese strategic thoughts. The focus here is whether those statements advised adventurous or
cautious use of force. Having assessed these statements according to the criteria, I will then
check their statements against their past actions to see whether there is a match or a mismatch
between the statements and the actions.
Having discussed how I assess the independent and dependent variables in the case
studies, I will end this chapter by explaining this dissertation’s case selection. In this study, US
assessments of the intentions of the Soviet Union and China in three periods will be examined:
Soviet intentions between the beginning of the Cold War and the outbreak of the Korean War
(1945-1950), Chinese intentions between the outbreak of the Korean War and the end of the
Dien Bien Phu crisis (1950-1954), and Chinese intentions during the Kennedy/Johnson
administration (1961-1965).
I chose the United States as a country whose policy officials assess enemy intentions for
four reasons. First, since the United States has been the most powerful country in the
international system at least since 1945 and has shaped world politics significantly since then,
understanding how US officials assess enemy intentions would be important for the foreseeable
future.
Second, these two US adversaries were led by the same leadership, allowing me to
control for the important variable for reputations to travel. Some recent reputation scholarship
argues that reputations adhere to leaders as well as states. Since the Soviet Union and China were
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led by the same leaders (Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong) in the periods examined by this
dissertation, this study’s case selection can control for this important variable.
Third, these cases have important within-case variations of the independent variables, so
that I can test my theory along with rival theories effectively. The most important within-case
variation is that the USSR had never initiated a war against a superior power, whereas China had
done so against the United States in the Korean War. Along with the USSR’s multiple backing
down in the postwar period in the face of US determination, the above variation allows me to test
the theory effectively. Furthermore, since China backed down twice at the Taiwan Strait after the
Korean War, this allows me to examine how China’s reputation had been updated in the first half
of the 1960s. China also initiated a war against India, a weaker power, in 1962, so this is a good
opportunity to test the observable implication that non-experts have a lower threshold for
interpreting enemy actions as resolute than experts.
Fourth, testing the observable implications of my theory needs rich documentary
evidence that recorded various policy officials’ beliefs and reasoning behind them. Unlike
academic papers and books, national security documents written by busy policy officials rarely
explain why they reached a particular evaluation of enemy intentions.93 This requires me to
explore documentary evidence of the most reliable quality extensively to find rare occasions in
which policy officials take efforts to explain their assessments. Practically speaking, this
requirement, along with one researcher’s language limitation, forces me to exclude nondemocratic countries because their archives are less accessible than democratic countries.
Furthermore, the above requirement forces me to exclude non-English and non-Japanese (present
author’s mother tongue) speaking countries from cases. Given this requirement along with the
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first reason for the case selection (the United States as the most important country in world
politics), I chose the United States over the United Kingdom (or other English-speaking
democratic countries in the British Commonwealth) or Japan.
One may question the fact that each of my cases covers a period that includes but goes
beyond crises by arguing that reputation and past actions have been conventionally studied in a
crisis context. This, however, is based on a mistaken understanding of the studies of reputation
and past actions. Statistical studies have long studied reputation not only in immediate deterrence
but general deterrence encounters.94 Furthermore, to overcome methodological problems
including a selection bias, early case study researchers also call for a longer perspective that goes
beyond crises to study reputation and deterrence.95
As James Fearon points out, a crisis happens, or general deterrence breaks, partly because
challengers underestimated defenders’ intentions to resist, which is caused by various factors
including the estimated resolve of defenders.96 From this perspective, case studies strictly
focusing on immediate deterrence encounters may have failed to find evidence for reputation
because challengers have already taken into account defenders’ reputations when the former
decided to initiate a crisis.97 Furthermore, crises recorded in various IR datasets from which
qualitative case studies choose cases may be already biased because there may be missing cases
in a dataset in which states issued threats, but the recipients did not respond to them (i.e., no
crises or militarized interstate disputes). Here, it is not difficult to imagine that some of those

94

Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War; Huth, Bennett, and Gelpi, “System Uncertainty, Risk
Propensity, and International Conflict among the Great Powers”; Huth, Gelpi, and Bennett, “The Escalation of Great
Power Militarized Disputes”; Grieco, “Repetitive Military Challenges and Recurrent International Conflicts, 1918–
1994”; Weisiger and Yarhi-Milo, “Revisiting Reputation”; Lupton, “Reexamining Reputation for Resolve.”
95
Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence; Lieberman, “The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate.”
96
Fearon, “Signaling Versus the Balance of Power and Interests”; James Fearon, “Selection Effects and
Deterrence,” International Interactions 28, no. 1 (January 1, 2002): 5–29.
97
Weisiger and Yarhi-Milo, “Revisiting Reputation,” 478; Allan Dafoe, Jonathan Renshon, and Paul Huth,
“Reputation and Status as Motives for War,” Annual Review of Political Science 17, no. 1 (2014): 371–93, at 385.

54

missing cases did not develop into crises due to challengers’ reputations. In short, given the
above points along with my argument about Press’s theory’s applicability to non-crisis
situations, defining cases by going beyond crises is indeed a natural and necessary move for
further development of reputation studies
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Chapter 3: The US Assessments of Soviet Intentions, 1945-1950

This chapter shows that between 1945 and 1950, non-experts and experts in the US government
assessed Soviet intentions differently due to their varying levels of enemy-specific knowledge.
Although both groups largely judged the Soviet Union as not intending to use force, they
employed different indicators to reach the conclusion. Throughout the period, massive Soviet
ground forces in being were balanced by US nuclear superiority and mobilizable conventional
war potential. In addition, the Soviet Union had never attacked a superior power over a high
interest in the past, and its strategic texts had urged the Soviets to carefully assess the balance of
power and exercise caution in the face of a superior power’s resistance.
The above information was available to both groups, but each group used a different set
of information in assessing Soviet intentions. Non-experts almost exclusively relied on the US
atomic superiority and war potentials to infer Soviet reluctance to use force for expansion. On
the other hand, experts also took into account the balance of power, but they heavily relied on
Soviet past actions and strategic texts whose implications matched those of past actions to infer
Soviet reluctance to use force. Furthermore, while non-experts sometimes assessed Soviet
intentions as if they had been experts, they did so by borrowing experts’ analyses, especially
from their close associates. In doing so, they use these indicators less often, less consistently, and
less confidently than experts.
The next section assesses the independent variables of each theory in this case and then
deduces each theory’s predictions. Then, the section is followed by an empirical analysis of US
officials’ assessments of Soviet intentions to use force, the dependent variable of this study. This
section is organized according to my theory’s predictions by dividing it into subsections
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describing non-experts’ views and experts’ views respectively. Furthermore, since the Soviet
atomic explosion in late August 1949 was the most significant event indicating the shifting
balance of power in this period, these subsections are also divided into periods before and after
the Soviet atomic test. Then, the influence of experts’ analyses on non-experts is investigated.
The following section discusses how rival theories performed against these empirical analyses.
The final section summarizes the findings.

Balance of Power, Past Actions, and Strategic Texts
During the period in question, the US-USSR balance of power in being was in substantial favor
of the Soviet Union, but once the two camps had mobilized, the balance of power would be in
favor of the United States. The nuclear balance of power was in considerable favor of the United
States. Soviet record of past actions indicated that the USSR had never initiated a war against a
superior power whatever level of interests was at stake. Soviet strategic texts urged caution in
challenging a stronger power, even calling for a retreat to avoid a showdown in a disadvantaged
situation. This matched the implications of the record of Soviet past actions.
Between 1945 and 1950, the balance of power between the two superpowers and their
allies (the United Kingdom throughout the period and China after 1949) gradually shifted in the
Soviet camp’s favor. As table 3.1 shows, the military balance between the West and the East,
measured by military expenditures and personnel, shifted from 6.9 to 1 to 0.6 to 1 between 1945
and 1950.1 The substantial advantage of the West in 1945 was primarily due to massive US
military expenditures during World War II, which dwindled in the following year and were even
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overspent by the Soviet Union after 1948. Another factor for the shift of the balance was the
addition of the massive manpower in China after 1949 to the eastern camp.2
The West-East economic balance of power, measured by iron and steel production and
energy consumption, shifted from 8.2 to 1 to 4.3 to 1 between 1945 and 1950.3 Here, the initial
advantage to the West was due to US’s massive economic power, but as the 1940s drew to a
close, the USSR had closed the gap by almost doubling its iron and steel production and energy
consumption.
Finally, the overall balance of power, measured by the Composite Index of National
Capabilities (CINC)—a function of military expenditures, military personnel, iron and steel
production, primary energy consumption, total populations, and urban populations—shifted from
4 to 1 to 1.2 to 1 between 1945 and 1950. The substantial shift from 1948 to 1949 happened due
to the addition of China’s manpower, but even before this shift, the Soviet Union alone was
catching up with the western camp. The milder shift in the East’s favor between 1949 and 1950
was due to the increase in US military expenditures and iron and steel production. In short,
between 1945 and 1950, the Soviet camp had an advantage in manpower (military personnel,
total population, and urban population), whereas the US camp had an economic and
technological advantage (iron and steel production and primary energy consumption).
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Table 3.1: The World Balance of Power, 1945-19504

Ratio of the West's Military Power to the
East's Military Power
Ratio of the West's Economic Power to the
East's Economic Power
Ratio of the West's Overall Power to the
East's Overall Power

1945

1946

1947

1948

1949

1950

6.9

4.6

1.5

1

0.7

0.6

8.2

6.3

7

6.1

4.3

4.3

4

3.1

2.8

2.3

1.3

1.2

The US officials’ assessments of the West-East balance of power were roughly in line
with the material balance of power. According to historians Phillip Karber and Jerald Combs, the
United States estimated Soviet ground forces as having 175 divisions with 2.5 million men
throughout the period. Furthermore, US intelligence analysts estimated that these figures could
be brought up to 300 divisions with 8 million men 30 days after mobilization. Given the
prolonged length of time it had taken for the United States to mobilize its war potential at the
beginning of World War II and its abortive attempt to establish something similar to the Soviet
mobilization system through universal military training after the war, this Soviet mobilization
capability was formidable to the United States. With this capability, the Soviet Union was
estimated to be able to overrun Europe to the Pyrenees within two months and have enough
divisions left over to conquer Italy, Scandinavia, the Balkans, and much of the rest of Eurasia
eventually.5
In terms of the nuclear balance of power, the United States was much superior to the
Soviet Union throughout the period because of the US nuclear monopoly, which would be only
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broken in the fall of 1949. However, one should not exaggerate its significance because this was
still an early period of the nuclear age.
The most important point about the nuclear balance during this period was that US
officials thought that the United States could not defeat the Soviet Union with an air atomic
offensive alone. The US stockpile of atomic bombs and delivery capability in the few years after
World War II were meager. According to David Alan Rosenberg’s masterly study, the US
atomic weapons stockpile between June 1945 and June 1950 was: 2 in 1945, 9 in 1946, 13 in
1947, 50 in 1948, less than 228 (probably 133) in 1949, and at least 292 in 1950. Thus, as
Rosenberg writes, “during the critical year” from June 1946 through June 1947 “when the United
States was entering the Cold War with the Soviet Union, and the Truman Administration was
announcing such major foreign policy initiatives as the Truman Doctrine . . . and the Marshall
Plan,” the United States was producing less than one atomic bomb every two months.6 The US
delivery capability was equally limited. Through 1948, there were only about 30 nuclear-capable
B-29s in the Strategic Air Command, all in the 509th Bomb Group based in Roswell, New
Mexico.7
Furthermore, two comprehensive studies by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) on the effect
of nuclear bombing on the Soviet Union and US ability to deliver the bombs to their assigned
targets respectively suggested that an atomic blitz could not destroy Soviet war-making
capability. In particular, the Harmon report of May 1949 concluded that even if all 133 bombs
detonated precisely on their aim points, this would not in itself “bring about capitulation, destroy
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the roots of Communism, or critically weaken the power of Soviet leadership to dominate the
people.” On the contrary, the report concluded that “for the majority of the Soviet people, atomic
bombing would validate Soviet propaganda against foreign powers, stimulate resentment against
the United States, unify the people, and increase their will to fight.”8 Even before this
comprehensive study, the claim that the atomic bomb would not be effective in defeating the
Soviet Union was made public by Walter Lippman in his column as early as 1946.9
Another important point about the nuclear balance is that with all nuclear weapons
allocated for strategic targets such as the Russian petroleum industry, tactical use against troop
concentration was out of the question. The implication is that the US atomic offensive could not
be used to prevent the Soviet juggernaut from overrunning most of Europe and Eurasia in the
early phase of the war.10 Marc Trachtenberg describes how the war was expected to unfold in its
early phase:
In the first few weeks of the war, the United States would be swept off the continent of
Europe, at least up to the Pyrenees. America would then begin to mobilize its resources
and mount a substantial bombing campaign with atomic bombs and aircraft produced
after the outbreak of the war. The Soviets, who now had the great resources of Western
Europe to draw on, would at the same time be conducting their own air offensive against
the United States and its bases and allies overseas. This would be a war of endurance, and
8
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the intensity with which this air war was conducted would be an important determinant of
its outcome.

Regarding the estimated length of the war, one JCS guidance assumed at least five years.11
Furthermore, during this war of attrition, the United States would have to bomb its allies to
prevent the Soviets from integrating the European economy into their war-making machine.
Therefore, as Trachtenberg writes, “The American victory, in other words, would be Pyrrhic.”12
In short, US strategy between 1945 and 1950 rested heavily on US deterrence by
punishment through an atomic offensive. Deterrence by denial was also operational but that was
only through a threat of a lengthy and costly war in which the United States would also suffer
tremendously. Furthermore, in the early phase of the war, most of Europe would be conquered in
a short period. This may look like more than a tempting prize to those who would think a limited
war was possible. Given that there are plenty of examples in which weaker powers attacked
stronger powers partly due to the expectation that the subsequent war would be limited, the US
deterrent was at least not robust from the balance of power perspective. In Secretary of State
George Marshall’s words, the United States was “playing with fire while we have nothing with
which to put it out.”13
Now, unlike the other chapters, it is not easy to deduce theoretical predictions from this
multi-faceted balance of power because the balance of power theory has various versions, each
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of which focuses on varying components of power.14 Furthermore, my theory is not specifically
designed for yielding fine-grained balance-of-power-theory predictions. Thus, it can only predict
that non-experts would estimate Soviet intentions primarily based on the balance of power,
whereas experts would regard the balance of power seriously but combined it with the
assessments of Soviet risk/cost propensity inferred from past actions and strategic statements. On
the other hand, the current calculus theory predicts that US officials, regardless of the distinction
between non-experts and experts, would consider the balance of power as the primary factor that
shaped their assessments of Soviet intentions.
Having assessed the balance of power, let me turn to Soviet past actions. The record of
Soviet past actions indicates that the Soviet Union had been cautious in attacking a stronger
power. Since the establishment of the Soviet regime, it had only attacked weaker powers, and
when a chance of war with a superior power arose, the Soviet Union had backed down or
avoided escalating conflict. Between 1917 and 1945, the Soviet Union was involved in wars with
Finland (border conflict in 1919 and the Winter War of 1939-1940), Poland (the Polish Russian
War of 1919-1921 and the Soviet invasion of Poland of 1939), and Japan (the Battles of Kalkhin
Gol in 1939 and Soviet invasion of Japan in 1945). Yet, all these foes were weaker, measured by
CINC, than the Soviet Union. Furthermore, these wars were over Soviet high interests, that is, to
prevent power shifts near borders. According to my classification scheme, these past uses of
force against weaker powers over high interests suggest that (1) policy officials would only
expect the Soviet Union to attack a weaker power over high interests but not low interests, and
14
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(2) that they would not expect the USSR to attack a stronger power over either low or high
interests.
In the postwar era, the Soviet Union repeatedly backed down in the face of US
determination, a stronger power, in crises such as the Azerbaijan crisis, the Turkish Straits crisis,
and the Berlin blockade crisis. I classify Soviet interests at stake in the Azerbaijan and Turkish
Straits crises as low and those in the Berlin blockade crisis as high. According to my
classification scheme, these past actions suggest, like USSR’s past actions before 1945, that US
policy officials would not expect the USSR to attack a stronger power like the United States over
either low or high interests.
Based on the above assessment, my theory predicts that experts would infer Soviet
intentions from its past actions as cautious in attacking a superior power regardless of the level of
interests at stake, whereas non-experts would not use Soviet past actions as important
information. Furthermore, the theory predicts that when non-experts used Soviet past actions,
they should have been already exposed to and influenced by experts’ analyses, and that nonexperts would use past actions less often, less consistently, and less confidently than experts. The
current calculus theory predicts that US officials across the board would not use Soviet past
actions to infer its resolve and intentions. On the other hand, the past actions theory predicts that
US officials, regardless of their differing levels of expertise, would use past actions to infer
Soviet caution in terms of the use of force.
Having evaluated the balance of power and Soviet past actions, I will now turn to Soviet
strategic statements. The amount of Soviet leadership’s original texts on strategy is enormous.
Thus, instead of analyzing original texts, I relied on the rich literature on the subject to find the
majority views on Soviet strategy. There is numerous work that identified Soviet geopolitical
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(but mostly military) strategy based both on Soviet texts and past actions. It should be noted,
however, that since my theory argues that the alignment between texts on strategy and past
actions allows the former to function as credible signals, identification of strategy should be
exclusively based on texts. Therefore, I carefully identified scholarly work that only discussed
and interpreted Soviet texts on strategy.
Following Nathan Leites’s authoritative work on Soviet operational codes, I divide Soviet
strategic texts and statements into five important themes relevant for this study: (1) pushing to
the limit, (2) avoiding adventures, (3) knowing when to stop, (4) retreating before superior force,
and (5) preferring political means over military means for expansion. First, Soviet strategic texts
emphasized power maximization to achieve their goals. As Leites writes, “the salvation of
mankind by communism presupposes the search for maximum power by the Party at any
moment before the complete realization of communism.” Since Bolsheviks believed that their
very life remained “acutely threatened as long as major enemies exist,” Leites writes, “Their
utter defeat is a sheer necessity of survival.” Therefore, he argues that the Politburo “feels to be
obliged to archive” the increment of power at any given moment.15
Second, although the goal of Communism was a world revolution through maximizing its
power, the Soviet leadership urged Bolsheviks to “avoid adventures” once obstacles to their
advance arose. As Leites observes, “Bolshevik doctrine emphatically opposes the disposition to
engage oneself in forward operations with an uncertain chance of success and a big risk of severe
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loss or annihilation in case of failure.” According to the doctrine, “The Party must neither
gamble nor complacently overestimate its strength, nor cease to calculate.” Leites further notes,
“It must exercise ‘caution’ and never be ‘adventurist’ in its attempts to advance: it must never
risk already conquered major positions, or even existence, for the sake of uncertain future gains.”
Therefore, he concludes, “It must undertake only those offensive operations for which its
resources are fully adequate.”16
Third, in pursuing their goals, the Soviet doctrine required its practitioners to know when
to stop by being flexible. Leites writes, “As Bolsheviks regard recurrent setbacks as inevitable,
and stress the slow maturation of major historical changes, they do not expect quick successes;
they are prepared both for success and failure as the solution to protracted deadlock.” Thus,
Leites argues, “the Party must temporarily discontinue an offensive as soon as the enemy
position it attacks has become a ‘fact’ which cannot, for the time being, be modified.”17 A
similar point was made by other observers.18
Fourth, the Bolshevik doctrine instructed the Soviets to retreat before superior force.
According to Leites, “Retreat is required when standing fast threatens annihilation in view of the
enemy’s superior force.” He elaborates, “The Party’s insight into the nature of history prepares it
for retreats; Bolsheviks know that even if the line of the Party is correct, recurrent setbacks are to
be expected: history moves in ebbs and flows.” However, the doctrine predicted, “As long as the
Party and its state power are preserved (even in a reduced area and to a reduced degree) the
chances of ultimate victory are good” because “During the ‘respite’ procured by retreat, it will
have accumulated forces,” and “the Party will in time launch a successful counteroffensive.”
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Therefore, Leites concludes, “Retreating is . . . for Bolshevik leaders a conduct which is as
legitimate—that is, as much required in certain conditions—as advancing.”19
Raymond Garthoff agrees with Leites’ analysis. Analyzing Soviet ideological texts and
statements, he observes, “The Soviet view is that ‘the calculation of the relation of forces’ in any
given situation is the Marxian mode of determining policy, and carries an ethical compulsion to
act accordingly.” Garthoff continues, “Advance, retreat, [and] defense are all decided in terms of
relative capabilities . . . and flexibility is permissible, indeed required.” In this light, Garthoff
argues, “ ‘active’ or ‘presently effective’ hostility . . . as the temporarily unalterable residue of
active opposition” would require the Soviets to have “a temporary cessation of the advance.”
Based on these findings, Garthoff fully agrees with the containment policy. He writes, “the basic
conception of stopping the otherwise continuing Soviet advance by ‘effective hostility’ . . . does
demonstrate a correct appreciation of Soviet ideas of advance, ‘balanced forces,’ and retreat.”20
Fifth, the Soviet doctrine preferred political means over military means for expansion.
According to Garthoff’s survey of Soviet strategic and military writings, “War is not the goal of
Soviet strategy; the Soviets prefer to gain their objectives by pacific means—by forcing
appeasement on the enemy.” He elaborates: “This consideration holds a significant place in
Soviet strategy, which judges the long-term trends and possibilities in determining what risks are
worth taking in the short run.” He concludes that “the Soviet army is generally offensively
employed only in situations in which other methods of lesser risk are not considered feasible, but
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in which a considerable potential for advance is calculated to exist.”21 A similar point was made
by other observers.22
Based on the above discussion, I now deduce my theory’s predictions. Since the
assessment of Soviet past actions and that of Soviet strategic texts are aligned, my theory
predicts that experts would use Soviet strategic texts to reinforce the assessments made from
Soviet past actions. On the other hand, the theory predicts that non-experts would not use Soviet
strategic texts and when they did, they would do so because they had been influenced by experts.
Having assessed the independent variables, let me identify experts outside the
intelligence community for this chapter. Searching through primary sources and secondary
sources, I found two recognized Soviet experts whose assessments are relatively well recorded:
George Kennan and Charles Bohlen. Their reputation as Soviet experts among their peers are
well known. They were among the few that finished the truncated Soviet experts training
program at the State Department during the interwar period.23 After his famous Long Telegram,
Kennan’s reputation as an authority on Soviet affairs was well known. For example, when Army
Chief of Staff Dwight Eisenhower heard of Kennan’s visit to Air War College, he said to his
subordinate: “How fortunate you are. Mr. Kennan is one of the most outstanding men in the State
Department, and the pre-eminent authority upon his subject.”24
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Along with Kennan, Bohlen finished the Soviet experts training program at the State
Department in the interwar period. Due to his expertise, US Ambassador to the Soviet Union W.
Averell Harriman specifically asked for Bohlen as counselor of the embassy. This request was
denied, and Harriman then insisted on Kennan and eventually got him. Bohlen also worked as an
interpreter and advisor for two presidents, FDR and Truman, and three secretaries of state, James
Byrnes, George Marshall, and Dean Acheson before and during this case. Although his
knowledge about the Soviet Union may be considered less compared to Kennan, on various
occasions one could find his reputation as a Soviet expert in primary documents. For example,
Dean Acheson and Paul Nitze had never failed to ask for his opinions when they were
formulating US strategy toward the Soviet Union.25 Henry Koch of the Policy Planning Staff
called Bohlen’s expertise “singular knowledge of Russia and the Kremlin.”26
In short, experts in this chapter consist of intelligence analysts on the one hand and
Kennan and Bohlen on the other. The rest of policy officials is considered non-experts.
Having assessed the independent variables of each theory in the case and deduced their
predictions, the next section shows US officials’ assessments of Soviet intentions.

Empirical Analysis
With the same information available to assess Soviet intentions, non-experts and experts used
information differently. Non-experts almost exclusively relied on the US atomic superiority and
war potential to infer Soviet reluctance to use force for expansion. In inferring Soviet intentions,
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on the other hand, experts surely took into account the balance of power, but they heavily relied
on Soviet past actions and strategic texts whose implications matched those of past actions.
Furthermore, while non-experts sometimes assessed Soviet intentions as experts did, they did so
by borrowing experts’ analyses, especially from their close associates. In doing so, they use these
indicators less often, less consistently, and less confidently than experts.

Non-Experts’ Views: Before the First Soviet Nuclear Test
As a foreign policy novice, President Harry Truman’s view on international relations was simple
and focused on the balance of power. As Deborah Larson observes, Truman conceived of
international relations as a poker game. From this perspective, the outcome of a dispute is often
determined by the relative power of two nations as measured by territory, population, resources,
and so on—the functional equivalents of the card values in a poker hand.27 Thus, having
described the slow progress of the Potsdam Conference in a letter to his wife, Truman wrote,
Stalin “doesn’t know it but I have an ace in the hole and another one showing—so unless he has
threes or two pair (and I know he has not) we are sitting all right.”28 His July 1946 meeting with
Bernard Baruch also shows that the balance of power were fundamental to Truman’s
understanding of international relations. In this meeting, Truman told Baruch that “if Harry
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Stimson had been backed up in Manchuria there would have been no war.”29 As Leffler notes, in
other words, Truman was a “realist.”30
The available evidence suggests that the balance of power predominantly affected
Truman when he estimated Soviet intentions. In October 1945, he shared with his subordinates
an episode about Potsdam, in which Churchill drew Stalin’s attention to the Pope’s concern with
Poland. According to Truman, Stalin responded by saying “how many divisions has the Pope
got?” and this ended the discussion.31 Truman used this episode again in his January 1946 letter
to Secretary of State James Byrnes. In it, Truman wrote: “There isn’t a doubt in my mind that
Russia intends an invasion of Turkey and the seizure of the Black Sea Straits to the
Mediterranean. Unless Russia is faced with an iron fist and strong language another war is in the
making. Only one language do they understand—‘How many divisions have you?’ ”32
It was the US atomic superiority that primarily shaped Truman’s views of Soviet
intentions. According to a recollection by Clark Clifford, one of the closest aides to the
President, “With the U.S. holding a nuclear monopoly” in the summer of 1946, Truman felt that
“there was no direct or immediate danger to the nation.”33 He kept this view from that time on.
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Truman expressed his view about the US nuclear superiority to David Lilienthal, Chairman of
the US Atomic Energy Commission, on multiple occasions. Having briefed about atomic tests at
Eniwetok Atoll in May 1948, Truman noted, “If we could just have Stalin and his boys see one
of these things, there wouldn’t be any question about another war.”34 In February 1949, Truman
said, “the atomic bomb was the mainstay and all he had.” He further noted, “the Russians would
have probably taken over Europe a long time ago if it were not for that.”35 In another meeting
with Lilienthal less than a week later, Truman also remarked, “we will never use it [the atomic
bomb] again if we can possibly help it. But I know the Russians would use it on us if they had
it.”36 Therefore, he declared to his advisers in July, “I am of the opinion we’ll never obtain
international control. Since we can’t obtain international control we must be strongest in atomic
weapons.”37 As late as 1952, Truman betrayed his difficulties in internalizing the Soviet atomic
bomb by calling it “phony” in his diary. This suggests that US atomic monopoly was something
special to him.38
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His policies also suggest that the nuclear superiority significantly influenced him in
gauging Soviet intentions. Fully aware of the possibility of war with the Soviet Union during the
Turkish Strait crisis in the fall of 1946, Truman adopted a forceful response to the Soviet
demarche to the Turks.39 In October, when the crisis was receding, Truman told his staff: “he did
not believe that there were over a half dozen” bombs in the American stockpile, but he believed
that “that was enough to win a war.”40 This suggests that it was the atomic monopoly that
allowed him to adopt the tough measure. The fact that he did not show any signs of concern
when he decided to stay in Berlin at the time of the Berlin blockade is also congruent with his
confidence in the US nuclear deterrent.41 The same can be said of his tight budget ceilings for
defense expenditures until the outbreak of the Korean War.42 In short, the available evidence
suggests that Truman almost exclusively relied on the balance of nuclear power to estimate
Soviet intentions.
The balance of power was also a primary factor through which Secretary of State George
Marshall estimated Soviet intentions. Although Marshall was close to the expert George Kennan
and therefore exposed to his assessments partly derived from Soviet past actions and strategic
statements, when Marshall expressed his own opinion, what came to his mind was almost always
the balance of power.
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He thought that the degree to which the United States could pursue an aggressive policy
against the Soviet Union would depend on US military preparedness, suggesting the balance of
power shaped his estimates of Soviet intentions. According to John Foster Dulles, in the spring
of 1947 Marshall felt that “because our military establishment is disintegrating, and because
Congress may soon cut off appropriations for a considerable army in Europe, and the reserves to
back it up, we cannot have a ‘strong policy’ in Europe.”43 In his recollection in November 1950,
Marshall also said that he had to constantly resist pressure to “give the Russians hell” during his
tenure as a secretary of state. This is because “At that time, my facilities for giving them hell . . .
was 1 1/3 divisions over the entire United States.”44 Therefore, he resisted his aides’ pressure for
military intervention in the Greek civil war because “under heavy Soviet pressure” US forces
might have to be “backed up” or withdraw “ignominiously.”45
Marshall was concerned that in response to an overly aggressive policy by the United
States, the Soviet Union may resort to a preventive war because the balance of power in being
was in its favor. According to Truman, in the spring of 1948, Marshall expressed the fear that the
president would “pull the trigger” for war by his action to restore selective service and support
universal military training.46 Likewise, Marshall told Secretary of Defense James Forrestal, who
demanded a military buildup, that “we should not plunge into war preparations which would
bring about the very thing we were taking these steps to prevent.”47 This is because “the greatest
danger lies in the possibility of a miscalculation on the part of the Soviet Government.”
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Therefore, he argued that “in our relations with the Soviet Union the present situation calls for a
policy of patience combined with firmness.”48
However, this does not mean Marshall was fearful of a sudden Soviet attack because he
thought without provocation, the Soviet Union would be deterred by US nuclear superiority and
war potential. Therefore, despite the weakness of US forces in being, Marshall supported
Truman’s budget ceilings on defense expenditures.49 Marshall also seems not as desperate as
Forrestal about the balance of forces in being. For example, he wrote Forrestal that “we are not at
all certain that the Russians are convinced that the military advantage lies so heavily on their
side. They sometimes have a tendency to be caught in their own propaganda which, as you
know, is to the effect that imperialist America is rushing around to take over the world.”50 By
this, he implied that the United States neither have to nor should build up its military forces at
this point because the Soviet Union might be sincerely fearful of US aggression.
Like Truman, the evidence suggests that US atomic superiority was the source of
Marshall’s qualified but relatively relaxed view of Soviet intentions. In October 1948, Marshall
told the Danish Prime Minister that the US willingness to use the atomic bomb “as the principal
deterrent to Soviet military aggression now.”51 About two weeks later, he also expressed a
similar view to the Italian President. Given the “tremendous factor of the atom bomb, the united
American public opinion” and “the favorable political and economic developments already
taking place in Western Europe,” he did not believe that “the Russians would force the
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international situation into war.”52 Elsewhere, Marshall also expressed his confidence in the
atomic bomb to other European leaders.53
His view expressed during his brief retirement from public office (he became Secretary
of Defense in September 1950) also shows that it was the balance of power that affected the way
he viewed Soviet intentions. In August 1949, he was summoned by Congress to hear his opinion
about mutual assistance security programs. In this hearing, he remarked, “You are faced with the
simple fact that one government [the Soviet Union] has the greatest military force in time of
peace in history, and it is in walking distance of all of Europe. You cannot escape from that fact.
What we are trying to do is create a situation where they would hesitate to take that walk.”54 In
short, the available evidence suggests that Marshall almost exclusively relied on the balance of
power to assess Soviet intentions.
Secretary of Defense James Forrestal, a famous hawk and anti-communist, also focused
on the balance of power in estimating Soviet intentions. His view of the balance went back and
forth, but it almost always determined his estimates of Soviet intentions. Earlier, his view of
Soviet intentions was relatively relaxed. In December 1947, he wrote, “There are really four
outstanding military facts in the world at this time.” These facts were: (1) “The predominance of
Russian land power in Europe and Asia,” (2) “The predominance of American sea power,” (3)
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“Our exclusive possession of the atomic bomb,” and (4) “American productive capacity.” Based
on these observations, he concluded, “As long as we can outproduce the world, can control the
sea and can strike inland with the atomic bomb, we can assume certain risks otherwise
unacceptable in an effort to restore world trade, to restore the balance of power—military
power—and to eliminate some of the conditions which breed war.”55
Forrestal later grew more apprehensive of the balance of power in being as US
commitments expanded beyond its available military means. In March 1948, he revealed his
concern before the Senate Armed Services Committee. In his opening statement, he likened the
current international situation to that of 1914 and 1939 and equated the expansive policies of the
Soviet Union with those of Kaiser, Hitler, and Mussolini. He asserted, “This record shows that
despotism, whatever its form, has a remorseless compulsion to aggression,” and “Today another
great and despotic power threatens to extinguish freedom in Europe.” It should be noted here that
even though the record of Soviet past actions differed from that of these countries, Forrestal
believed that they would resort to war in a similar manner.
What mattered to him was the balance of power in being between the United States and
the Soviet Union. He maintained that if US “assets and potentialities” were “promptly developed
into readiness,” this “will turn the scale from a possibility of future war to a rational expectation
of future peace.” His preoccupation with power was a textbook example of worst-case thinking
in international politics. He observed, “no one in this world, outside a small group in the
Kremlin, can say what is the real intentions of the Soviet rulers. We in America are sure only of
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the facts which cannot be overlooked: the threat of communism in western Europe and the
inherent capabilities of Communist force to increase that threat.”56
Forrestal seems to have understood it was folly for the USSR to start war given the US
war potential, but he could not restrain his fear of worst-case scenarios. In March 1948, he wrote,
“It is inconceivable that even the gang who run Russia would be willing to take on war, but one
always has to remember that there seemed to be no reason in 1939 for Hitler to start war, and yet
he did, and he started it with a world practically unprepared.” He continued, “Our effort now is
to try to make the Russians see the folly of continuing an aggression which will lead to war, or if
it is impossible to restore them to sanity, that we at least have a start which will enable us to
prevent our being caught flat-footed as we were in 1941.”57
His April 1948 memorandum for the NSC also took a similar tone. He observed, “The
current belief that the USSR does not plan overt warfare for at least five years is not necessarily
correct and there is increasing doubt in many quarters as to its soundness.” He failed, however,
to identify who the “many quarters” were. In fact, his following contention—circular
reasoning—suggests he grounded his assertion on not evidence but on his fear that situations
may dramatically change: “In any event, circumstances may change, quite possibly with
considerable rapidity, in such a way as to invalidate the ‘five-year’ reasoning [emphasis
added].”58
As 1948 neared a close, Forrestal changed his view of an imminent war, but even here the
reason for the change was his estimate of the balance of power. He wrote in his diaries,
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“Throughout my recent trip in Europe I was increasingly impressed by the fact that the only
balance that we have against the overwhelming manpower of the Russians, and therefore the
chief deterrent to war, is the threat of the immediate retaliation with the atomic bomb.” He
continued, “The central question, of course, is whether or not our bombers can get in to deliver
this attack. A year ago I had substantial misgivings, and while nobody can say anything with
certainty about war, I now believe the Air Force can get in with enough to deliver a powerful
blow at the Russian capacity to make war.”59 In short, although Forrestal had changed his
estimates back and forth, the available evidence shows that he grounded his estimates of Soviet
intentions almost always on his estimates of the balance of power.
Louis Johnson, who took over in March 1949 as the secretary of defense also relied on
the balance of power to infer Soviet intentions. In his address at the Pentagon in June 1949, he
asserted that the Soviet Union did not have “the capacity to fight us today.” He further noted, “I
don’t think there’s any war ahead so long as the strength of this Establishment and the strength
of the American economy, which is just as important, is so great that any potential aggressor
knows she can’t do other than respect it.”60 His effort to meet Truman’s request to cut defense
outlays also supports this view. Central to Johnson’s view was US airpower and atomic
superiority. As the historian Steven Rearden writes, “Any loss of strength from the cutback, he
repeatedly implied in public statements, would be more than made up by increased reliance on
strategic air power.”61
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Other important officials followed suit. Army Chief of Staff Dwight Eisenhower
grounded his estimates of Soviet intentions on the balance of power. In June 1946, Eisenhower
remarked that “I don’t believe the Reds want a war” partly because “They need a strategic air
arm and a navy.”62 In February 1948, at the National Press Club, he also expressed his opinion
that “The Soviet Union is in no position to support a global war, . . . and no other nation in the
world is in a position to support one, either.”63
Walter Bedell Smith, the Ambassador to the USSR, also relied heavily on the balance of
power, although as noted later, occasionally he also made expert-like observations due to his
close association with Kennan. In May 1947, he estimated that the Soviets would not be able to
engage in a major conflict for ten to fifteen years.64 In late September, Smith also reported to
Washington, “USSR is not prepared for and does not want active war in presently foreseeable
future.”65 In November, his cable noted that the Kremlin neither “desires or will force the issue
to such a point as to become involved in a major war” partly due to its need “to rebuild its
economic-industrial potential.” He continued, “Soviet leaders fish in troubled waters, and think
primarily in terms of relative power. Faced with resolute determination on the part of the
democratic world, they will halt and probably will retreat.”66 Other important officials calculated
in a similar manner.67
In short, before the first Soviet atomic explosion in August 1949, most non-experts
predicted that the Soviet Union did not intend to attack the West due to the US atomic
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superiority and war potential. Although they could have invoked Soviet past actions and strategic
texts to reinforce their assessments of Soviet reluctance to use force, most of them did not do so.
The next section shows that these non-experts continued to use the balance of power to
determine Soviet intentions in the wake of the first Soviet atomic test.

Non-Experts’ Views: After the First Soviet Nuclear Test
On August 29, 1949, the first Soviet atomic device was detonated at the Semipalatinsk test site in
Kazakhstan. The test was later confirmed by the Truman administration and made public in late
September. Now, the US atomic monopoly was broken earlier than expected. In July, for
example, one report prepared by specialists from various organizations predicted that the Soviet
Union might be able to have their first atomic bomb by mid-1950. Truman was more optimistic.
Relying on Manhattan Project director General Leslie Grove’s advice, he believed it might be
another decade for the Soviet Union to develop a single atomic bomb.68
The Soviet atomic test did not change Truman’s confidence in US capabilities to deter
Soviet aggression. When Lilienthal was summoned by Truman to discuss the Soviet first nuclear
test in September, he found Truman “not worried.”69 His budgetary decisions corroborate this
interpretation. Due to the first postwar recession, in July, Truman had requested a $1.5 billion cut
for the defense budget, down to $13 billion.70 At that time, Keynesianism was not widely
accepted in Washington, and rearmament was believed to bankrupt the country.71 Therefore,
despite the Soviet nuclear test and the establishment of a communist China in the fall, Truman
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had still sent the budget request to Congress in January 1950. Furthermore, he even intended to
cut additional $4 billion from the military budget in the spring.72 Even after having read NSC 68,
he publicly committed to a smaller defense budget for the next fiscal year. He also said in public
that the current US defense was in better shape than in 1946 or any time when the United States
was not at war.73
Louis Johnson continued to rely on the balance of power to estimate Soviet intentions.
When the Truman administration announced the Soviet atomic test in late September, Johnson
told reporters, “I warn you: don’t overplay this.”74 Furthermore, in his address at Pentagon in
April 1950, he stated, “We are convinced that Russia doesn’t have the capacity to make war on
us today and that she knows it.”75 He also told Secretary of State Dean Acheson in June, “The
peace of the world depends on the sufficiency of the American forces.”76
Military leaders were not worried about Soviet intentions to resort to aggression because
the overall balance of power was still in US’s favor. In March 1950 at the Council of Foreign
Relations, Eisenhower expressed his opinion that Soviet possession of the atomic bomb had not
changed the basic strategic situations in Western Europe. Furthermore, when he heard of NSC
68, he did not believe that its recommendation for military buildup was warranted.77
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JCS Chairman Omar Bradley regarded Soviet intentions as a function of the balance of
power. Before the Senate Appropriations Committee, he stated in October 1949, “I feel that
reasonable security will exist when we have such military forces that it would be foolhardy for
an aggressor to attack us, and yet forces not so strong that their maintenance would sap our
national strength and exhaust our resources.”78 In March 1950, before the House Appropriations
Committee, he also expressed his feeling that with the reduced military budget ($13.1 billion),
“we are going to achieve the necessary forces to prevent a disastrous attack from crippling this
Nation.” He argued that “the eventual strength of our country depends upon its industrial
capacity” and “We must not destroy that by spending too much from year to year.” From this
perspective, $13.1 billion would allow the United States to “maintain a certain strength as our
contribution to keeping the peace” because an imbalance of power would be “the biggest
encouragement to war today.”79
It was Paul Nitze, the new director of the Policy Planning Staff (PPS) and the primary
author of NSC 68, who came to be most alarmed about Soviet intentions due to the shift of the
balance of power in Soviet favor. As Gregory Mitrovich argues, Nitze’s view had changed
dramatically once he was exposed to JCS’s forecast of the growth of the Soviet atomic arsenal
and its strategic implications. In late January 1950, a JCS report (JIC 502) predicted that by mid1954, the Soviet Union would have the capability to deliver a decisive blow against both U.S.
industrial potential and retaliatory capability with two hundred nuclear warheads. In other words,
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the report predicted that by mid-1954, the Soviet Union might be able to deal a surprise knockout
blow against the United States.80
It should be noted that even Nitze had been under the influence of experts and not
worried about Soviet aggression up until the circulation of the JCS report in late January,81 which
will be discussed in the following section. Next month, however, he changed his assessments. In
a meeting, he remarked that the danger of war “seemed considerably greater than last fall.” In
elaborating his new assessment, Nitze explicitly rejected Soviet historical caution and strategic
texts as reliable evidence of Soviet intentions, which he had considered important until then.
Now he stated, “historical precedents may have become inaccurate as criteria by which to judge
the degree of probability.” He further remarked, “there are increasing indications that some of
the basic elements of Communist dogma no longer hold, i.e., that the Communist bastion has
infinite time in which to achieve its purpose, that capitalist nations carry within themselves the
seeds of their own destruction which require watering but not planting by the Soviet Union, that
the Red Army is used only when a revolutionary atmosphere makes the situation right for
the coup de grâce, etc.”82
It was Nitze’s tendency to think about worst cases about enemy intentions that was the
driving force of this change. According to Kennan, in estimating a state’s behavior, Nitze had
“no feeling for the intangibles” such as “values and intentions.” He was “mesmerized by
numbers” and he tended to base the numbers on a “total theoretical hostility that had to be
assumed to give these figures meaning.” What was missing in his thought was “what the Soviet
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leaders actually wanted,” a critique shared by Bohlen.83 As Kennan recollected, “When there was
talk of intentions, as opposed to capabilities,” Nitze would say, “How can you measure
intentions? We can’t be bothered to get into psychology; we have to face the Russians as
competitors, militarily. That’s where I come in; that’s where I’m in my element.” In addition,
intentions may change quickly. Nitze tended to think that “Even if less hostile Soviet intentions
could at any time be accurately divined, they could also, on short notice, change.”84
Therefore, Nitze started to worry that greater Soviet risk-taking backed up by its growing
power may result in a local, limited war and, possibly, even a general war through
miscalculation. Citing Moscow’s recognition of Ho Chi Minh and lesser evidence of a shift in
the Kremlin’s tactics, Nitze contended in February, “Nothing about the moves indicates that
Moscow is preparing to launch in the near future an all-out military attack on the West. They do,
however, suggest a greater willingness than in the past to undertake a course of action, including
the possible use of force in local areas, which might lead to an accidental outbreak of general
military conflict.” Therefore, his conclusion was: “the chance of war through miscalculation is
increased.”85 This change of his estimates resulted in his recommendation in NSC 68 for a
military buildup of a four-fold increase of annual defense expenditures ($50 billion) in the
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coming few years, which was nowhere near what even the JCS estimated as necessary for
Western European defense ($17-19 billion).86
In short, although non-experts took the implications of the Soviet atomic test differently,
their reliance on the balance of power to estimate Soviet intentions remained. It should be noted,
however, that there is one important non-expert whose estimates I have not examined yet:
Secretary of State Dean Acheson. His estimates will be discussed in the section that investigates
how experts’ analyses influenced non-experts because Acheson’s strategic view was
significantly influenced by experts’ analyses. The next section shows how experts estimated
Soviet intentions.

Experts’ Views: Before the First Soviet Atomic Test
George Kennan’s Long Telegram of February 1946 shows experts’ reliance on Soviet past
actions to estimate its resolve and intentions. Although Kennan emphasized a Soviet threat to US
interests in the telegram, he argued that the problem was “within our power to resolve . . .
without recourse to any general military conflict” due to a few encouraging factors. The first was
a Soviet cautious nature. He wrote:
Soviet power, unlike that of Hitlerite Germany, is neither schematic nor adventuristic. It
does not work by fixed plans. It does not take unnecessary risks. Impervious to logic of
reason, and it is highly sensitive to logic of force. For this reason it can easily withdraw—
and usually does when strong resistance is encountered at any point. Thus, if the
adversary has sufficient force and makes clear his readiness to use it, he rarely has to do
so [emphasis added].
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Although his reasoning is not unambiguous, the word “usually” suggests that Kennan made his
estimate partly based on observations of Soviet past actions. The second encouraging factor was
the balance of power. “Gauged against Western World as a whole,” he wrote, “Soviets are still
by far the weaker force.” Due to the above reasons, an outlook presented by Kennan was
optimistic: Soviet “success will really depend on degree of cohesion, firmness and vigor which
Western World can muster. And this is factor which it is within our power to influence.”87
The Central Intelligence Group, the predecessor of the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA), also began to circulate its own assessments based on Soviet past actions and strategic
statements. In July 1946, the Office of Research and Evaluations (the Office of Reports and
Estimates from October, ORE)—the predecessor of the Office of National Estimates—circulated
its first estimate of Soviet foreign and military policies. In it, the balance of power was surely
important. Although the estimate observed that “world domination” may be the “ultimate” goal
of the Soviet Union, in view of “such actual circumstances as the marked indisposition of
democratic nations to adopt the Communist faith and the greatly inferior war potential of the
Soviet Union in relation to them, that goal must be regarded by the most sanguine Communist as
one remote and largely theoretical.” In other words, given the current balance of power, such a
major war as World War III was not forthcoming.
According to the estimate, one of more immediate Soviet policies was “To seize every
opportunity to expand the area of direct or indirect Soviet control.” The estimate continued,
however, “Although these general policies are premised upon a conviction of late and inevitable
conflict between the U.S.S.R. and the capitalist world, they also assume a postponement of overt
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conflict for an indefinite period.” Relying on Soviet strategic statements and past actions, the
estimate explained the rationale of this observation: “The doctrine of Marx and Lenin does not
forbid, but rather encourage, expedient compromise or collaboration with infidels for the
accomplishment of ultimate Communist purposes. The Soviet Union has followed such a course
in the past and has need to do so still, for time is required both build up its own strength and to
weaken and divide its assumed antagonists.”88
In a classified lecture in April 1947, Kennan once again inferred Soviet intentions from
its past actions. According to him, the Soviets “are extremely reluctant to go to war,” which was
demonstrated by the fact that “They tried it only once in 29 years, and that was against the
Finns.” He continued, “I do want to stress this – I think that in calculating their own capabilities
and comparing them with those of their adversaries and deciding whether or not to go into a
military adventure, the Soviet Government, the people in the Kremlin, would insist on a greater
margin of superiority for themselves than any other group in the world, including our own.”89 As
he put it elsewhere, “The men in the Kremlin are cool and calculating individuals.”90
He also upheld his view of a cautious Soviet Union with Soviet strategic texts. In his Xarticle of July 1947 in Foreign Affairs, he wrote, “we have seen that the Kremlin is under no
ideological compulsion to accomplish its purposes in a hurry.” He continued to explain why this
was the case: “The very teachings of Lenin himself require great caution and flexibility in the
pursuit of Communist purposes.”91
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Kennan considered the fact that the Soviet Union had never attacked a superior power as
important evidence for the USSR being “extremely cautious.”92 In his lecture in May 1947,
Kennan, now Director of PPS, observed, “Let us recall that the Soviet Government has been in
existence for nearly thirty years. It has attacked other nations. The war against Finland in 1939
and 1940 constituted such an attack. But in this case it was Moscow which conceived itself to
have the great preponderance of force.” He further noted, “Russia did not attack Germany. On
the contrary, the people in Moscow went very far to accommodate themselves to Germany’s
desires.” This is because “Lacking a marked preponderance of force, they had no desire to tangle
with Germany.” Therefore, he concluded, “They are really very cautious people in a military
sense.”93
CIA’s monthly estimate in September 1947 also made an inference partly from Soviet
past actions. The report admitted that the Soviet Union currently did not have capabilities to
attack the continental United States. It observed, however, “The preponderance of readily
available Soviet ground strength is such . . . that the U.S.S.R., at will, could speedily overrun
most of continental Europe, the Near East, northern China, and Korea.” Thus, the estimate
contended, “If the U.S.S.R. were to exercise this capability, the ultimate danger to the United
States would be even greater than that threatened by Germany and Japan.” Nevertheless, the
report concluded, “Despite this initial advantage, the U.S.S.R. is unlikely to resort to overt
military aggression in present circumstances.” According to the CIA, this is because “By
indoctrination, experience, and personal interest the rulers of the U.S.S.R. are predisposed
toward the pursuit of their objectives by conspiratorial rather than by military methods [emphasis
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added].”94 In other words, judging from Soviet past behavior and strategic statements, the CIA
predicted that Soviet leaders were inclined to choose less risky means for expansion.
Furthermore, this analysis was “generally reaffirmed” by another monthly report circulated in
January 1948.95
Despite the February 1948 Communist takeover in Czechoslovakia, the CIA did not
budge. In April, it concluded, “The preponderance of available evidence and of considerations
derived from the ‘logic of the situation’ supports the conclusion that the USSR will not resort to
direct military action during 1948.”96 The report listed in descending order of importance
“considerations which might restrain Soviet leaders from resorting to direct military action
during 1948.” The list raised eight factors, and the first and second factors were to do with Soviet
past actions and strategic texts.
As for the first factor, the report observed, “The ultimate effectiveness of the European
recovery program in stabilizing the economic situation in Western Europe is still far from
assured, particularly in the light of Communist capabilities for disruption in Italy and France.
The opportunities for further Soviet gains through the exploitation of economic, political, and
social instability, while recently diminished, are by no means exhausted.” Given that the above
monthly reports inferred Soviet preference for conspiratorial methods from its past actions and
strategic statements, the above observation could be also considered based on the same logic.
The second factor was more explicit: “Soviet leaders have been in the past habitually cautious
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and deliberate, and, consequently, might be reluctant voluntarily to incur the risks inherent in a
major war.”
In this report, the CIA did mention balance-of-power factors; surprisingly, however, the
report considered them less important in restraining Soviet expansion than the above factors. For
example, “The basic economic deficiencies of the USSR in terms of requirements for global war
against the US” only came fourth place in the list. Furthermore, the US “growing stock of atomic
bombs” came in sixth place.97 Moreover, even after the outbreak of the Berlin blockade, the CIA
considered the above report’s discussion and conclusions to be “still valid” and “applicable to the
immediate future.”98
Kennan’s assessment of Soviet intentions remained unchanged. A few days before the
Berlin blockade began, he circulated PPS/33, which also incorporated an assessment by another
Soviet expert Charles Bohlen. The paper listed factors that would “militate against the likelihood
at this juncture of international, planned Soviet armed action which would involve this country.”
The first factor was a lesson from the two world wars: that is, the domination of the European
continent would require a European aggressor to deal a decisive blow to the North American
military-industrial potential in the early phase of a war. The second and third factors were a
remaining “huge reconstruction problem” on the Soviet territory and the “war-weariness of the
Soviet peoples.” Then, as the fourth factor, the paper referred to Soviet leaders’ “traditional
preference for political means as opposed to direct military action” in seeking control over
foreign territories. According to the paper, this preference stemmed from “communist ideology
and from Russian national tradition.”
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Although Kennan listed Soviet preference for political means for expansion as the fourth
factor in PPS/33, that does not mean Soviet cautiousness was less important than the balance of
power because his emphasis in other documents differed.99 For example, in his unsent letter to
Walter Lippman to justify his containment policy, written around the same time as PPS/33, he
exclusively focused on the importance of Soviet preference for political means inferred from
Soviet past actions. In it, Kennan did admit the possibility of a Soviet military attack in Europe;
however, he wrote, “Soviet plans have never run that way,” suggesting he was confident in his
knowledge of the Soviet way. He continued, “Theirs is first and foremost a political attack. Their
spearheads are the local communists [emphasis original].” He went as far as to say that “The
peoples of western Europe could do away with two-thirds of their own danger if they would face
up to the problem of their own communists.” Then, he repeated a familiar theme: “The Russians
don’t want to invade any one. It is not in their tradition. They tried it once in Finland and got
their fingers badly burned.” He also listed successful examples of his containment policy,
suggesting that he considered them evidence of Soviet cautiousness. “Actually,” he asserted, his
containment policy “has worked better than I would have dared to hope a year ago. Has Iran
gone? Or Tukey? Or Greece? I can assure you that not one of them would have been an
independent country today if we had not done what we did. Has Trieste fallen? Or Austria?”100
Even after the outbreak of the Berlin crisis in late June, Kennan and Bohlen retained their
judgments. NSC 20/2 by Kennan, mostly based on his PPS/33, once again emphasized Soviet
caution based on past actions.101 In his meeting with Undersecretary of State Robert Lovett and
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the latter’s European counterparts, Kennan also emphasized the difference between Stalinism
and Hitlerism to express his “disbelief that the Soviet leaders contemplated launching world
conflict by armed force.”102 In another similar meeting, Bohlen grounded his estimates on
historical Soviet caution. He observed, “the most dangerous period had been in the immediate
postwar years, 1945–1947, when the U.S. military establishment was rapidly disintegrating and
the American public had not yet been alerted to the Russian peril; yet it was significant that the
Soviet Army did not move during this period.” It should be noted that between 1945 and 1947,
there were the Azerbaijan and Turkish Strait crises, where the Soviet Union backed down in the
face of US determination. Bohlen continued, “it should be remembered that the Russian Army
had not moved beyond the line which we now refer to as the ‘iron curtain.’ ” Therefore, Bohlen
suggested that “opportunities for expansion and aggrandizement on the part of the Russians
should be removed, noting that historically the Kremlin has usually exercised great caution in the
risks it has taken to achieve its objectives.”103
Throughout the Berlin blockade, Kennan’s view of Soviet intentions had remained the
same. In his lecture and PPS memorandum in November, he once again emphasized his thesis of
historical Soviet caution, Soviet preference for political means for expansion, and the difference
between Stalin and Hitler.104 In May 1949, near the end of the blockade, he prepared to resubmit
his PPS/33, a policy document written a year earlier. As noted above, in it, Kennan inferred
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Soviet preference for political means for expansion from communist ideology and Russian
national tradition.105
Throughout the Berlin blockade, the CIA also kept emphasizing historical Soviet
cautiousness. The CIA report circulated one month after the outbreak of the Berlin blockade is a
good example. The purpose of this report was to “analyze and evaluate the advantages and
disadvantages that would accrue to the USSR if it should elect, prior to 1950, to overrun the
European continent and the Near East (to Cairo), with a view to determining whether or not the
strategic position thus acquired would be sufficiently strong per se to induce Soviet leaders to
adopt such a course of action.” In addressing this question, two alternative scenarios were
prepared: (1) the USSR obtains a negotiated peace shortly after the occupation of these areas; (2)
after the occupation of these areas, the USSR is faced with a continuing global war with the
United States and its allies, involving ultimate US invasion of Soviet-controlled territory.
The report concluded, “in spite of the prospect of substantial tangible economic,
scientific, and military gains, the Soviet leaders would consider these political risks so serious a
threat to their own positions of power and to their ultimate objective of a Communist world that
they would be unlikely to undertake this operation—even under the assumption of a negotiated
peace [emphasis added].” In reaching this conclusion, the report noted that an effort had been
made to “develop the maximum number of factual data” regarding Soviet economic, scientific,
and military factors. Despite this effort, “In the final analysis,” the report admitted, “we are still
to a large extent dependent upon ‘the logic of the situation’ and upon deductions from the pattern
of Soviet behavior for our conclusions as to the possibility of direct Soviet military action
[emphasis added].” One of such deductions was a Soviet cautious nature. The report observed, if
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the Soviets “took these risks” stemming from conquering these areas, “they would definitely be
stepping out of character.” This is because “as in the past they have always acted with great
caution.”106
In late October, the CIA released an appendix to the above report and reached a similar
conclusion. The report wrote, “Political considerations do not favor a Soviet decision to overrun
Western Europe and the Near East prior to 1 January 1950.” There were two reasons: the
difficulties the Soviets would encounter with a possible Soviet occupation of Western Europe
and the Near East and the promising prospects of the traditional Communist methods of
subversion and infiltration. In discussing the disadvantages of general war, the CIA argued,
The Soviet leaders, many of whom have spent thirty years in building up the power and
prestige of their Socialist state, would be reluctant to stake their life’s work on such an
uncertain gamble for world power. The present leaders have consistently followed a
policy distinguished chiefly by caution, and unless Stalin dies soon and the power
exercised by him and his associates falls into the hands of younger and more impulsive
leaders, it seems improbable that the USSR would presently risk a major war against the
West.107

As with the case with other reports, Soviet past actions shaped the CIA’s assessment.
In September, the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI)’s memorandum also inferred Soviet
intentions partly from Soviet past actions. The balance of power surely mattered in its estimate.
The memorandum argued that since January 1946, ONI’s conclusion was that “the Soviet [sic]
would not in the foreseeable future embark on military adventures” because the Soviet Union
was “exhausted,” “having trouble with internal morale,” and having “manifold problems of
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reconstruction.” However, observations of Soviet past actions reinforced this conclusion. The
memorandum read that the USSR “has never in the past and gives no reasonable assurance now
that this program [of overthrowing capitalism] is to be carried out by military aggression at the
risk of disaster to Russia.” In particular, “despite her designs on Greece, her demands on Turkey
and her wartime occupation of Northern Iran, she had not deliberately in peace-time employed
military aggression in the strict sense of the word.” Thus, the paper concluded, “It is a reasonable
assumption, in the light of available historical and current intelligence, that the leaders of the
Soviet Union will limit themselves to ‘all means short of war,’ at least until they are confident
that their strength has far surpassed that of the U.S. or that the U.S. intends to make an imminent
military attack on their orbit.”108
Soviet strategic statements were also an important source for the CIA to infer Soviet
intentions. In February 1949, the CIA observed, “In Stalinist doctrine, the function of militant
Communism is to hasten a dissolution of capitalist society expected, with ‘scientific’ certitude,
as the inevitable consequence of that society’s inherent contradictions, and the role of the USSR
is to provide, during the interim, a secure base and powerful support for international
Communism.” The report further noted, “In this concept the Kremlin’s primary instrument of
aggression is the international Communist movement, to which the war-making power of the
Soviet state is essentially auxiliary.” Therefore, the CIA concluded, “in present circumstances,
the Kremlin is content to pursue its ends by normal Communist techniques and is unlikely to
resort to open military aggression. It has at present no compelling reason to resort to war.”109 In
another report in May, the CIA also observed, “Philosophically prepared to take the long view in
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the absence of an immediate threat and confident that future crises of capitalism will produce
new opportunities for Soviet aggrandizement by non-military means, the Kremlin would have
reason to avoid a premature showdown while assiduously developing its capabilities for eventual
defense or aggression.”110
Some historians took note of the effect of Soviet past actions on US estimates, but they
did not draw attention to who, non-experts or experts, made those estimates. Having introduced
the director of Army intelligence’s observation that the United States had operated on the theory
that the USSR would retreat before determined resistance, the historian Eduard Mark observes,
“The Kremlin’s decision not to press its claims on Turkey and to abandon its clients in Iran
contributed greatly to this belief.”111 The historian Melvyn Leffler also writes, “For many
American policy makers . . . the Iranian crisis of 1946, the Greek civil war, and the ongoing
Berlin airlift seemed to demonstrate that Russia would back down when confronted with
American determination, even if the United States did not have superior forces-in-being.”112
However, their works’ focus was not to demonstrate the above claims with evidence, which this
chapter did.
In short, this section showed that, unlike non-experts, experts used Soviet past actions
and strategic texts as well as the balance of power to infer Soviet intentions. In doing so, they
often put greater emphasis on past actions and strategic texts than on the balance of power to
assess Soviet intentions. The next section shows that despite the Soviet atomic test, Soviet past
actions and strategic texts remained important information for experts to infer Soviet intentions.
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Experts’ Views: After the First Soviet Atomic Text
The Soviet atomic test did not change experts’ views significantly, and they continued to use
Soviet past actions and strategic texts as important indicators of Soviet intentions. One of the
important moments when Soviet intentions mattered after the atomic explosion was when the
Soviet Union threatened to use force against Yugoslavia. The tension between these two
countries had been increasing since late July with the exchange of notes regarding the conduct
and treatment of Soviet citizens in Yugoslavia. This culminated in implicit Soviet threats to use
force and undisguised troop movements in Yugoslavia’s neighboring countries in August.113
Despite these threats, US policymakers estimated Soviet/satellite aggression against Yugoslavia
unlikely primarily due to their inadequate military build-up in the region and a risk of a possible
general war.114 In making those estimates, however, they also paid significant attention to Soviet
cautiousness learned from Soviet past actions. In discussing a possible Soviet operation to
liquidate the Tito regime, P.P.S.60 noted in mid-September: “Our knowledge of Soviet methods
indicates that Moscow will probably exercise patience and restraint in this operation, resorting to
direct and overt force only under conditions where there exists little or no risk of a general war
which the Soviet Union desires at this time to avoid [emphasis added].”115 Furthermore, two
months later NSC 18/3 and 18/4 repeated the above sentence word-for-word.116 Likewise, the
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CIA observed in November: Stalin would attack Yugoslavia only if “no serious resistance is to
be expected” because of “Stalin’s character and tactics, as developed throughout decades.”117
Kennan continued to infer Soviet intentions to make war from its past actions and
strategic statements. In his article that appeared in the March 1950 issue of Reader’s Digest, he
wrote, “current Stalinist doctrine does not demand war.” Rather, he contended that the
Communists “see the role of Communism as one of hastening the collapse of capitalism and
assisting, as a midwife, at the birth of the Socialist order.” “In theory,” he continued, “this as
primarily the task of the native Communists in each country, and not of the Soviet Red Army.”
He also relied on Soviet caution inferred from past actions. He wrote, “Russia has a long history
of expansion; but it is generally a history of a sly and cautious expansion, of a readiness to wait
patiently for opportunities to extend existing borders without undue risk.” “Viewed against the
background of doctrine, tradition and practical realities,” he concluded, the Russian leaders
“would do anything they could to hasten it [our downfall], but they would not wish to endanger
in any major way the security of the world citadel of Communism, the U.S.S.R.”
In this article, Kennan examined the effect of Russia’s development of atomic weapons
but calculated that it would not “affect the situation very much” partly because of USSR’s
inadequate nuclear arsenal. Yet even here, Soviet past actions mattered. He argued, “In an atomic
world, total war . . . has become potentially more suicidal; and the masters of the Kremlin, in
contradistinction to Hitler and the Japanese, are not suicidally inclined.”118 Elsewhere, in
discussing the situations in the Far East, he also emphasized that problems were political in

117

CIA, “Implications of the Tito-Stalin Conflict.”
George F. Kennan, “Is War with Russian Inevitable? Five Solid Arguments for Peace,” Reader’s Digest, March
1950, 1–9. Elsewhere, Kennan also counted Soviet ideology as one of the reasons for predicting that the Soviet
Union “probably” would not resort to war “soon.” See Russia and the Russians, Jan 21, 1950, Kennan Papers,
https://findingaids.princeton.edu/catalog/MC076_c03162.
118

99

nature. He wrote, “Remember, Russians haven’t attacked anyone militarily since V–J Day. Their
successes, such as they have been, have been primarily in minds of men [emphasis original].”119
In April, yet another CIA estimate concluded Soviet military aggression was unlikely
based on Soviet past actions and strategic statements.120 This estimate analyzed how the Soviet
bomb affected US security and the probability of Soviet direct military action. Its conclusion
was: “There would appear to be no firm basis for an assumption that the USSR presently intends
deliberately to use military force to attain a Communist world or further to expand Soviet
territory if this involves war with a potentially stronger US [emphasis in original].” The report
further noted, “Even if the USSR should gain military superiority (i.e., in overall military
potential) over the US and its allies, . . . so long as it deems the opportunity to exist it will still
prefer to seek its objectives by exploiting measures short of an all-out attack.” These conclusions
were drawn from the following two factors: “the past conduct of Russian foreign relations” and
“the known ideological concepts of the present rulers of the USSR.”
As for the ideological concepts, the report observed, “An analysis of the behavior and
tactics of Soviet leaders in conducting both the foreign relations and the internal affairs of the
Soviet state indicates clearly that Marxist ideology . . . is the predominant influence on the
pattern of their thought and actions.” Therefore, the report argued, “Communist ideology affords,
then, a key to past, present, and future Soviet behavior.” As the past CIA reports had argued
repeatedly, the subsequent analysis of the Soviet ideology revealed that military aggression was
secondary to political subversion for the Communists. For example, the report wrote, Soviet
military power’s “offensive function appears to be secondary and limited, to be used locally
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against military and economic forces already weakened by Communist subversion, but not in
head-on attack against strength in which the issue might be in doubt.”
Regarding the past conduct of Russian foreign relations, the estimate examined Tzarist
Russia’s history and found the following three characteristics as Russian tradition:
hypersensitivity to security, a cautious but opportunistic mode of expansion; occasional
miscalculation and subsequent willingness to accept diplomatic defeat rather than facing
intervention by major powers. The report concluded both Soviet ideology and Russian tradition
were oriented toward opportunistic but cautious expansion.
However, could the characteristics derived from Russian history—not even Soviet
history—and the concepts derived from the Stalinist ideology—cheap talk—be reliable to
estimate the likelihood of Soviet aggression now armed with nuclear weapons? The report took
due note of this concern; however, it argued that its analysis of Soviet foreign policy since 1917
“indicates that the enhanced Soviet power position has not yet, at least, induced Soviet leaders to
reject the influences of Russian tradition, and the methods and tactics prescribed by Communist
ideology as outlined above.” The report proceeded to state, “Soviet policy since VE-Day is
explicable only in terms of Russian tradition and Communist ideology.” In particular, it
explicitly referred to the Azerbaijan and Turkish strait crises, where the USSR probed and then
backed down, as predictable because “They would expose USSR to no risk such as that inherent
in direct military aggression.” Furthermore, the estimate brought up post-war Finland’s case as
further evidence: “In the case of Finland, where these processes [political subversion and its
related methods] could not be made to work, the USSR has refrained from military coercion,
although it could have exercised that power with impunity [emphasis added].” The USSRYugoslavia confrontation was also mentioned. The report wrote, “The defection of Yugoslavia is

101

a matter of gravest concern to the USSR” and therefore “a matter of primary importance that Tito
be overthrown and a Stalinist orientation restored in Yugoslavia.” Yet, the report continued,
“even in so urgent a matter as this, the USSR is proceeding on a basis of conspiracy and
apparently internal revolution rather than by direct military aggression.” In short, the report
heavily relied on Soviet past actions and strategic texts to infer Soviet intentions to use force.
However, this coordinated estimate was challenged by the intelligence organizations of
the Department of State, Army, and Air Force in their dissenting opinions attached to the
estimate. The Office of Naval Intelligence also submitted its dissenting opinion, but it did agree
with the report’s analysis of Soviet past actions and strategic statements. As a result, the CIA was
forced to release another report in June, from which the discussion on Soviet ideology and past
actions was deleted.121 Upon learning this development, Kennan fiercely disputed this revision
because he considered, predictably, the original estimate “thoughtful and generally
competent.”122 Furthermore, the Office of Naval Intelligence once again submitted a dissenting
opinion to the revised estimate because the latter completely ignored Soviet objectives and
intentions, which, the ONI contended, “stem principally from political, ideological and economic
factors, historical experience and aspirations [emphasis added],” suggesting Soviet past actions
and strategic statements were fundamental to understanding Soviet intentions.123 In short, the US
intelligence community was divided on how to interpret the impact of the Soviet atomic bomb on
Soviet intentions, but the CIA and the ONI remained convinced that past actions and strategic
texts were important evidence of Soviet intentions.
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In short, experts relied heavily on Soviet past actions and strategic texts to infer Soviet
intentions between 1945 and 1950. The next section shows how their assessments had influenced
non-experts’ analyses.

The Influence of Experts’ Views on Non-Experts
The foregoing discussion showed that non-experts and experts had utilized different information
to estimate Soviet intentions. Nevertheless, there are some instances in which non-experts
inferred Soviet intentions from its historical caution and strategic statements as experts did. As
this section shows, however, the evidence strongly suggests that when non-experts calculated
like experts, they had been influenced by and borrowed experts’ analyses. This is because (1)
these observations were made only after experts had expressed their views, (2) these non-experts
had close relationships with experts, suggesting their exposure to experts’ analyses, and (3) some
non-experts explicitly admitted that they were influenced by experts’ views.
US Ambassador to the Soviet Union Walter Bedell Smith occasionally presented expertlike analyses about Soviet intentions, but he had been influenced by George Kennan, Smith’s
primary aide when he arrived in Moscow. In December 1947, before the Senate Appropriations
Committee, Smith stated, “the USSR, as a matter of policy, keeps pushing on all fronts as long
and as much as possible.” However, he continued, “When the opposition becomes too strong it
usually pulls back and awaits a more opportune time or else attempts another and different
approach.”124 In his memoirs published in 1949, Smith also wrote like an expert:
the Soviet Government has never in the past been prepared to expose the Soviet state to
the risk of disaster. Although, since the last war, it is genuinely believed in the Soviet
Union that there has been a vast swing of power in favor of the rising forces of
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communism and that the capitalist system is greatly enfeebled, it seems to me a
reasonable assumption that the Soviet state still will be guided by that principle. In
pursuit of the final Communist goal, the Soviet leaders will limit themselves to “all
means short of war,” so long as they believe that the outcome of a war would be
uncertain, i.e., until they are confident that the strength controlled by the Soviet Union
has far surpassed that of the United States.125

The resemblance of these analyses with experts’ assessments was no surprise given Smith’s
close association with Kennan. In his memoirs, Smith described Kennan as a “mentor” and “the
best possible tutor” for Smith during the first months after he arrived in Moscow.126 This was not
just Smith’s nicety because he expected his memoirs to be read by Kennan. In his letter to
Marshall in early 1947, Smith “strongly” recommended that he bring Kennan with him to the
Council of Foreign Ministers in Moscow because “George Kennan . . . knows more about the
Soviet Union, I believe, than any other American.” Smith continued, “I know all of the Russian
experts, here and in Washington, and they are all good, but Kennan is head and shoulders above
the lot.”127
The US embassy in Moscow’s joint annual intelligence reports, products by the team
work by diplomats, attachés, and intelligence officials of the mission, also contained
observations like experts, but given that they had been written by Kennan’s old associates, the
chief of mission Smith’s respect for Kennan, and the involvement of intelligence officials as
another group of experts, no wonder why these reports sounded like experts. The April 1948
joint intelligence report wrote, “The Kremlin leaders are . . . cautious, realistic, well-informed,
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and determined not to sacrifice final objectives to immediate gain.” Having pointed out that
Soviet political methods had succeeded in expanding Soviet influence, the report continued,
“Until this advantage has been fully exploited, it is difficult to believe that the realistic Soviet
leaders would deliberately initiate war.”128 The April 1949 joint intelligence report also
observed, “the Kremlin under Stalin is tactically cautious in approaching any immediate situation
and evaluates carefully the risks involved.”129
A number of NSC documents also contained expert-like assessments but given that many
NSC documents were drafted by Kennan and his staff, it is no wonder why these documents
relied on Soviet past actions and strategic texts to assess Soviet intentions. For example, NSC
20/2, which was prepared by Kennan’s PPS, observed, “In seeking control over foreign
territories, Soviet leaders have a strong traditional preference for political means as opposed to
direct military action. This preference stems not from moral considerations, but from communist
ideology and from Russian national tradition.”130 In assessing Soviet intentions to attack
Yugoslavia in the fall of 1949, the NSC 18 series, prepared by the PPS, also wrote, “Our
knowledge of Soviet methods indicates that Moscow will probably exercise patience and
restraint in this operation, resorting to direct and overt force only under conditions where there
exists little or no risk of a general war, which the Soviet Union apparently desires at this time to
avoid.”131
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When Undersecretary of State Robert Lovett made an expert-like assessment in his reply
to the secretary of the navy, the source of his assessments was also experts’ analyses. In his reply
in December 1948, Lovett denied the possibility of another “Pearl Harbor” by the USSR
apprehended by the secretary of the navy. In explaining his estimate’s rationale, he wrote, “It
would not be in character with the tradition or mentality of the Soviet leaders to resort to such a
measure unless they felt themselves either politically extremely weak, or militarily extremely
strong.”132 Lovett then referred to the aforementioned NSC 20/2 drafted by the PPS and April
1948 joint intelligence report by the US embassy in Moscow, suggesting Lovett’s above
assessment was taken from these reports prepared by experts.
The seemingly most problematic exception to my theory is Secretary of State Dean
Acheson. Although historians tend to emphasize the similarity of his strategic thinking to that of
Nitze, the way Acheson estimated Soviet intentions was heavily influenced by experts.133 As
noted above, although Nitze had been under the influence of experts’ analyses, once the JCS
forecast about the Soviet nuclear stockpile (JIC 502) was circulated, he dismissed experts’
analyses and became seriously concerned about the likelihood of a local and even general war
with the USSR. This concern was the driving force for drafting NSC 68. Although Acheson was
kept informed of NSC 68 development and was fully supportive, he was not as worried about
Soviet intentions as Nitze was. To be sure, Acheson also estimated annual $50 billion in defense
expenditures in the coming few years as necessary as Nitze did; however, Acheson predicted that
neither a local nor a general war would be initiated by the Soviet Union because he believed that
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the USSR would continue a cold war due to its historical caution and preference for political
means for expansion.134
The balance of power surely affected the way Acheson estimated the Soviet threat.
According to his memoirs, the Soviet threat to Europe was “singularly like that which Islam had
posed centuries before, with its combination of ideological zeal and fighting power.”135 In order
to address this threat, the balance of power was important because it would affect Soviet
intentions to expand. A year after his retirement, Acheson wrote Truman, “Power is at the root of
most relationships—by no means the only factor, but one of vast importance. A balance of power
has proved the best international sheriff we have ever had. Many of our troubles—or perhaps
better to say, many troubles—came from the dissolution of our power and the destruction of any
balance capable of restraining the Russians from acts which weakened the West greatly.”136
For Acheson, US nuclear superiority and war-making potential were the main shields
from Soviet aggression. In 1958, he recalled, “So long as the United States had a virtual
monopoly of nuclear weapons, the path of policy was not too obscure. The regime in Moscow, in
considering action or intimidation aimed at Western Europe, knew that the vast preponderance of
risk—and a lethal risk at that—had to be borne by it. This risk was posed by the Strategic Air
Command.”137 As Melvin Leffler writes, “he believed that the Kremlin would seek to avoid war
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because of the American atomic monopoly and superior American warmaking capabilities.”
Faced with this power reality, Acheson calculated that the Soviets would not take excessive
risks.138
However, what is missing in the conventional interpretation of Acheson’s strategic
thought is the role of Soviet past actions when he estimated Soviet intentions. When
policymakers estimate enemy intentions, a specific balance of power does not tell them whether
an enemy will use force because risk-tolerant states and risk-averse states may behave differently
faced with the same balance of power. In order to ascertain whether the Soviet Union would
judge as unacceptable the cost and risk the US capabilities would impose on the USSR in war,
Acheson turned to past Soviet behavior.
The earliest evidence of Acheson’s expert-like analyses is his testimony in January 1948
before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, where he was summoned as a former
undersecretary of state. Before the committee, he explained the Soviet pattern of expansion and
retreat: “a study of the Soviet activity over the past 30 years indicates that the Soviet Union
probes the soft spots. Wherever it meets stability, it stops that effort and turns to fields which are
easier and more productive.” He illustrated this with post-war examples:
There was a very aggressive Soviet move in the direction of Turkey some time ago. That
was met by quite clear statements by some of the nations as to where we stood on the
question of Soviet pressure against Turkey. Our attitude seemed to be firm and solid, and
that area has not been entered by Russia. . . . The same thing occurred with regard to Iran.
Perfectly unequivocal attitudes were taken by the various nations on the United Nations
Security Council. That pressure has to a large extent relaxed, though it has not been
abandoned.
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Furthermore, he predicted Soviet pressure on Italy, France, and Greece would “recede” once the
United States had responded strongly and established stability. From these observations, he
concluded, “The great danger which exists between us and the Soviet Union is in allowing
situations of weakness and vacuum to occur in the world and not by pressing forward resolutely
to restore strength to those areas.”139
The evidence suggests that Acheson had been already influenced by experts’ analyses at
this point. As shown in the previous sections, when Acheson was summoned by the House in
January 1948, experts’ analyses had been already widely circulated across the government.
Acheson had also read Kennan’s long telegram, “truly remarkable dispatch” in his words, and it
is difficult to think he had not read the X article.140 Furthermore, as the undersecretary of state,
he must have also read the intelligence community’s assessments.
Since his testimony in January 1948, Acheson had remained convinced of the cautious
nature of the Soviet Union, and he remained so even after the Soviet atomic test and the
circulation of the JCS forecast on the Soviet nuclear stockpile (JIC 502). In discussing the
possibility of Soviet forceful reaction to the formation of NATO in April 1949 after he took over
as the secretary of state, he dismissed it due to partly what he had learned from Soviet past
actions. Given “the pattern of past performance” by the Soviets, he did not think the Soviets
would use force. Rather, he maintained that they would confine their reactions to measures short
of war such as an intensification of propaganda, peace efforts, and war scares.141 His strategic
estimate was well described in a memorandum drafted by him, Kennan, and Nitze in late
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December 1949. In it, they asked which danger, “the cold war” or the “danger of military
aggression,” was “most imminent and pressing” upon the United States. The first item for
consideration to answer this question was Soviet strategic texts. These authors observed,
Soviet theory warns us that their primary attention is directed toward the former [the cold
war]. a) They believe that the capitalist world is doomed by internal decay. b) They do
believe and advocate active and subversive activities within capitalist societies by the
communist parties. c) They do not believe that the overthrow has to come through
communist arms in the first instance, but they believe that the capitalist world will not
finally surrender power without a resort to arms and that, therefore, at some time they
may be attacked. d) They would prefer a war between capitalist countries in which they
intervene at the decisive moment, but in view of the unlikelihood of that coming about
might intervene in confused situations created by satellites or subversive groups
[emphasis added].

The second item for consideration was Soviet past actions. The memorandum observed,
“Russian history is divided, but Soviet history seems to be against military adventures which
entail any risk.” Having mentioned “the Polish affair of 1921 and 1939,” the memorandum
observed, “these latter may be said to have involved no great risk and to have lessons that risk is
hard to estimate. The great care to escape involvement in the ‘capitalist’ war of 1939 supports
the thesis that the lesson was learned.” As a result, the conclusion was, “The weight of the
evidence leads to the belief that the Russians will put their chief reliance on the cold war. It is
here that we must meet the most pressing dangers and not from military aggression.”142
Although Nitze jettisoned experts’ analyses upon reading the JCS forecast in late January
1950, Acheson remained convinced of the implications of Soviet past actions. His press
conference in February 1950 revealed the emphasis he had given to Soviet past actions in
inferring its intentions. He stated, “What we have also observed over the last few years is that the
142
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Soviet Government is highly realistic, and we have seen time after time that it can adjust itself to
facts when facts exist.” By “facts,” he meant difficulties to achieve Soviet goals in the face of the
demonstration of US determination. He continued, “We have seen also that agreements reached
with the Soviet Government are useful when those agreements register facts or a situation which
exists, and that they are not useful when they are merely agreements which do not register the
existing facts.” As “a great many illustrations” of the above observation, he then referred to
Soviet retreat in the face of US determination at Berlin, Greece, and Turkey. To be sure,
Acheson admitted the possibility that the Soviet Union was now armed with atomic weapons. He
contended, however, “the existence of this possibility does not change the facts which I have just
been discussing with you,” suggesting the nuclear-armed USSR did not change the basic picture
that the Soviet Union had been cautious in the face of situations of strength.143 In another speech,
Acheson also referred to the Berlin success as evidence of Soviet caution in the face of US
determination.144
In short, Acheson expected that the Soviet Union would initiate neither a local nor
general war because he had learned from experts’ analyses that the Soviet Union had been
historically cautious, and its preferred method was “to wipe out centers of resistance wherever
they exist by political and economic undermining.”145
Taken together, these non-experts surely employed experts’ estimates but, they had
borrowed experts’ analyses when they did so. Since Kennan’s estimates were circulated widely
and the CIA regularly circulated their analyses, it is no wonder why these non-experts were
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influenced by their analyses. The next section discusses how the rival theories performed against
the above empirical analysis.

Evaluations of the Rival Theories
Both the current calculus theory and past actions theory performed poorly compared to my
theory. The current calculus theory predicted correctly the use of the balance of power by both
groups but failed to correctly predict the use of past actions by experts and non-experts who were
influenced by the former’s analyses. The past actions theory predicted the use of past actions by
experts but was not able to predict correctly that non-experts did not use past actions.
As predicted by the current calculus theory, the balance of power played an important
role among non-experts and experts alike. Both groups used the balance of power as an
important factor to infer Soviet intentions to use force. However, the importance attached to it
differed between non-experts and experts. In non-experts’ estimates, it played a central role in
determining Soviet intentions. However, experts often attribute an equal or even heavier weight
to the Soviet cautious nature deduced from its past actions and strategic texts, which the current
calculus theory fails to predict. Equally important, as opposed to the predictions of the current
calculus theory, experts’ analyses spilled over to non-experts.
Likewise, the past actions theory’s performance was unsatisfactory because it was only
able to explain the way experts and their close associates estimate enemy resolve and intentions.
As noted in the previous chapter, the past actions theory de facto adopts a state-as-unitary
assumption. Therefore, if the theory is correct, there should not be any clear pattern in which
some groups of policy officials use past actions to infer enemy resolve and intentions whereas
others do not. My empirical analysis, however, demonstrated that there was a clear pattern in
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which non-experts did not use past actions whereas experts did. Furthermore, when non-experts
used past actions and strategic texts to infer enemy intentions, my empirical analysis was able to
show those non-experts borrowed estimates from experts around them. In so doing, moreover,
they did so less often, less consistently, and less confidently compared with experts.
For example, even alarmist Nitze had used Soviet past actions to infer its intentions, but
once the JCS forecast about the future Soviet atomic arsenal came in, he dismissed the reliability
of experts’ analyses. Acheson’s use of past actions was more consistent than Nitze’s. However,
given that he believed the staggering $50 billion annual defense budget for multiple years was
necessary to retain US superiority to win the cold war, the confidence he put in Soviet past
actions seems much weaker than Kennan, who believed “two high-quality Marine divisions” as
“sufficient” to support the containment policy or CIA analysts, who wrote that “Even if the
USSR should gain military superiority (i.e., in overall military potential) over the US and its
allies, it is estimated that so long as it deems the opportunity to exist it will still prefer to seek its
objectives by exploiting measures short of an all-out attack.”146
Furthermore, neither the current calculus theory nor past actions theory predicts the effect
of Soviet strategic texts that matched Soviet past actions on US assessments of Soviet resolve
and intentions. This does not fare against these two theories, especially the current calculus
theory, because the effect of the statements is beyond their scope conditions. However, given
that the statements’ intimate relations with the effect of past actions and their significant effects
on experts’, and sometimes even non-experts’, assessments, it would be desirable if theories that
explain the effect of past actions could be capable of predicting their effects as well.
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Summary
This chapter showed the way US officials assessed Soviet resolve and intentions to use force
between 1945 and 1950 is generally in line with my theory’s predictions. With the same set of
information available to them, that is, the balance of power, Soviet past actions, and Soviet
strategic texts, non-experts and experts employed a different set of information to assess Soviet
intentions. Although the predictions by the current calculus theory and the past actions theory
explained important aspects of the case, my analysis showed that there is a clear pattern that
neither theory can explain: non-experts inferred Soviet intentions almost exclusively from the
balance of power, whereas experts inferred Soviet intentions from Soviet past actions and
strategic texts as well as from the balance of power. When non-experts calculated Soviet
intentions as if they had been experts, the evidence showed that they had a close association with
experts, and experts’ analyses had been already widely circulated across the government,
suggesting they borrowed their analyses from experts.
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Chapter 4: The US Assessments of Chinese Intentions, 1950-1954

This chapter examines US assessments of Chinese intentions from the beginning of the Korean
War in 1950 through the end of the Dien Bien Phu crisis of 1954. This case demonstrates that
when an enemy demonstrated its resolve clearly, both non-experts and experts use the resolute
action to update their estimates of the enemy’s resolve. The Chinese intervention in Korea and
the Dien Bien Phu crisis provide a good opportunity to conduct the method of difference to
control for various important variables. Despite the similarity of these variables between the two
occasions, the United States assessed China’s intervention in Korea as unlikely, whereas it
assessed a similar intervention as likely in the Dien Bien Phu crisis. One important variable that
differed between these two occasions was the record of China’s past actions. On the eve of the
Chinese intervention in Korea, US officials had no information about relevant Chinese past
actions because the Chinese regime was just established a year earlier. By the time of the Dien
Bien Phu crisis, on the other hand, China had demonstrated its resolve to attack a superior power
over border security by engaging the US forces in Korea and fighting them to a stalemate despite
its mounting costs. Given the similarity of the other important variables between the two
occasions, this semi-controlled analysis suggests that it was China’s past actions that had caused
the divergent estimates.
This conclusion is further strengthened by conducting process tracing to show how policy
officials updated their estimates of Chinese resolve after the Chinese intervention. This analysis
shows that both non-experts and experts updated their estimates of Chinese resolve and
intentions to use force upward due to the resolve China demonstrated in Korea. Furthermore, as
opposed to chapter 3 where experts interpreted Soviet strategic texts aligned with Soviet past
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actions as further evidence of the Soviet cautious nature in challenging a superior power, this
chapter shows that experts did not use Chinese strategic texts urging caution because the
implications of the texts did not match China’s resolve demonstrated in Korea.
The next section discusses the theoretical predictions of each theory. Then, the section is
followed by an empirical analysis. In it, I first show the divergent US assessments of Chinese
intentions on the eve of the Chinese intervention in Korea and during the Dien Bien Phu crisis
respectively. This is followed by an analysis based on the method of difference, which shows all
the important variables for these two occasions are either comparable or predict that US officials
would assess Chinese intentions to intervene in Korea more likely than in Dien Bien Phu. Then,
process tracing shows how US policy officials had updated their estimates of Chinese resolve in
the wake of the intervention and how this had affected US assessments in the Dien Bien Phu
crisis. The following section discusses how rival theories performed against the empirical
analysis. The final section summarizes the findings.

Distribution of Capabilities, Past Actions, and Strategic Texts
Throughout the period, the balance of power between the United States and China was in favor
of the United States. There was no record of China’s past actions on the eve of the Chinese
intervention, but China demonstrated its resolve to attack a superior power over border security
by its intervention in the Korean War. Chinese strategic texts called for caution and even retreat
before a superior power’s resistance, but this did not match what the Chinese intervention had
demonstrated.
Between 1950 and 1954, the distribution of capabilities between the United States and
China was shifting in favor of the United States in military and overall terms and shifting in
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favor of China in economic terms. As table 4.1 shows, the US-China ratio of the distribution of
military capabilities shifted from 3.03 to 8.96, an almost three-fold increase.1 This significant
shift in US favor was due to the massive military buildup prompted by the recommendations of
NSC 68.
The ratio of the US economic capabilities to China’s economic capabilities shifted to
China’s advantage. As table 4.1 shows, the US-China ratio of the distribution of economic
capabilities shifted from 93.49 to 28.89, an almost one-third decrease.2 This downward shift for
the United States was due to China’s rapid modernization and its low starting point of economic
development. China’s economic capabilities were so low compared to the United States that even
a small absolute increase in its economic capabilities changed the ratio to its advantage
dramatically.
Finally, the overall distribution of capabilities shifted in favor of the United States. As
table 4.1 shows, the US-China ratio of the distribution of overall capabilities, measured by
CINC, shifted from 2.4 to 2.98, a roughly one-fifth increase. Here, the substantial advantage of
the United States in military and economic terms discussed above is offset by the Chinese
massive total population and urban population roughly comparable to US’s.
In short, the ratio of US-China military capabilities, the most important indicator of
power, shifted in favor of the US by roughly three times, whereas the ratio of US-China
economic capabilities, latent power, shifted in favor of China by a one-third decrease. Given this
and the modest shift of the ratio of US-China overall capabilities in favor of the US, one can say

1

To generate the military capabilities ratio, I calculated the ratios of US military personnel and expenditure to those
of China respectively and averaged the personnel and expenditure ratios.
2
To generate the economic capabilities ratio, I calculated the ratios of US iron and steel production and energy
consumption to those of China respectively and averaged the personnel and expenditure ratios.
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that the distribution of capabilities between the two countries had not changed significantly, or it
had only modestly changed in favor of the United States.

Table 4.1: The Distribution of Capabilities between the United States and China, 1950-19543

Ratio of the US Military Power to
China's Military Power
Ratio of the US Economic Power to
China's Economic Power
Ratio of the US Overall Power to
China's Overall Power

1950

1951

1952

1953

1954

3.03

5.94

9.43

10.35

8.96

93.49

141.24

44.99

42.01

28.89

2.4

3.08

3.23

3.27

2.98

US officials’ assessments of the overall distribution of capabilities between the United
States and China seem in line with the above interpretation. In late October 1952, a National
Intelligence Estimate concluded that without deterioration of Communist positions in Asia, the
Communists would refrain from expansion through the identifiable use of Chinese Communist or
Soviet forces through mid-1953. The reasons for this estimate were “grave danger of war against
mainland China, of general war in the Far East, or even of global war” and the “economic and
military vulnerabilities of Communist China and the Soviet Far East.”4 In other words, the US
intelligence community was aware of the overall advantage of the US over China and/or the
USSR, which, it believed, would deter them from expanding in Asia. Given that the US did not
deploy all the forces abroad to East Asia alone, the local balance of power between the United
States and China was also important, which will be discussed in the next section.

3

Correlates of War, “National Material Capabilities (v6.0),” https://correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/national-materialcapabilities.
4
“Communist Capabilities and Intentions in Asia through Mid-1953 (NIE-47),” Oct 31, 1952, CIA, CREST:
0000269267.
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Now, I turn to China’s past actions. Since Communist China was established about a year
before China’s intervention in the Korean War, there were no relevant China’s past actions for
US policy officials to use to assess China’s resolve. Then, in the fall of 1950, China attacked the
UN forces led by the United States, a country three times stronger in terms of CINC, over a high
interest, that is, to prevent the adverse shift of the balance of power near its borders.
Furthermore, China fought the US fiercely for more than two and half years and brought about a
stalemate.
Having assessed the balance of power and China’s past actions, now let me lay out
predictions for my theory and the current calculus theory. Since the United States was stronger
than China on the eve of Chinese intervention in Korea and there was no relevant record of
China’s past actions, both non-experts and experts would predict China’s reluctance to intervene
in the fall of 1950. By the time of the Dien Bien Phu crisis, the balance of power had not shifted
significantly or modestly shifted in favor of the United States. Since China had demonstrated its
resolve to attack a superior power over high a high interest, however, my theory predicts that
both non-experts and experts would assess China’s likelihood to intervene in Dien Bien Phu to
protect China’s border security, a high interest, higher. On the other hand, the current calculus
theory predicts that policy officials across the board would expect China’s intentions to intervene
both in Korea and Dien Bien Phu unlikely or they would expect similar Chinese intentions on
both occasions.
Now, I will turn to China’s strategic statements. According to scholars who studied
Mao’s strategic thoughts, one important common theme is his emphasis on strategic flexibility
and the importance of military superiority for taking the offensive. According to Alastair Iain
Johnston who analyzes ancient Chinese strategic culture and compares it with Mao’s cognitive
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map, the latter emphasizes a “concept of absolute strategic flexibility” and that “superior military
power is clearly a critical causal element in the defeat of an adversary and the achievement of
key political goals.” Therefore, Johnston argues that Mao’s texts instruct that “The shift from the
strategic defensive to the strategic offensive should come only when conditions are ripe—
namely, when the relative balance of composite capabilities shifts in one’s favor.”5
Alice Langley Hsieh, a renowned China specialist in the 1960s, also reaches a similar
conclusion. She observes that Mao established “an integrated doctrine whereby a weak force
could hope to succeed against a militarily stronger enemy.” She elaborates:
It was no accident that in 1936 Mao wrote: “Our strategy is ‘to pit one against ten,’ while
our tactic is ‘to pit ten against one.’ ” By 1948 this formula was translated into his famous
dictum of “strategically despise, tactically respect” the enemy. By this Mao meant that
the trend of historical development was with the forces of socialism even though the
strength of the capitalist or imperialist enemy might have to be acknowledged in specific
situations. In effect, this was a reaffirmation of the premise that force was an instrument
to be used cautiously and rationally, depending on the political-military balance.6

Edward L. Katzenbach and Gene Z. Hanrahan argue in similar lines. According to them,
“Mao recognizes that there are two politico-military dangers. The first is too great a penchant for
heroism—desperadoism, he calls it. The other is, as one might expect, a willingness to give up
too soon.” They argue that in Mao’s thought, “Discouragement requires that war must be at once
constantly successful and most cautiously fought. Losses must be kept at a minimum, and local
successes must be continuous.” In other words, “The very price of survival is caution.” They
conclude, “Hence Mao’s repetitive insistence on the necessity of local superiority: five and even

5

Johnston, “Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China.” The quotes are from 239, 245, 246.
“Communist China and Nuclear Force,” Alice Langley Hsieh, Mar 1963,
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD0401340.pdf, 9.
6
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ten against one is his formula.”7 Although Johnston and Katzenbach and Hanrahan discuss
military strategy during a war instead of grand strategy of when to wage a war, they are
interchangeable because in Mao’s thinking, military and political strategy are intimately
intertwined.8
In short, one common theme in Mao’s politico-military thought is a cautious and flexible
application of force only when relative military capabilities are in one’s favor. This assessment,
however, does not match the resolve China demonstrated by attacking a stronger power in Korea.
Thus, my theory predicts that experts would not use China’s geopolitical statements emphasizing
caution and a superior balance of power as necessary conditions for taking the offensive to infer
China’s intentions in the wake of the Chinese intervention. Likewise, the theory predicts that
non-experts would pay no attention to China’s geopolitical statements as evidence of Chinese
intentions.
Finally, a word on Chinese experts in the US government during the period of this case
study is in order. As with the case with other chapters, the intelligence community was a group
of experts on China during the whole period. Regrading experts outside the intelligence
community, John Patton Davis, a renowned China Hand, resided in the State Department on the
eve of the Chinese intervention. As noted above, however, my theory predicts that Chinese
experts’ assessments would converge with non-experts’ assessments both at the times of the
Korean War and the Dien Bien Phu crisis. Furthermore, by the time of the Dien Bien Phu crisis,
Davis had been purged. Therefore, his assessments are not examined in this chapter.

7
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Empirical Analysis
The analysis based on the method of difference below suggests that China’s record of past
actions had caused the divergent US assessments of Chinese intentions to intervene in Korea and
in Dien Bien Phu. Process tracing then demonstrates how US policy officials’ beliefs of Chinese
resolve had changed in response to the intervention and how they referred to it when they
considered US intervention in the Dien Bien Phu crisis.

Divergent US Assessments of China’s Intentions to Intervene in Korea and Dien Bien Phu
On June 25, 1950, the Korean People’s Army of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
crossed the 38th parallel and began its invasion of the Republic of Korea. The United States,
along with the United Nations’ support, intervened shortly to arrest the invasion, but caught by
surprise, the UN forces were forced to retreat to the tip of the peninsula. The tide of the conflict
started to change after September 15 when US Far Eastern Commander Douglas MacArthur
launched an amphibious counteroffensive at Inchon. Caught off guard, the Korean People’s
Army retreated northward and beyond the 38th parallel. Fearful of another invasion in case
North Korea was left intact, the United States decided to cross the parallel to unify the peninsula.
On October 1, South Korean forces crossed the parallel, followed by US forces on the 7th. In the
meantime, since late August, China had begun issuing verbal threats suggesting a possible
military intervention. US Intelligence also indicated that China massed forces in Manchuria, an
adjacent area to North Korea, enough to effectively intervene in the fray. The series of these
verbal threats culminated in Zhou Enlai’s dramatic statement toward K. M. Panikkar, Indian
ambassador in Beijing, in early October. In no uncertain terms, Zhou declared that crossing the
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parallel by forces other than South Korean forces would be met with Chinese intervention. As a
result, although Soviet and Chinese reactions had been discussed by the US government since
the beginning of North Korea’s invasion, discerning China’s intentions became crucial to US
policy in the fall of 1950.9
The evidence shows that with few exceptions, US officials estimated in early October
that China would not intervene in the conflict. They did not alter this estimate until the UN
forces encountered Chinese troops for the first time later in that month. Top policymakers at the
State Department agreed that China would not intervene. Upon receiving a series of China’s
verbal threats, for example, Secretary of State Dean Acheson admitted that there was a risk to
ignore the threats. He asserted, however, “the only proper course to take was a firm and
courageous one and that we should not be unduly frightened at what was probably a Chinese
Communist bluff.”10 Undersecretary of State James Webb and Deputy Undersecretary of State
H. Freeman Matthews expressed similar assessments.11 So did Assistant Secretary of State for

9
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the Far Eastern Affairs Dean Rusk and Director of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs John
Allison, officials with the greatest responsibilities to report to Acheson on Korea.12
The chiefs of US diplomatic missions abroad also dismissed China’s threats. US
Ambassador in Moscow Alan Kirk wrote back to Washington, “Chou En-lai’s statements to
Panikkar may be last minute Chinese attempt to play upon Indian apprehension to point where
maximum profit for China and USSR can be salvaged from North Korean reverses.”13 US
Consulate General at Hong Kong James R. Wilkinson agreed: “North Koreans will not receive
open large-scale military support from Chinese Communists but will go on guerrilla resistance.”
He added, “Majority British and Chinese opinion [in] Hong Kong is that Chinese Communists
will not intervene militarily there.”14 Various host countries’ foreign ministries also agreed with
the US estimates and discounted the likelihood of China’s intervention.15
The US intelligence community also concluded that China would not intervene. A
number of daily intelligence reports by the CIA between late September and early October
concluded that Chinese intervention in force was unlikely.16 The Joint Intelligence Indications
Committee, an ad hoc committee comprised of mostly military intelligence officials and chaired
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by the head of the US Army intelligence branch, was also skeptical of Chinese intentions to
intervene overtly.17 Most important, in mid-October, the intelligence community’s coordinated
estimate, presided over by the CIA’s Office of Reports and Estimates, concluded, “While fullscale Chinese Communist intervention in Korea must be regarded as a continuing possibility, a
consideration of all known factors leads to the conclusion that barring a Soviet decision for
global war, such action is not probable in 1950.”18
The US Far Eastern Command also reached the judgment that China would not intervene.
In mid-October, Charles Willoughby, the head of G-2 of the Far Eastern Command, considered
Chinese threats to be “probably in a category of diplomatic blackmail.”19 Most important, in
response to Truman’s question about the likelihood of Chinese intervention, MacArthur
famously answered in mid-October at the Wake Island Conference:
Very little. Had they interfered in the first or second months it would have been decisive.
We are no longer fearful of their intervention. We no longer stand hat in hand. The
Chinese have 300,000 men in Manchuria. Of these probably not more than 100/125,000
are distributed along the Yalu River. Only 50/60,000 could be gotten across the Yalu
River. They have no Air Force. Now that we have bases for our Air Force in Korea, if the
Chinese tried to get clown to Pyongyang there would be the greatest slaughter.20

In short, there was a consensus that Chinese intervention was not likely.
To be sure, there were some dissenting opinions at the State Department, but they were
few, expressed by relatively junior State officials.21 In discussing Zhou’s threat at a meeting,
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Livingstone Merchant, deputy assistant secretary of state (Rusk’s deputy), expressed his belief
that “we should treat it with extreme seriousness and not discount it as a bluff.” He noticed,
however, that “the majority present were inclined to regard it as a bluff pending more
information.”22 U. Alexis Johnson, deputy director of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs
(Allison’s deputy), and O. Edmund Clubb, director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Rusk’s
subordinate), went more than Johnson by suggesting an exclusive use of South Korean troops
beyond the 38th parallel.23 However, their suggestion could not impress their superiors.
The result of the above US consensus was well known. On October 25, China engaged
UN forces and then temporarily retreated less than two weeks later. In late November, they
ambushed the UN forces on a larger scale. As a result, the United States ground forces suffered
the longest retreat in its history.
The United States had encountered a similar situation in Dien Bien Phu in the spring of
1954. The Dien Bien Phu crisis happened in the eighth year of the First Indochina War.
Exhausted and frustrated by the lengthy war, the French had agreed to discuss Indochina issues
at the Geneva conference supposed to be held in late April 1954. In the meantime, French
General Henri Navarre had deployed the best French troops to the remote village of Dien Bien
Phu in northwestern Vietnam to lure the Vietminh into a set-piece battle, which was what he
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believed in French advantage. Viet Minh General Vo Nguyen Giap accepted the challenge, and
the climactic battle began on March 13. As opposed to French expectation, the battle proceeded
from the beginning in substantial favor of the Viet Minh. In order to help the French, therefore, a
possible US intervention were being discussed in the Eisenhower administration. In line with this
effort, US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles publicly called for “United Action” among US
allies to intervene in Indochina. In the end, the French surrendered on May 7. However, even
after the battle of Dien Bien Phu, US intervention was on the table while the Geneva Conference
was going on. In considering US intervention during the crisis, one important factor for US
officials was whether China would openly intervene in response to US multilateral or unilateral
intervention, a similar situation to Korea where the United States had to estimate the likelihood
of Chinese intervention in response to US attempt to unify the peninsula by crossing the 38th
parallel.24
US officials assessed that it was probable that China would intervene if the United States
intervened in Dien Bien Phu. Unlike Korea, they were not so optimistic about China’s response
this time. For example, in discussing the probability of Chinese intervention in the face of
hypothetical Viet Minh defeat, an NSC paper on April 5 concluded, “The chances are about even
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that in this situation Communist China would decide upon overt intervention rather than accept
the defeat of Vietminh.”25
US intelligence community followed suit. Although there was some disagreement within
the community, as Director of the CIA Allen Dulles noted at an NSC meeting on April 6, the
disagreement was “one of degree.” According to him, “All the members of the [Intelligence
Advisory] Committee recognized that if the United States intervened in such force as to contrive
the defeat of the Vietminh, there would be very great danger of overt Chinese Communist
intervention.” He added that some members of the Intelligence community predicted more than a
fifty percent chance of Chinese intervention, whereas he himself calculated less. Having said
that, he emphasized, “At any rate, the contingency of Chinese Communist intervention was very
significant and should be taken into consideration in the Council’s deliberations.”26 Nobody
present at the meeting questioned this judgment.
Most important, President Eisenhower believed that China and even the Soviet Union
would intervene if the US intervened. As noted above, he did not question the CIA’s estimate of
a fifty percent chance of Chinese intervention, and according to his memoirs, he and Dulles were
“concerned” with the estimate.27 Furthermore, should the United States intervene unilaterally,
Eisenhower thought China would meet US intervention with its counter-intervention. He noted
in an NSC meeting in late April, “if the United States were to intervene in Indochina alone, it
would mean a general war with China and perhaps with the USSR, which the United States
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would have to prosecute separated from its allies.”28 In short, unlike in the fall of 1950, few
lightly dismissed the likelihood of Chinese intervention.
In the end, the Eisenhower administration decided against multilateral or unilateral
intervention in Vietnam. Although probable Chinese intervention in response to US intervention
was just one factor among a few that helped the United States give up on intervening, it is far
from a trivial factor that affected Eisenhower’s decision. In discussing various reasons that the
Eisenhower administration had not intervened, historians have mainly focused on factors other
than the administration’s assessments of China’s intentions such as Congress’ opposition, the
lack of public support, British opposition, and French reluctance to comply with US advice on
how to fight.29 However, this is probably because the prospect of Chinese intervention was not
seriously questioned by the administration. Furthermore, when the administration showed its
hesitancy to intervene and Congress showed its strong opposition to intervention, one important
factor was antipathy toward another land war in Asia.30 Given that the Chinese intervention
turned the Korean War from a war that would shortly end into a costly, lengthy one, US anxiety
of another land war in Asia implied fear of China. In short, although historians do not discuss
how US officials assessed China’s reaction to US intervention much, that does not mean their
assessments did not matter.
Taken together, US officials assessed China’s intentions to intervene in Korea and
Vietnam in a completely opposite way: They dismissed the possibility of Chinese intervention in
Korea, whereas they took the possibility of Chinese intervention in Vietnam seriously. The next
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section executes Mill’s method of difference to get hints of what had caused the divergent
assessments.

Mill’s Method of Difference: The Korean War and the Dien Bien Phu Crisis
Now, what can explain these divergent US assessments of Chinese intentions to intervene in the
Korean War and Vietnam? Below, I single out several variables that may explain the divergence
and assess each variable’s impact on US assessments on these two occasions. Mill’s method of
difference strongly suggests that it was Chinese intervention in the Korean War that had caused
the divergence.
First, as noted above, the relative distribution of capabilities between the United States
and China had not changed significantly since the Korean War. In fact, military capabilities, the
most important component of power in international politics, had shifted in favor of the United
States almost three-fold. In the meantime, the overall balance of power modestly shifted in favor
of the United States (see Table 4.1 above). This suggests that the distribution of capabilities
cannot explain why the United States assessed China’s intentions to intervene in Korea and
Indochina differently.
Second, China’s military buildups near the borders with North Korea and Vietnam
respectively and US assessments of these buildups were also comparable, suggesting they cannot
explain the divergent assessments. It has been argued that the more a state builds up its military
forces near the zone of a conflict, the more likely the state is perceived to be willing to use force
and therefore the more credible its threat is.31 By the beginning of October 1950, US officials
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had estimated that China built up at least 400,000 troops concentrated in Manchuria, a Chinese
region adjacent to North Korea.32 Furthermore, out of this troop concentration, 100,000 troops
were estimated to be ready to enter North Korea immediately.33 Thus, a US intelligence
community’s coordinated estimate concluded in mid-October, “There are certainly enough
Chinese Communist forces readily available in Manchuria to permit military intervention on a
scale sufficient to alter the course of events in Korea.”34
On the other hand, according to a CIA briefing at an NSC meeting in early April 1954,
China was estimated to be able to logistically support 240,000 troops in Vietnam. Out of this
maximum troop strength, two Chinese armies (60,000) were stationed immediately adjacent to
the Tonkin border. Furthermore, the briefing noted that China could “overrun Tonkin with a
force of 50-75,000 men, together with Viet Minh troops, against French resistance alone.”35 In
other words, with the two Chinese armies stationed near the border, China could intervene
immediately to change the tide of the conflict. Furthermore, according to a National Intelligence
Estimate of June 1954, the CIA estimated that once a decision to intervene had been made, China
could send the above maximum strength (240,000) within a month, even prior to US
intervention.36 In short, the fact that US officials were aware that China had built up forces
enough to effectively intervene in both Korea and Dien Bien Phu suggests that the military
buildups cannot explain the opposite estimates of Chinese intentions in Korea and Vietnam.
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Third, China’s interests at stake in these two conflicts predict that the United States
would assess China’s intentions to use force more likely in Korea than in Indochina, suggesting
that this variable cannot explain the divergence in US estimates. It has been argued that the more
important interests are at stake in a dispute between states, the more likely a state is perceived to
be willing to use force to protect the interest at stake.37 In this light, both Korea and Vietnam
were bordering the frontiers of China. In other words, China’s buffer zones were at stake during
both the Korean War and Dien Bien Phu crisis.
However, close, nuanced analysis reveals that these two buffer zones had different levels
of strategic importance for China, even though they were both buffer zones. The North Korean
border was much closer to Beijing (a few hundred miles away) than Tonkin in Vietnam (over a
thousand miles away). Furthermore, Manchuria, the most industrialized area of China at that
time, was just beyond the border between China and North Korea. There was also the Suiho dam
on the Yalu River, the largest dam in Asia that provided Manchuria with electricity.38 In short,
the fact that more important Chinese interests were at stake in Korea than in Dien Bien Phu
suggests that interests at stake cannot explain the divergent assessments.
Fourth, another important variable is the strength of verbal threats issued by China
toward the United States in these two crises. Like other variables, it seems that this variable
cannot explain the divergent US assessments in Korea and Dien Bien Phu because China’s
threats in Korea were stronger than those in Dien Bien Phu. Although there has been a dispute
over which, public or private threats, are more credible, various theories of verbal signaling hold
that the more explicit and unambiguous verbal threats are, the more credible they are.39 In this
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light, Chinese verbal threats were less explicit and therefore less menacing in Dien Bien Phu than
in Korea.
The strongest verbal threat on the eve of Chinese intervention in Korea was Chou Enlai’s private statement toward Indian Ambassador K. M. Panikkar. In early October 1950, Zhou
dramatically convened Panikkar a little after midnight and stated in no uncertain terms: “The
American forces are trying to cross the 38th parallel and to expand the war. If they really want to
do this, we will not sit still without doing anything. We will be forced to intervene.”40 China also
issued numerous public threats.41 For example, China’s foreign ministry declared in midOctober, “The American war of invasion in Korea has been a serious menace to the security of
China from its very start … The Chinese people cannot stand idly by with regard to such a
serious situation created by the invasion of Korea by the United States and its accomplice
countries and to the dangerous trend toward extending the war.” Then, it asserted, “The Chinese
people . . . are even more firm in holding that aggressors must be answerable for all
consequences resulting from their frantic acts in extending aggression.”42
On the other hand, Chinese threats to intervene in Vietnam were less explicit. The most
explicit verbal threat was a public threat made on April 21 when People’s Daily declared,
“Chinese people advocate peace and oppose war, but, faced with armed aggression, they will
certainly not refrain from doing something about it.”43 A week later, Chou also accused publicly
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the US collective defense measures in the Far East of an attempt to “start a new world war.”44
These public threats were as explicit as China’s public threats in the Korean War, but their
volume during the Dien Bien Phu crisis was much less than that on the eve of Chinese
intervention in Korea. Furthermore, there were no private threats in the Dien Bien Phu crisis
comparable to Zhou’s threat through Panikkar.
In fact, in the middle of the Dien Bien Phu crisis, the US intelligence community
meticulously compared China’s verbal threats with those issued in Korea to infer China’s
intentions. Its conclusion was: “Current Sino-Soviet comment on the Indochina war is . . . much
less menacing than the line on Korea just prior to Chinese intervention there in 1950.”45 In short,
given that China’s threats at Dien Bien Phu were less threatening than those at Korea, it is
suggested that the strength of verbal threats cannot explain the divergent US assessments.
Fifth, yet another important variable was China’s desire to consolidate its regime and
focus on economic development at home. At the time of the Chinese intervention in Korea, the
Chinese Communist regime had been just established a year earlier, and its economy was
exhausted due to the civil war and the war against Imperial Japan. Furthermore, the regime still
had to handle hostile guerillas in the southern and western parts of the country.46 Thus, the US
policymakers must have been aware of the Chinese leadership’s desire to focus on domestic
problems. In fact, the CIA pointed out that mounting domestic problems were one of the factors
opposing its intervention.47
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This logic, however, was applicable, if not more applicable, to China during the Dien
Bien Phu crisis. When the Dien Bien Phu crisis began, an armistice on the Korean Peninsula had
been just reached a year earlier. Given that the civil war and war against Imperial Japan were
soon followed by the Korean War, Chinese leadership in 1954 must have wanted to address
mounting domestic problems much more than in 1950. The evidence supports this logic. In
December 1953, the CIA estimated that China’s incentives to “concentrate upon domestic
problems including strengthening of Communist China’s economy” “might deter the
Communists from deciding to intervene openly in force.”48 In short, given that US officials were
aware of China’s domestic problems both in the fall of 1950 and the spring of 1954, they cannot
explain the divergent US assessments in these crises.
Sixth, some scholars argue that racism plays an important role in threat perceptions. The
historian Gordon Chang argues that the United States considered China more threatening than
the USSR despite the latter’s much stronger material capabilities because of racism in the United
States.49 The international Relations scholar Zoltan Buzas also contends that racial difference
inflates policymakers’ threat perceptions, whereas racial similarity deflates them.50 However, it
is difficult for the racism in the United States to explain the divergent assessments of Chinese
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threats in Korea and Vietnam because it can be safely assumed that the prevalence of racism in
the United States was roughly constant when these two crises had happened.
Finally, some scholars have argued that the United States dismissed Chinese threats to
intervene in Korea because the Soviet Union, China’s senior ally from the US point of view, was
not ready for a general war. According to this claim, with the assumption of the Sino-Soviet
alliance as monolithic, US officials estimated that as long as the Soviet Union was not ready for
a general war, it would not let China intervene because that might escalate into a global war that
would involve the USSR.51 This view is worth close analysis because if the United States
considered China during the Dien Bien Phu crisis a more independent actor than it used to be on
the eve of Chinese intervention in Korea, this may explain the US divergent assessments of
China’s intentions in these two crises.
The evidence does not support the above claim because it is the factors more unique to
China, not the USSR’s constraint on China, that primarily shaped US assessments of the
likelihood of Chinese intervention in Korea. Although US officials listed several reasons why
they predicted that China would not intervene, the most important reason seems to be the US
underestimation of China’s resolve to absorb costs inflicted by superior US armed forces. The
most comprehensive estimate by the US intelligence community listed several factors opposing
Chinese intervention, and the top factor in the list was that “Chinese Communists undoubtedly
fear the consequences of war with the US” because “Their domestic problems are of such
magnitude that the regime’s entire domestic program and economy would be jeopardized by the
strains and the material damage which would be sustained in war with the US.” To be sure, the
list referred to Soviet influence as the third factor, but it is far from arguing the Soviet Union
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would not approve of China’s intervention. The report noted, “Open intervention would be
extremely costly unless protected by powerful Soviet air cover and naval support. Such Soviet
aid might not be forthcoming because it would constitute Soviet intervention [emphasis added].”
Furthermore, among the seven factors listed by the report, the most were specific to China.52
In addition, when Secretary of State Dean Acheson, the most important policymaker of
the time, recalled the reasons why the Truman administration had dismissed China’s threats to
intervene at the MacArthur hearing in the spring of 1951, he did not mention Soviet influence.
He noted,
Among the reasons for believing that they would not come in were the amount of welltrained troops which they would have to commit, the possible weakening of the
Government in China itself, the lack of real advantage to China itself in coming in, and
these are some of the factors—its position internationally, it would probably lose ground
rather than gain ground in its international position.53

Historians and political scientists have also considered China’s military capabilities and
the enormous costs China would suffer due to its capability gap with the United States the most
important causes of US assessment.54 For example, a historian William Stueck writes,
China did not possess the capacity to wage global war against the United States, or even
to strike in Europe; the Soviet Union did. This fact made caution in the face of a threat by
the latter . . . more necessary . . . than by the former. The momentum of early October
was breakable, but by the Soviets, not the Chinese [emphasis original].55
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In short, far from estimating that China would be constrained by the Soviet Union, the United
States underestimated Chinese intentions to intervene due primarily to factors unique to China.
Table 4.2 summarizes the above discussion. These important variables either predict
China’s threats in the fall of 1950 in Korea would be more credible than those in the spring of
1954 in Dien Bien Phu or they would be comparable. Nevertheless, US officials calculated that
China was unlikely to intervene in Korea, whereas they predicted that China was likely to
intervene in Dien Bien Phu in response to US intervention. This suggests that
these variables cannot explain the divergence of US estimates. On the other hand, China’s past
actions suggest that Chinese threats in Dien Bien Phu would be more credible than those in
Korea because China’s record of past actions was tabula rasa in Korea whereas China’s resolve
had been already demonstrated in Korea when the Dien Bien Phu crisis began. Thus, the method
of difference strongly suggests that it was China’s past actions that differed in these two crises
and that may explain the US divergent assessments of China’s intentions. The next section
performs process tracing to examine how US officials’ assessments had evolved and why they
had reached their estimates.

Table 4.2: The Method of Difference Applied to the US Assessments of Chinese Intentions to Intervene in Korea and Dien Bien
Phu
Independent Variables
China's Overall
Capabilities

Korea

China's Military
Buildup near
the Borders

Stronger

China's
Interests at
Stake

Strength of
Chinese Verbal
Threats

Stronger

Stronger

Comparable

Dependent Variable
US Racial
Prejudices
toward the
Chinese

Comparable

Dien Bien
Phu
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Soviet
China's Past
Constraint on
Actions
China
Never so
strong in US
assessments

US Assessments of
the Likelihood of
Chinese Intervention

N/A

Low

Resolute

High

Process Tracing
China demonstrated its resoluteness in Korea by attacking and fighting fiercely against a
materially superior power, the United States. As a result, this brought China a status or reputation
of a great military power. One may argue that if the Korean War demonstrated China’s military
power, it is power, not resolve and risk-taking, that China demonstrated in Korea. This is only
half correct because China’s reputation as a great military power was brought about by
demonstrating China’s steadfastness to win the war despite its mounting costs. In other words,
observers attributed China’s cost indifference to its source of power. This view is in line with
classic IR theorists who conceptualized “national morale” and “national will” as a component of
power.56
China had incurred massive casualties in Korea. To be sure, US losses in the war were
significant, but compared to those of China, its losses were far less. The United States’ losses
consist of 36,574 killed and 103,284 wounded. On the other hand, China’s losses are estimated
by the United States as 400,000 killed and 486,000 wounded.57 Roughly speaking, this means
that 11 Chinese soldiers sacrificed their lives to kill 1 American soldier. This is indeed a
staggering gap. To put it in perspective, Imperial Japan killed 1 enemy soldier for every 12
friendly soldiers killed in the Pacific theater in World War II.58 The fact that Japanese soldiers’
determination so impressed US leadership in the Pacific theater that it was seriously concerned
with the mounting US casualties signifies how US officials viewed the Chinese intervention.
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Chinese soldiers’ sheer number and leadership’s high tolerance of costs were described
by contemporaries as “yellow tide,” “human sea,” and “human waves,” and this resoluteness in
the face of modern firepower wielded by the strongest armed force on earth brought China a
reputation of a great military power. Journalist Richard Hughes wrote, “Under the ruthless
discipline of communism and the influence of Russian training and supplies, China has become a
first-class fighting power.” According to him, this status was won partly because “The Chinese
are displaying the Japanese readiness to die rather than surrender.”59 Harry Gordon, a journalist,
also concluded that the Chinese were so fanatical that they “marched out into minefields with the
express job of stamping on the mines.” In his account, Chinese soldiers “were prepared to throw
the bodies of dead and wounded comrades onto barbed wire entanglements so that they could
clamber across them.”60 US Army Colonel Samuel Marshall described how American soldiers
were “swamped by a yellow tide which moved upon it from all sides . . . it was like dealing with
mass lunacy.”61 US Army General Mark Clark also wrote, “the enemy hurled overwhelming
numbers of men at us, apparently heedless of how many he lost.”62 As a result, New York Times’
military correspondent Hanson Baldwin went as far as to write that the way the Chinese fiercely
fought “led to reports . . . that the Chinese in battle . . . were ‘hopped up’ with opium,” although
he admitted that he had seen no verification.63
The Korean War was the watershed for American popular images of China. According to
Harold Isaacs’ influential study, American images of the Chinese up until the Chinese
intervention were “unaggressive, nonmechanical, and unmartial.” Now, these unaggressive
59
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Chinese became tough warriors. Isaacs writes, “It required an experience as jolting as that in
Korea to introduce these new images of the Chinese as a warrior.”64 Baldwin agreed. He writes
in Foreign Affairs in 1951, “The picture we once entertained of the somewhat benign, inscrutable
but wise and civilized Chinese, too intelligent for war—an oversimplified caricature 20 years
ago—has even less validity today.” “For the future,” he continued, “China is in the hands of
peasant stock, of patient men who have shown on many battlefields that they will fight. We have
learned this, somewhat to our surprise and at heavy cost, in Korea [emphasis original].”65
Historians and political scientists agree that the Korean War shaped the US image of a
resolute and tough China. Rosemary Foot writes, “America’s long-term appraisal of the actions
of Moscow and Peking in Korea established the basis for distinguishing between the U.S.S.R. as
its ‘reasonable adversary’ and China as its ‘irrational foe.’ ”66 Gordon Chang concurs. He writes,
“The Chinese, in the eyes of policymakers and public alike, became a demonic threat: they were
oblivious to death, attacked in ‘human waves,’ and ‘brainwashed’ American prisoners.”67 In his
seminal work on China’s road to the Korean War, Allen Whiting also observes, “One major
political consequence of Peking’s entry into the Korean War was the undisputed establishment of
‘new China’ as a force to be reckoned with in Asia. Whatever might have been the merits or
demerits of hotly debated alternative U.N. strategies for countering Chinese Communist
intervention, the outcome of events proved to all Asia, if not to all the world, that the government
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of Mao Tse-tung was both willing and able to defend its interests against direct U.S.
opposition.”68 In her book based on careful historical analysis, a political scientist Evelyn Goh
follows suit: “The strongest element of the Red Menace image envisaged the Chinese
Communists routinely employing force to fulfill their expansionist ambitions. This belief was
based primarily on Beijing’s intervention in the Korean War, which greatly magnified the
perception of China as a direct aggressor against the United States and against the UN, a symbol
of the American-led world order.”69
The US declassified national security documents support this view. Since right after the
Chinese intervention, its impact on US assessments of China’s intentions to intervene in
Indochina had been significant. In mid-November 1950, weeks before the full-scale Chinese
intervention in Korea, a National Intelligence Estimate noted, “If . . . there were signs of the tide
turning in French favor, the Chinese People’s Government, backed by the Soviet Union, might
well decide to undertake invasion by Chinese Communist forces [emphasis added].”70 A little
over a month later in the wake of the Chinese intervention, however, US intelligence
community’s estimate had changed. On December 29, a National Intelligence Estimate observed,
“if the Viet Minh shows signs of failing to attain its military objective of driving the French out
of Indochina or if the Bao Dai government begins to show considerable promise of winning
nationalist supporters away from the Viet Minh, we believe that the Chinese Communists will
resort to direct substantial military intervention in Indochina by committing ‘volunteer’ troops
for service with the Viet Minh unless other considerations intervene [emphasis added].”

68

Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu; the Decision to Enter the Korean War (New York: Macmillan
Company, 1960), 166.
69
Evelyn Goh, Constructing the U.S. Rapprochement with China, 1961–1974: From “Red Menace” to “Tacit Ally”
(Cambridge University Press, 2004), 23.
70
“Soviet Capabilities and Intentions (NIE-3),” Nov 15, 1950, CIA, CREST: 0000269240.

142

Apparently, the reference to volunteer troops was due to the Chinese intervention in Korea. The
report further noted, “Similarly, if US or other non-Communist military forces intervened
directly in support of the French, the Chinese Communists almost certainly would intervene
[emphasis added].”71 The degree of certainty about the estimate had changed from “might well”
before the intervention to “will” and “almost certainly would” after the intervention. Given the
result of Mill’s method of difference, the reference to volunteer troops, and the timing, it is
difficult not to conclude the change was caused by the Chinese resolve demonstrated by Chinese
intervention.
Subsequent CIA estimates support the above interpretation. In August 1951, the CIA
observed that the North Korean invasion of South Korea and Chinese intervention “made clear”
that “the strategy permitted the provision of direct military support by Bloc I countries [areas
under Communist control] to ‘liberation’ movements of Bloc II countries [countries vulnerable
to Communist forces] suffering serious reverses or in danger of extinction, and raised the
possibility of outright military aggression by Bloc I countries.” The report continued,
“International Communist strategy in the Far East has preferred to rely primarily on the efforts of
indigenous Communist forces, but events in Korea have shown that this strategy is not inflexible.
There is, therefore, the distinct possibility, if covert Chinese aid to Communist forces in
Southeast Asia appears inconclusive, that Peiping will intervene directly.”72
A similar observation can be found in a memorandum drafted for NSC in March 1952 by
the Policy Planning Staff and commented by various offices of the State Department. It
observed, “The Chinese Communists have demonstrated in Korea their sensitivity to the
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presence of U.S. forces near their borders and their willingness to accept major risks and
casualties to prevent the approach of U.S. forces to the Manchurian frontier. It must be estimated
that the Chinese Communists have the same sensitivity about their southern border as they have
demonstrated in the case of Manchuria and it is probable therefore that the intervention of U.S.
armed forces in Indochina would occasion a full scale Chinese Communist military
intervention.”73 Reviewing the memorandum, the JCS suggested to replace words denoting
probability in these sentences with those denoting less certainty (e.g., “probable” to “possible”),
but it agreed with the basic logic.74
After Dwight Eisenhower assumed his office, Chinese intervention in Korea had been
always in top policymakers’ minds. Eisenhower himself was well under the influence of the new
image of China demonstrated in the Korean War. He wrote in his memoirs, “We kept a sharp eye
on the Red Chinese for many reasons. For one thing, the Chinese are smart people. For another,
they are tremendous in number, and their leaders seem absolutely indifferent to the prospect of
losing millions of people.”75 His letter to Churchill in the middle of the Taiwan crisis of 19541955 suggests that Eisenhower developed his image of China from the Korean War. He wrote:
it is clear that our vital interests can be seriously damaged by operations that she [China]
is capable of carrying out against weaker areas lying along the boundaries of her territory.
We saw what she tried to do in Korea . . . She can pay any price in manpower, with
complete indifference to the amount. Consequently, she is a distinct threat to the peace of
the world as long as she may be sufficiently irresponsible to launch an attack against
peoples and areas of tremendous importance to us [emphasis added].”76
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He also revealed his concern with a repeat of Chinese intervention in Korea in Indochina when
he declared in his “Chance for Peace” speech in April 1953, “any armistice in Korea that merely
released aggressive armies to attack elsewhere would be a fraud.”77
His top aides shared his concern. In March, NSC discussed “deterrence against the
Chinese Communists so they would not send their forces openly into Vietnam as they had done
in Korea after the North Koreans were defeated [emphasis added].”78 In this meeting, all top
policymakers were present, suggesting that they were under the influence of China’s resoluteness
demonstrated in Korea. In September, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles also delivered an
address on Korean problems before American Legion at St. Louis. In it, he asserted, “Communist
China has been and now is training, equipping, and supplying the Communist forces in
Indochina. There is the risk that, as in Korea, Red China might send its own army into Indochina
[emphasis added].”79
NSC 166/1, the Eisenhower administration’s first top-level strategic document on China,
also made an estimate of future Chinese behavior partly based on Chinese intervention in Korea.
The report, which was circulated in November 1953, observed, “Beyond the historically Chinese
areas, Peiping apparently feels it has preeminent security interests in certain border areas,
particularly North Korea, North Burma, and Northern Vietnam. Peiping would presumably go to
considerable lengths to prevent the establishment of strong Western military forces in these
areas.” The rationale for this estimate was the Korean experience. The document read, “It is
significant that the primary reason advanced by Peiping propaganda in its Korean intervention
was the security of Manchuria—a factor that certainly weighed heavily in the Chinese decision
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to intervene.” In other words, since China intervened in Korea to protect its security interests, the
report inferred China would do the same in North Burma and Northern Vietnam as well.
Focusing on Vietnam, the report further noted, “There is a possibility, although no certainty, that
threatened defeat of the Vietminh by the French and Vietnamese or the intervention of U.S.
forces in Indochina, would result in Chinese Communist intervention on the Korean pattern
[emphasis added].” 80 A concern with the repetition of Chinese intervention in Korea elsewhere
was clearly in the minds of the authors.
Concerned with the French prospect to hold out in Indochina, the Eisenhower
administration established a committee to study US policies toward Vietnam in early 1954. Its
report, finished in early April, also showed the impact of Chinese intervention in Korea on US
assessments. In discussing a possible multilateral intervention in Vietnam led by the United
States, the report suspected that “The fact that the United States was initially only one of a group
would probably not appreciably reduce Peiping’s apprehension at the presence of U.S. power on
the southern border of China.” The report elaborated, “Peiping might well believe that in the end,
as in the case of Korea, the situation would evolve into a continuing and largely U.S. unilateral
commitment [emphasis added].” Thus, the conclusion was: “the chances of overt Chinese
Communist intervention would remain substantial.”81 In other words, the report concluded that
no matter how the United States arranged an international coalition to intervene in Vietnam,
judging from the Korean experience, the United States probably would not be able to avoid
Chinese intervention.
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The above discussion made clear that the US officials had learned lessons from Korea:
the West should not put their forces near Chinese borders unless they are ready to engage
Chinese forces. The significance of this learning will be cleaner if one compares this with US
officials’ views on the eve of the Chinese intervention in Korea. Surprisingly, US officials took
for granted that UN forces approaching Chinese borders on the Korean Peninsula should not look
threatening to China because they were just trying to unify Korea. Interviewed by television in
September 1950, Acheson asserted:
Now, I give the people in Peiping credit for being intelligent enough to see what is
happening to them. Why they should want to further their own dismemberment and
destruction by getting at cross purposes with all the free nations of the world who are
inherently their friends and have always been friends of the Chinese as against this
imperialism coming down from the Soviet Union I cannot see. I don’t see why they
should yield to what is undoubtedly pressures from the Communist movement to get into
this Korean row.82

Therefore, Chang writes, “The Truman administration’s policy toward China had all along been
based on an exaggerated sense of America’s importance and goodwill to China. . . . Officials
never appreciated the depth of Chinese animosity to America’s support of, and continuing links
with, Chiang Kai-shek.”83 However, the above indifference to Chinese security interests in its
frontiers was now gone. US officials now anticipated that China would fight fiercely to prevent
the West from ensconcing its troops near their borders.
As noted above, the US intelligence community carefully examined the similarity
between Chinese verbal threats in Korea with those in Dien Bien Phu. This comparison suggests
that the intelligence community was deeply concerned with the prospect that China may
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intervene, and that comparing current threats with the past threats would give analysts hints
about Chinese intentions in the current crisis. In late April, Undersecretary of State Walter Bedell
Smith sent Secretary of State John Foster Dulles an intelligence analysis made by the State
Department intelligence branch comparing Chinese threats in Korea with those in Dien Bien
Phu. A few weeks later, the CIA made another analysis on the similarity of the verbal threats on
the two occasions. The report noted, “Peiping and Moscow have appeared since early in April to
be shaping a propaganda line for possible large-scale intervention in Indochina some time in the
future.” The similarity of this propaganda line reminded the CIA analysts of the eve of Chinese
intervention in Korea. The report continued, “The line could become more menacing if
Communist proposals on Indochina were rejected [at Geneva] and the United States seemed to
be making progress with plans for ‘united action.’ ” The conclusion of the report was: “Such
propaganda might well culminate in public and private warnings of the type issued by Chou Enlai in 1950.”84 What is suggested here is that if the United States intervened through “united
action,” China would issue threats as explicit as Chou once made in Korea and then intervene as
it did.
A National Intelligence Estimate in June also revealed the effect of Chinese intervention
in Korea on estimated Chinese resolve. The conclusion of the estimate is: “China will probably
be reluctant to undertake courses of action which it considers might involve substantial risk of
provoking unlimited war with a major power.” The major reasons for this estimate were: (1)
China’s need to focus on domestic problems, (2) various limitations with China’s armed forces;
(3) the vulnerability of China’s industrial centers; (4) the narrow margin of available resources
over minimum domestic requirements. Despite these deterrents, the report concluded, “However,
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China will probably counter with military force, to the full extent of its capability, any action
which it considers to be a military threat to its borders or to constitute an imminent threat to its
vital interests, accepting the risks of war inherent in such action.”85 It should be noted the above
four factors were all present at the time of the Korean War, but nevertheless, the CIA concluded
that Chinese intervention was unlikely at that time. Given this point and the analysis up until
now, the rationale behind the above judgment was clear: the CIA learned China was ready to risk
substantial costs to prevent the West from threatening its borders.
I end this section by discussing the effect of Chinese strategic texts. As noted, one
implication of China’s strategic texts was caution in challenging a superior power. However, this
matched neither the record of China’s past actions before the Chinese intervention nor after it.
Before the intervention, China had a clean slate of past actions. Thus, there was no match
between the record of Chinese past actions and the caution advised by Mao. The intervention
demonstrated China’s resolve to challenge a superior power over a high interest, and this did not
match the implication of the strategic texts because each suggested an opposite nature. To be
sure, it is more difficult to demonstrate the lack of evidence than its presence due to the
possibility that unchecked documents may contain positive evidence. However, I have found no
references to Mao’s admonition for caution during this period, which differs significantly from
the empirical analysis for the next chapter where China’s strategic texts and past actions
matched. In short, the evidence supports my theory’s predictions regarding the effect of strategic
texts.
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Taken together, the method of difference and process tracing demonstrated that as my
theory predicted, both non-experts and experts updated China’s resolve upward after they saw
China intervene in Korea.

Evaluations of the Rival Theories
Since the predictions of my theory and the past actions theory for this case are essentially the
same, the past actions theory performed as good as my theory to explain the US divergent
assessments of Chinese intentions at Korea and Dien Bien Phu. The current calculus theory, on
the other hand, performed poorly compared to the other two because it failed to systematically
explain the divergent assessments.
The current calculus theory has failed to explain this case study’s process and outcomes.
Despite that the US-China balance of power and Chinese interests at stake were comparable
between the Korean War and the Dien Bien Phu crisis, US policy officials calculated Chinese
intentions on these two occasions in a completely opposite way. As demonstrated above, US
policy officials estimated China would not intervene in Korea whereas it would in response to
US intervention in Indochina. The semi-controlled analysis and process tracing revealed that it
was a reputation for resolve China acquired in Korea that caused this divergence. China’s
steadfastness and determination to fight for its border security in Korea made it difficult for US
officials to dismiss China’s resolve for defending a similar interest in Indochina.
It should be also noted that the impact of the reputation on US officials was significant
given a variety of countervailing factors. As noted above, the overall balance of power between
the United States and China was roughly 3:1. Furthermore, the quality of these two forces was
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substantially in the US favor.86 It should be also noted that the nuclear balance between the
United States and the Soviet Union, China’s ally, was so favorable to the former, and the nuclear
taboo was still barely binding on US officials.87 Furthermore, China’s desire to focus on
mounting domestic problems by behaving conciliatory internationally was difficult to be
dismissed. In addition, one study argues that military doctrinal differences between belligerents
will increase misperceptions and make them underestimate each other’s capabilities. From this
perspective, the military doctrinal difference between the United States and China in the early
1950s would have caused the United States to underestimate Chinese military capabilities during
the Dien Bien Phu crisis.88 Nevertheless, China’s resoluteness demonstrated in Korea prevailed
over these countervailing factors. In short, given the above discussion, the current calculus
theory performed poorly.
The past actions theory performed as well as my theory in this chapter because the
predictions of both theories are essentially the same. To be sure, my theory predicts that nonexperts have a lower threshold to judge enemies as resolute than experts due to the negativity
bias. However, the Chinese intervention demonstrated its resolve to challenge a stronger power
over a high interest so clearly in Korea that both non-experts and experts took it into account
when they assessed whether China would intervene in Indochina.
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Summary
This chapter examined the US assessments of Chinese intentions from the beginning of the
Korean War in 1950 through the end of the Dien Bien Phu crisis of 1954. I first conducted the
method of difference to show that many important variables cannot explain the US divergent
assessments of Chinese intentions to intervene in Korea and Dien Bien Phu. The analysis
strongly suggested that it was China’s record of past actions that had caused the divergence.
Process tracing then demonstrated that both non-experts and experts developed the image of a
resolute China in the wake of the Chinese intervention in Korea. The analysis further
demonstrated that both non-experts and experts referred to the image and the Chinese
intervention in Korea when they consider multilateral or unilateral intervention in Indochina. As
predicted by my theory, experts did not refer to China’s strategic texts because the latter did not
match the resolute reputation China had acquired in Korea. In short, my analysis showed that my
theory and the past actions theory performed better than the current calculus theory.
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Chapter 5: The US Assessments of Chinese Intentions, 1961-1965

Chapter 3 on the US assessments of Soviet intentions demonstrated that non-experts and experts
used different indicators to reach the same conclusion that the Soviet Union was reluctant to use
force against US interests. In it, I showed that non-experts almost exclusively relied on the
balance of power to assess Soviet intentions, whereas experts employed Soviet past actions and
strategic texts as well as the balance of power to do the same.
This chapter takes a step further from chapter 3 in that it shows that non-experts and
experts had interpreted Chinese past actions differently and reached different conclusions about
their resolve and intentions. Despite China’s backing down in the Taiwan Strait in 1955 and
1958, non-experts in the first half of the 1960s did not update their assessments of China’s
resolve and were fixated on its resolute reputation acquired from the Korean adventure.
Furthermore, following China’s attack against India across the Himalayas in the fall of 1962,
non-experts reinforced their view. They did so even though the attack was against a weaker
power and had questionable information value when US officials pondered China’s intentions to
challenge a stronger power like the United States. In the meantime, experts updated their
estimates of China’s resolve downward in response to its behavior during the Taiwan Strait
crises. Furthermore, they did not take China’s decision to attack India as informative for
assessing its resolve to use force against a superior power. Like chapter 3, this chapter also
shows that when the implications of the record of past actions match those of geopolitical
statements, experts use the latter as further information concerning enemy resolve and intentions.
Unlike in the first half of the 1950s when the texts and behavior did not match, experts started to
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use Mao’s strategic statements urging caution in conjunction with China’s cautious behavior
shown in the Taiwan Straits to estimate China’s resolve and intentions.
The next section discusses the theoretical predictions of each theory. Then, the section is
followed by an empirical analysis organized according to my theory’s predictions. In it, how
non-experts estimated China’s resolve and intentions before and after the Sino-Indian War of
1962 are first discussed. This is followed by the section on experts’ estimates. Then, this section
is followed by how the assessments by experts had influenced non-experts’ estimates. The
following section discusses how rival theories performed against the empirical analysis. The
final section summarizes the findings.

Distribution of Capabilities, Past Actions, and Strategic Texts
The balance of power in Southeast Asia in the first half of the 1960s was in favor of China on the
conventional dimension and in favor of the United States on the nuclear dimension only when
the latter was determined to risk substantial diplomatic and political costs and Soviet retaliation.
The record of Chinese past actions at the beginning of the 1960s was as follows: China attacked
UN forces in Korea, a superior power, over border security, a high interest in 1950; China
retreated in the face of US deterrent policy over a territorial dispute, a high interest, in the
Taiwan Straits in 1955 and 1958; China attacked India, a weaker power, over border security, a
high interest, in 1962. Finally, Chinese strategic texts called for caution and even retreat before a
superior power’s resistance, and this matched Chinese caution demonstrated before the United
States in the Taiwan Straits twice, newer Chinese actions than the Chinese intervention in Korea.
In the first half of the 1960s, the balance of power between China and its neighbors in
Southeast Asia was clearly in China’s favor. During this period, the ground forces of the
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People’s Liberation Army (PLA) had 2.3 million personnel. According to contemporary US
estimates, upon mobilization, this strength could expand to 3.2 million within six months and a
formidable six million within two years. Furthermore, between 1958 and 1965, China possessed
around 1,800 jet fighters (its majority were MiG-17s) and somewhere between 290 and 450 IL28 bombers.1 US officials such as President’s Military Representative and later Joint Chief of
Staff Maxwell Taylor were concerned about China’s modernizing and expanding air force. Some
officials even worried that China’s air power in the region was superior to the US’s.2 Therefore,
a military historian Damien Fenton concludes that compared to the regional neighbors, China
“possessed an overwhelming superiority in both the quantity and the quality of the forces at their
disposal.”3 CIA’s estimate of December 1960 agreed: China was “capable of defeating any other
non-Soviet Asian force or combination of forces.”4
From the perspective of US officials, the key to regional stability was how the US
intervention would affect the military balance because the United States committed itself to the
defense of the region through the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). Since the mid1950s, the balance of power between the United States and China had been gradually shifting in
China’s favor. As table 5.1 shows, the US-China ratio of the distribution of military capabilities
had shifted from 8.98 to 2.49 between 1954 and 1964. Focusing on the first term of the
Kennedy/Johnson presidency between 1960 and 1964, the ratio still had shifted from 3.73 to
2.49.
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A similar trend can be observed for the balance of economic capabilities. As table 5.1
shows, the US-China ratio of the distribution of economic capabilities between 1954 and 1964
had shifted from 28.89 to 10.86, an almost one-third decrease. However, focusing on the first
term of the Kennedy/Johnson presidency, the balance had shifted in US favor from 4.85 to 10.86
due to the failure of the Great Leap Forward in China.
Finally, the overall distribution of capabilities had shifted in favor of China. As table 5.1
shows, the US-China ratio of the distribution of overall capabilities, measured by CINC, had
shifted from 2.98 to 1.84 between 1954 and 1964. In short, although the failure of the Great Leap
Forward was a setback for China, the balance of military capabilities, the most important
indicator for intentions to use force, was significantly shifting in favor of China, along with
China’s overall capabilities.
Table 5.1: The Distribution of Capabilities between the United States and China, 1954-19645

1954
Ratio of the US Military
Power to China's Military
Power
8.96
Ratio of the US
Economic Power to
China's Economic Power 28.89
Ratio of the US Overall
Power to China's Overall
Power
2.98

1955

1956

1957

1958

1959

1960

1961

1962

1963

1964

8.34

4.22

4.03

4.24

3.89

3.73

3.53

3.42

2.99

2.49

21.86 21.07 17.44

8.51

5.87

4.85

8.61 11.25 11.35 10.86

2.16

1.96

1.8

2.92

2.66

2.56

2.01

2.03

1.94

1.84

Now, let me discuss US officials’ perceptions of the balance of power. Since the Korean
War, US officials had been reluctant to be involved in another limited land war in Asia because
of its need for substantial ground forces.6 As Taylor recollected, “the ground force requirements,
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U.S. and allied, to meet a major attack originating on the Asian continent would always be
astronomical.”7 Furthermore, due to President Eisenhower’s determination to cut defense
spending, US Army active combat divisions went down between 1956 and 1960 from eighteen to
fourteen, with three of the latter engaged in training duties rather than being ready for immediate
deployment.8 Therefore, among the US leadership, it was agreed that China’s thrust to its
periphery could be only defeated by the use of nuclear weapons.9 However, the United States
could not use nuclear weapons against China with impunity due to the following two factors:
political and diplomatic costs associated with their use and possible Soviet retaliation.
One significant constraint on the use of nuclear weapons by the United States was its
consequences on world public opinion and the support of US allies. As Matthew Jones
demonstrates, US officials started to realize that given that the first two atomic bombs were used
against the Japanese, another use against the Asians would be prohibitively costly for US global
leadership. Even during the Eisenhower administration, which had threatened to use nuclear
weapons on multiple occasions, US officials started to realize toward the end of the
administration that they would suffer considerable costs if they used nuclear weapons in Asia.
This trend remained in the Kennedy administration. Thus, a number of US officials and studies
toward the end of the Eisenhower administration and during the Kenney/Johnson administrations
noted that in terms of world public opinion and support of US allies, any use of nuclear weapons
would be “catastrophic,” “at prohibitive cost,” would “alienate large and influential sectors of
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world opinion,” could have “irreparable consequences,” or could result in “the damaging charge
that we regard them as the white man’s weapon against Asians.”10 In addition, the use of nuclear
weapons in East Asia may jeopardize the US access to Japanese bases, where two-thirds of the
US combat aircraft in the area were located.11 Some officials even observed that Chinese
leadership surely recognized this constraint on the use of nuclear weapons by the United States.12
Furthermore, Soviet retaliation in case of the US nuclear attack against China was
another constraint. The opinion that the break between the two Communist giants was
fundamental and irreparable had been gradually common since the beginning of 1962.13
However, a number of US officials argued that it was difficult to imagine that in case of
hostilities between the United States and China, the Soviet Union would stand by while the
United States was striking China with nuclear weapons.14 Thus, although the possibility of
Soviet extended deterrence would be eventually ruled out as the dispute between the two
countries further deteriorated, it seems that US officials could not lightly dismiss Soviet
retaliation during this period.
In short, the balance of power in Southeast Asia was in favor of China on the
conventional dimension and in favor of the United States on the nuclear dimension only when
the latter was determined to risk substantial diplomatic and political costs and Soviet retaliation.
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Based on these assessments, my theory predicts non-experts would regard the balance of power
with great concerns and therefore assess that China might or even would be willing to use force
in the region. In the meantime, the theory predicts that experts would regard the balance of
power seriously but combine it with assessments of China’s resolve to estimate China’s
intentions to use force. The current calculous theory predicts that US officials, regardless of the
distinction between non-experts and experts, would consider the balance of power as the primary
factor that shapes their assessments of Chinese intentions. In particular, it predicts that US
officials would calculate that China might or even would be willing to use force.
Now, let me assess China’s record of past actions. China attacked the UN forces
including the armed forces of the United States, a superior power, over border security (a low
interest) on the Korean front in 1950. This was followed by backing down twice in the face of
US determination in the Taiwan Straits over territories (a high interest) in 1955 and 1958. Then,
in October 1962, China attacked India, a weaker power, across the Himalayas over territories (a
high interest). Thus, my theory predicts that non-experts would stick to China’s resolute record
in Korea and reinforce this perception in response to the Sino-Indian War. On the other hand,
experts would assess China as cautious because its resolute reputation from Korea was updated
by cautious behavior shown in the Taiwan Strait twice. Furthermore, since the attack across the
Himalayas was against a weaker power, experts would not significantly change their perceptions
of a cautious China in the face of the US superior power. The current calculous theory predicts
that US officials across the board would not employ China’s past actions to infer Chinese resolve
and intentions to use force. On the other hand, the past actions theory predicts that US officials,
whether they are non-experts or experts, would use China’s past actions in a way I specified for
experts above.
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Having interpreted the balance of power and Chinese past actions, I will turn to China’s
strategic statements. Since I already assessed China’s statements on strategy in the previous
chapter, I only summarize the assessment here. As noted in the previous chapter, one common
theme in Mao’s politico-military thought is a cautious and flexible application of force only
when relative military capabilities are in his favor. This attitude is best represented by Mao’s
dictum “despise the enemy strategically but respect him tactically.” This interpretation matches
the assessment of China’s record of cautious use of force from experts’ perspectives. Thus, my
theory predicts that to infer China’s intentions, experts would use its strategic statements as
additional evidence for Chinese caution in the face of US deterrent. On the other hand, the theory
predicts that non-experts would pay no attention to China’s strategic statements as evidence of
Chinese intentions.
Finally, I identify experts outside the intelligence community for this chapter. Although
China Hands were swept from the US government due to McCarthyism, there were two China
experts during the period of this case study: Edward Rice and Allen Whiting. Rice was a veteran
foreign service officer, who spent more than ten years in China between the 1930s and 1940s.
Despite his career, he managed to escape the purge of McCarthyism. After working in European
Affairs in the 50s, he got a post in the Policy Planning Council in 1959. Although his impact on
policy was nowhere near Kennan’s or Bohlen’s, his knowledge about China seems to have been
well recognized among his peers. James Thomson, a State Department official, called Rice a
“China specialist,” and William Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific
Affairs, called him “our best China man.”15
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Allen Whiting was a Columbia University political science Ph.D. holder and a renowned
China watcher. He was especially known for his book, China Crosses the Yalu, originally
published in 1960. He cannot be strictly considered an expert outside the intelligence community
because he worked in the first half of the 1960s at the Bureau of Intelligence and Research
(INR), the State Department’s intelligence organization. However, since he developed his
expertise on China well before coming into the intelligence community and became the director
for Far East Analysis at INR within less than a year after his recruitment (fall 1961), he could be
considered a de facto expert outside the intelligence community.16 Compared to Kennan and
Bohlen, memoranda written by Rice and Whiting are substantially limited. However, their
assessments can collectively show how experts outside the intelligence community assessed
Chinese intentions during the first half of the 1960s.
Having assessed the independent variables of each theory, the next section reports the
empirical analysis conducted to evaluate the observable implications of each theory.

Empirical Analysis
With the same set of information available to non-experts and experts, these two groups assessed
Chinese intentions to expand in Southeast Asia in an opposite way. Non-experts were concerned
about Chinese expansion in the region. They even sometimes referred to the Chinese intervention
in Korea to warn about a similar contingency. In the meantime, experts were relatively relaxed
about the possibility of Chinese expansion. This is because they learned from China’s multiple
retreats in the Taiwan Strait crises that China would be cautious enough to avoid challenging the
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US interests in the region. In response to the Chinese attack on India in 1962, non-experts
updated Chinese resolve, whereas experts did not. Furthermore, non-experts did not refer to
China’s strategic texts in estimating Chinese intentions, except when they had been already
convinced by experts’ estimates, whereas experts did as further evidence for China’s cautious
nature.

Non-Experts’ Assessments
The previous chapter showed that the Chinese intervention in the Korean War affected both nonexperts’ and experts’ views of China between 1950 and 1954. Despite China’s backing down in
the Taiwan Straits, among non-experts, the Chinese intervention in the Korean War was still
considered evidence of China’s resolve to use force even in the 1960s. The memories of
American soldiers who were “swamped” by a “human sea” of China’s volunteers, were still
active.17 This experience to have engaged Chinese armed forces on the battlefield distinguished
China from the Soviet Union, which the United States had never openly fought. As Rosemary
Foot observes, “America’s long-term appraisal of the actions of Moscow and Peking in Korea
established the basis for distinguishing between the U.S.S.R. as its ‘reasonable adversary’ and
China as its ‘irrational foe.’ ”18 Noam Kochavi shows that this view was still influential among
US officials even in the 60s.19 Other scholars agree.20
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Along with China’s action in Korea, its capabilities to expand to its periphery affected
non-experts’ views of China. A few months before John F. Kennedy took office, Undersecretary
of State Douglas Dillon, who would become the secretary of the treasury for the Kennedy
administration, remarked at an NSC meeting: “Some years hence . . . the Chinese Communists
would have a nuclear capability of their own. They might not be as cautious about a world
conflagration as the Soviets are and may be more willing to use nuclear weapons in limited
hostilities.” Nobody in the meeting including President Eisenhower questioned Dillon’s view.21
Here, the predicted increase of Chinese power by nuclear weapons and China’s resolve
demonstrated in Korea seems to have shaped Dillon’s view.
Secretary of State Dean Rusk was also concerned about China’s capabilities in its
periphery. Prospect for America, the Rockefeller panel reports published in December 1959,
recorded the assessment of China’s intentions by a foreign policy panel chaired by Rusk.22
Rusk’s biographer Warren Cohen writes, “the views and language of the report were generally
vintage Rusk” and “bore Rusk’s stamp.”23 The report concluded: “What is clear is that
Communist China is in a posture that, in past historical experience, has almost invariably led to
aggression. It has a rapidly growing population, a shortage of vital resources, and a fanatical
ideology.” Then, the report brought up its balance of power logic: “Around a large part of its
perimeter exist ‘soft’ situations, making infiltration, subversion, and outright conquest seem easy
or inviting prospects.”24
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Chester Bowles, Kennedy’s foreign policy advisor during his presidential campaign and
his Undersecretary of State through November 1961, also had a view characterized by the
balance of power. Bowles wrote in his Foreign Affairs article of April 1960 that China
“possesses not only the world’s largest army but a potential capacity for the production of
nuclear weapons.” He continued, “mainland China, with an inadequate resource base, spiraling
population, ruthless Communist leadership and intense nationalist spirit, will develop fiercely
expansionist tendencies directed toward the weaker neighboring states to the south [emphasis
added].”25 In the same month at the Council of Foreign Relations, Bowles went as far as to assert
that China craved lebensraum in Southeast Asia by likening China to Nazi Germany and
Imperial Japan. He maintained that the United States needed to make “crystal-clear” its
determination to intervene in case of a Chinese drive into the region.26
In a meeting in the spring of 1961, where US officials discussed intervention in Laos,
Bowles also contended: “the main question to be faced was the fact that we were going to have
to fight the Chinese anyway in 2, 3, 5, or 10 years and that it was just a question of where, when
and how.” According to him, “a major war would be difficult to avoid.”27 In his memoirs, he
attributed his assessment partly to the Korean War. He wrote, “The Chinese . . . were no more
likely to allow us to establish a solid American beachhead in Laos on their southern border than
they had been to permit us to advance through North Korea to the Yalu River in 1950.”28 Since
then, Bowles had retained the above view. In April 1962, he—now Ambassador at Large—noted
in his memorandum: “The paramount fact of life in Asia today is the existence of Communist
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China. It would be wrong to overstress China’s power; it would be equally wrong to
underemphasize the impact of China’s presence [emphasis original].” He continued, “prudent
U.S. policy in Asia must be prepared for” China’s “defiant, tough reaction in Southeast Asia, the
Formosa Straits and elsewhere that could sharply increase the possibility of war.”29
Adlai Stevenson, Permanent Representative to the United Nations (UN) during the
Kennedy and Johnson administrations, was also deeply concerned about China’s threat due to the
balance of power between China and its weaker neighbors and its resolve demonstrated in the
Korean War. Although he was not among the most important officials in the Kennedy and
Johnson administrations, his view is a good window into assessments by non-experts like
presidents because he was selected twice as a Democratic presidential candidate.
At the beginning of 1960, he wrote in Foreign Affairs, “In Peking . . . I doubt if cost and
risk are decisive factors,” suggesting China’s image created by the Korean adventure was still
active. He continued, “at this stage, pressure from ‘foreign devils,’ real or contrived, provides
[Chinese leadership with] excuses for the austerity and brutal repression involved in the massive
modernization. In this mood, China might conceivably be ready to risk a war in disaster.”30 In his
speeches at the UN, Stevenson characterized China as leading a “plague of warrior states,”
“unregenerate,” and “the world’s most warlike regime.”31
One could argue that these statements were only for public consumption. However, his
private memoranda suggest they were not so different from his true beliefs. In an NSC meeting
in May 1961, Stevenson agreed with Bowles that the United States should prepare for a “full-
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scale war with Chinese” in five to ten years in Southeast Asia.32 He had retained this view in the
subsequent years. In his memorandum for LBJ and Rusk, Stevenson observed in November
1964: “The principal threat to world peace and Western security in the foreseeable future will
almost certainly be Communist China. It is arrogant, aggressive, resourceful and resolute. It is
already stronger militarily than any other state in Asia except the Soviet Union and its military
strength, including its ability to make and deliver nuclear weapons, is likely to grow much faster
than has been forecast.”33 Therefore, he was worried that the US deterrent against China in
Southeast Asia may not be robust. In another memorandum for LBJ of June 1964, he maintained,
“We should not be too certain that our various ‘signals’, political and military, to the
Communists [North Vietnam and China] will really deter them [from intervening in Laos].”
After emphasizing adequate Communist military capabilities to intervene and advising US
vigilance, he ended the paragraph with the following italicized sentence: “Remember Korean
precedent.”34
Robert Komer, an important National Security Council staffer, also showed a similar
view. In April 1961, he circulated a paper on US policy toward China. In it, Komer predicted
that Chinese expansionism would manifest itself “on the Sino-Indian border, in Tibet or Laos or
in the future elsewhere.” The reason was its growing power and inadequate US resources for
containment. According to Komer, during the last decade, China had been “oriented primarily
inward” and “essentially lacked the resources” for expansion, which allowed the United States to
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contain China with minimal resources. However, in his opinion, this would not be the case
anymore. He noted, “this situation of relative ChiCom weakness permitting containment without
too great an allocation of US resources is unlikely to persist. We must project our policy for the
60s against a new order of magnitude in the threat created by burgeoning ChiCom power.” In
doing so, he drew attention to “the essential weakness of the target areas around the CPR
periphery.” His conclusion was, “These offer standing invitations for political maneuver and
even military adventure should conditions appear propitious.”35
An important exception to the above trend is Deputy National Security Advisor and later
Chairman of the Policy Planning Council Walt Rostow. He did not consider China resolute
enough to intend to use force to expand because he assessed China’s overall capabilities as not as
powerful as others judged. As a famous economist and strong believer in modernization theory,
he found Chinese economy as grounded on an unbalanced economic base that critically rested on
agricultural output. From his perspective, the failure of the Great Lead Forward would critically
prevent China from external adventures. During the Laos crisis of spring 1961, he was among
the few that predicted China would not intervene in response to American intervention due to its
horrible economic disaster at home.36
This fact, however, does not significantly contradict my theory because Rostow still
relied on his own unique balance of power estimate that differed from his colleagues.
Furthermore, as a non-expert on China, he did not ground his view of Chinese reluctance to use
force on its past cautious actions. Although he later relied on China’s past actions and strategic
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statements to infer Chinese cautions nature, this was only after he was acquainted with the view
of his experts’ colleagues and subordinates.
Most importantly, the record shows that President Kennedy fretted about China’s
intentions to use force due to the balance of power in Southeast Asia. A few days before his
inauguration day, the incoming president’s letter arrived at George Kennan. In it, the president
said he had read Kennan’s lecture at BBC about nuclear weapons, and he wrote: “I was
especially interested in your thoughts on our considering not merely limitations in testing but the
abrogation of the [nuclear] weapon itself.” However, Kennedy’s interest in this direction was
hampered by a balance of power logic. He continued, “I wonder if we could expect to check the
sweep south of the Chinese with their endless armies with conventional forces” presumably after
the abrogation of the nuclear weapon.37
Although the center of the administration’s attention had shifted to the Soviet Union due
to the Berlin and the Cuban missile crises, Kennedy retained his view of China. When
neutralization was finally established in Laos in July 1962, JFK was puzzled to see why the
Communist side accepted a neutral Laos because he believed that “communism traditionally
pushed outward whenever it could.” Given the favorable balance of power for China in this
region, its cautious approach to Laos seemed puzzling to Kennedy. Thus, he threw this question
at Souvanna Phouma, the leader of the neutralist faction in Laos. Souvanna replied, “Both Mao
and Chou En-lai had told him they feared US presence in Laos and needed a buffer between
SEATO and themselves.” However, JFK did not accept this benign interpretation of what
appeared to him as an aggressive and resolute China.38
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In short, in the early 1960s, a variety of non-experts considered China as threatening to
the stability of Southeast Asia and even willing to use force to expand in the region due to the
conventional balance of power favorable to China. This assessment was further reinforced by
China’s resolute reputation acquired in Korea. Non-experts did not consider China’s backing
down in the Taiwan Straits twice a sign of its cautious nature. The next section shows that nonexperts retained and even reinforced this view in the wake of the Sino-Indian War of 1962.

The Impact of the 1962 Sino-Indian War on Non-Experts’ Estimates
Non-experts retained their alarmist view of China as time progressed in the first half of the
1960s, and their view was further reinforced by China’s attack against India across the
Himalayas in the fall of 1962. On October 20, China initiated its military campaigns against
India in two areas along their common frontier (Aksai Chin in the west and Northeast Frontier
Agency in the east, at opposite ends of the Himalayas). The border dispute can be traced back to
the 19th century, and since 1958, intermittent border skirmishes had been happening.
Throughout the war, China fought skillfully, and the PLA swept down to the undisputed border
along the foothills. Then, on November 21, Beijing unilaterally announced a ceasefire and
eventually withdrew to its approximate positions before the war except for critical checkpoints at
certain passes that remained under its control.
NSC staffer Robert Komer described the attack as “potentially one of the most crucial
events of the decade.”39 Kennedy shared this impression. In the middle of the war, he wrote to
Pakistani president Ayub Khan: “We see another instance of Communist aggression almost as
close to your borders as Cuba is to ours—the Chinese Communist attack on India.” He
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continued, “It also concerns me greatly. The Chinese have moved quickly, with large forces to
take territory beyond that immediately in dispute; it is no longer a border wrangle.” “In my
judgment,” he further noted, “the long-run significance of this move cannot be exaggerated. The
Chinese Communists, having established themselves on the near slopes of the Himalayas, will
have secured a favorable position for further aggression.”40 A month later, Kennedy directed
Averell Harriman, his special envoy to Pakistan, to make the following point to Ayub:
“Whatever India’s past follies, the Chicom attack and India’s response to it create a basically
new situation. We regard this as far more than a mere border squabble, even if it ends in a
temporary settlement. By the Chinese action, the subcontinent has become a new area of major
confrontation between the Free World and the Communists. We must take this fact into account
in our global policy.”41 In recollection by Theodore Sorensen, Kennedy’s speechwriter and one
of his closest advisers, the president also privately remarked, “These Chinese are tough.”
According to Sorensen, Kennedy believed that “the Chinese would soon threaten again, in India
or elsewhere.”42
Kennedy made a series of public remarks that revealed his alarmed view of China within
less than a month after the end of the war, suggesting that his concerns with China were
reinforced. In one of them, Kennedy stated, “The Chinese Communists believe that by constantly
hitting, and if war comes, a nuclear third world war, they can survive it anyway with 750 million
people.”43
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Furthermore, his private talks suggest his concerns showed in public were not just for
propaganda purposes. According to Assistant Secretary of State William Tyler, in a private
dinner with a French cabinet member in January 1963, Kennedy noted, “Relations with the
Soviet Union could be contained within the framework of mutual awareness of the impossibility
of achieving any gains through war. But in the case of China, this restraint would not be effective
because the Chinese would be perfectly prepared to sacrifice millions of their own lives, if this
were necessary in order to carry out their militant and aggressive policies.”44 Likewise, at an
NSC meeting in the same month, Kennedy said that “China’s possession of nuclear weapons
would come at a time when the Chinese Communists were in an expansionist phase.” In another
NSC meeting in May, discussing India’s security in the face of Chinese threat, Kennedy was
informed by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and others that “Any large Chinese
Communist attack on any part of that area [South Asia] would require the use of nuclear
weapons by the US.” Minutes after hearing McNamara’s sober observation, Kennedy
nevertheless said, “We should defend India, and therefore we will defend India if she were
attacked.”45 Kennedy’s urgency for the defense of India, which had never been the issue before
the war, suggests that his assessment of China’s resolve and intentions to use force had increased
in the aftermath of the war. One month later, Kennedy further emphasized his concern in his
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cable to Averell Harriman, his envoy to the Soviet Union. He wrote, “I agree that large [nuclear]
stockpiles are characteristic of US and USSR only, but consider that relatively small [nuclear]
forces in hands of people like ChiComs could be very dangerous to us all.”46
Likewise, for Rusk, the Chinese attack proved China’s willingness to use force. In April
1963, Rusk addressed the SEATO Council of Ministers: “The blatant aggression of Communist
China on the Indian border has vast and historic significance.” He continued, “Suffice it at the
moment to say that it revealed for the whole world Communist China’s readiness to turn even on
those who have tried to be a friend and to resort to overt aggression whenever its expansionist
aims are thereby served.”47 Rusk also addressed the Senate in July: “The Chinese aggression of
1962 . . . demonstrated for all to see—and for the Indians to see—the true nature of the conflict
between two radically different political and social systems and the difference between the
Communist and the free world’s concept of peace. It would be a mistake to underestimate the
importance of the issues raised by the movement of Chinese forces against India last fall and the
threat that such a movement might be resumed.”48
His private remarks were in line with these public statements. In late July, an NSC
meeting was held to assess whether the Soviet move toward detent with the West and the
intensified Sino-Soviet split would drive China into more assertive actions, particularly the
possibility of China’s aggression in Southeast Asia. In the meeting, Rusk reminded the
participants of the Chinese intervention in the Korean War. Then, he further noted, “we should
maintain a state of considerable alert during the next few weeks.” He pointed out that “the
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Chinese Communists could cause grave trouble from a standing start; i.e. without
reinforcements, on several fronts at the same time.” In his opinion, this is because of the balance
of power in favor of China in the region. He maintained, “The military capability on their
frontiers is great. The troops in front of them are very thin and totalitarian regimes can reverse
their courses very quickly.”49 It is not a stretch to attribute this fear of surprise attack to the
Korean experience, which was further reinforced by the attack across the Himalayas.50
Rusk’s alarmed view did not change as time progressed. His cable in December to LBJ,
now president, to report his meeting with de Gaulle stated that he told de Gaulle that “we were
concerned at the evidence of Chinese militancy” by mentioning “the Indian attack” as one of its
examples.51 In February 1964, Rusk also told the Japanese ambassador that China’s militant
approach to the world “offers the most immediate threat of war in the world today,” and
“therefore very important that we not take any step which might encourage Peiping to believe
that its aggressive policies could pay dividends.”52
The timing of the US search for means to retard Chinese nuclear programs also suggests
the administration’s threat perception was increased by the Chinese attack. As historian Sean
Turner argues, although the Kennedy administration had been discussing the implications of
Chinese nuclear weapons from the beginning of the administration, it was only after the SinoIndian War that Kennedy ordered his advisers to search for means to retard China’s nuclear
development.53 Jones also observes that the border war added to the imperative to prevent
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Chinese acquisition of nuclear weapons.54 Furthermore, according to historians William Burr and
Jeffrey Richelson, during Kennedy’s first two years in office, no one in the government had
prepared a comprehensive analysis of the problem of a nuclear China.55
However, Kennedy’s sudden sense of urgency after the border war was clear. In an NSC
meeting two months after the border war, Kennedy, who had just experienced a nuclear
confrontation with the Soviet Union in Cuba, went as far as to say that he “feared this
combination [of nuclear China and China’s expansionist phase] would produce the most
dangerous times since World War II.”56 To be sure, up until the border war, Kennedy
occasionally showed his concern with China’s nuclear weapons; however, his remarks on this
subject were very few and had never reached this level of urgency. For example, in January
1962, he described a nuclear China as one of the “special unsolved problems.” He wondered in
passing, “When the Chinese get missiles and bombs and nuclear weapons, for example, what
effect will that have on our dispositions in Southeast Asia?”57 Then he immediately turned to the
next issue.
However, in the wake of the border war, Kennedy shifted the gear. The fact that he
envisaged possible cooperation with the Soviet Union to coerce China and even preventive
strikes against Chinese nuclear facilities in this period suggests a heightened threat assessment of
China.58 According to the CIA’s estimate in December 1960, the most probable date for the
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detonation of the first Chinese nuclear device would be sometime in 1963.59 Thus, Kennedy did
have over full two years to prepare for this contingency if he had thought of an expansionist
nuclear China as the “most dangerous times since World War II” from the beginning of his
administration. His relative inaction until the border war suggests that the war at least reinforced
his threat perception. In short, the timing of the search for means to prevent Chinese nuclear
development also indicates the effect of the border war on non-experts’ estimates of China’s
resolve.
Finally, among historians, there is a consensus that the Chinese attack across the
Himalayas demonstrated to US officials its aggressive intentions to use force. Noam Kochavi
argues that the Sino-Indian War resulted in “vindication of the view of China as a predatory
power.”60 Warren Cohen observes, “Chinese willingness to use force and the ease with which
they routed the Indians seemed to demonstrate aggressiveness.”61 Matthew Jones writes, “The
border war heightened the sense in the Kennedy administration that China was determined to
expand its influence in Asia if given the chance, and added to the imperative need to prevent
Beijing attaining a nuclear capability.”62 Michael Lumbers also concludes, “When a brief SinoIndian war erupted in October, the Kennedy team’s most alarmist preconceptions about China’s
belligerent and aggressive tendencies were corroborated.”63 Most importantly, Sean Turner
perceptively points out the divergent assessments of the war between non-experts and experts.
He observes, “upper-echelon discussions in the Administration about the implications of the war
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were marked by a degree of urgency entirely at odds with these measured estimates of Beijing’s
intentions.”64 What he refers to as “these measured estimates” were made by experts, to which
now I will turn.
In short, non-experts in the first half of the 1960s inferred Chinese intentions from the
balance of power and the resolute image of China acquired from the Korean adventure and the
Sino-Indian border war. They did not pay attention to Chinese past actions that suggested its
cautious nature, nor did they use Chinese strategic statements emphasizing flexibility and caution
in considering the use of force. These tendencies significantly depart from the way experts
assessed China’s intentions, which is discussed in the next section.

Experts’ Estimates of Chinese Intentions
Experts’ estimates of Chinese intentions differed from non-experts’ from the beginning of the
Kennedy administration or even before Kennedy came into office. However, some scholars
mistakenly connected a view of a cautious China prevalent among some US officials with the
advent of Allen Whiting to the INR far eastern section in early 1962.65 For example, Kochavi
argues, “The alternative image of a Chinese leadership rather moderate in action if not in words
only began to dominate among revisionists with the bureaucratic reshuffle around the turn of the
year [1961] and the advent of Allen S. Whiting to government.”66 Likewise, Kennedy
administration official James Thomson recollected, “Whiting carefully documented a conviction
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about China’s military caution and foreign-policy rationality that served as a counter-weight to
the more alarmist views still prevalent in the Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency.”67
Although these observations do not necessarily contradict my theory, these analysts
overlook a view of a cautious China that originated in the CIA even before Whiting started to
work at INR. As early as February 1959—a few months after China backed down in the Taiwan
Straits—a National Intelligence Estimate observed, “Chinese Communist policy may continue to
resemble something we might call ‘aggressive flexibility’; that is, the use of greatly varied
tactics, soft or tough as the situation may indicate, but with a readiness to push to a considerable
degree if necessary or opportune.” The estimate also inferred that the Chinese motive for causing
a crisis at the Taiwan Strait was a belief that “there was not much to lose by probing.” 68
Although not explicit, the above statements suggest that the intelligence community gradually
realized that China would retreat in the face of a strong counterforce.
The idea became clearer in a National Intelligence Estimate released just over a month
before JFK came to office. It observed: “Despite its arrogance and tough talk, in practice Peiping
has been following essentially low-risk policies during the past year. This apparent contradiction
suggests that Chinese Communist policy is neither irrational nor inflexible.” In making this
estimate, the CIA turned to Chinese strategic statements. The report continued, “One of Mao’s
fundamental concepts has been that a total and irrevocable commitment of forces should not be
made unless there is overwhelming superiority over the enemy. Mao and his colleagues are
almost certainly aware that Communist China does not possess such superiority at present.”69
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One can find the clearest expression of a cautious China inferred from its past actions in
the May 1961 CIA memorandum on Chinese military move in Southeast Asia. While nonexperts were fretting about China’s aggression as demonstrated above, the memorandum
concluded, “A Chinese Communist push into Southeast Asia is highly unlikely, either now or in
the foreseeable future.” To the authors of the memorandum, the balance of power surely
mattered. They noted, “The most persuasive reason for believing that the Chinese would not
attempt a military move into Southeast Asia is that they would almost certainly estimate that
such action would result in military involvement with the US on a major scale.” In addition, the
authors also drew attention to USSR’s strong constraint on China in case of the latter’s military
move. However, the memorandum continued, “Even if the Chinese believed that war with the US
could be avoided . . . there are other reasons which would argue against the move [emphasis
added].” According to the CIA, one of the reasons was China’s cautious nature learned from its
past actions. The memorandum observed:
An overt invasion would be out of character both with Communist China’s preoccupation
to date with internal problems, and with the foreign and military policies it has pursued.
The Chinese intervened in Korea only in the last instance, in a situation in which, from
their point of view, strong US forces threatened their border. They have exercised caution
in their offshore island probes, and have backed off from face-to-face encounters with US
forces. Their course has been cautious in Laos [the cease-fire went into effect on May
3].70

In short, the preceding discussion suggests that the experts took the balance of power seriously,
but they also regarded the Chinese cautious nature learned from its past actions as another
significant factor militating against an invasion of Southeast Asia.
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Furthermore, experts’ rich knowledge of examples of China’s failure to carry out threats
also contributed to their views that differed from non-experts. In June, a National Intelligence
Estimate observed, “The several Chinese ‘intervention’ statements concerning Laos in recent
months” had been “generally ambiguous” and “issued at times when the situation in Laos was
such that there appeared little likelihood of their having to be carried out.” It continued,
“Additionally, Peiping is tolerating situations which it earlier said it would not, e.g., the
remaining Chinese Nationalist irregulars in Burma-Laos.”71 The unsaid implication of the
estimate was that China had been more cautious than its words suggested. This evidence also
suggests that experts know more examples of “backing down” or “bluffing” than top echelon
non-experts, which may lead the former to make a more relaxed view of enemy resolve. This is
because experts are incentivized to distinguish credible threats from non-credible threats and
report only the former to the top echelon in order to avoid a crying wolf phenomenon. As a
result, both non-experts and experts know the same cases of credible threats and subsequent
crises, but experts know more cases of bluffs.
In short, although Whiting would eventually circulate a similar assessment based on
China’s past actions and strategic statements from INR, the intelligence community
independently reached the view far before his advent to the government.
Likewise, Edward Rice, a State Department China expert, inferred cautious Chinese
character from its statements on strategy. In his over-100-page report circulated in late October,
he considered the exclusion of US military power from Southeast Asia China’s major objective.
In his view, in order to achieve this objective, a variety of means that “spans the full scope of
human activities” was available to China. In particular, “The massive, overt invasions of which
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the Chinese Communists and their DRV allies are capable could undoubtedly sweep over any
forces which China’s weaker non-Communist neighbors have or are likely to have.”
Nevertheless, Rice dismissed this possibility due to a few reasons, and the first reason
was China’s cautious manner to use force. He noted, “their strategy is one which does not seek
such direct, frontal large-scale military engagements where the outcome is doubtful.” Rice
elaborated by heavily relying on his understanding of Mao’s strategy:
Mao-Tse-tung’s proclaimed tactical respect for us requires rather that we be confused,
kept off balance, and worn down through a carefully-controlled, long-term conflict in
which the places of attack, mixes of means and degrees of pressure can be changed with
circumstances. His strategic contempt for us is based on the belief that we will, or can be
led to expend our efforts in ways which will only waste our resources, alienate world
opinion and achieve the destruction of our own morale. This is the application of a
species of political-warfare judo, in which the opponent is deceived into making mistakes
whereby his own strength can be used to destroy him. The Chinese Communists expect to
use it against us at least until the balance of forces are deemed to have clearly been
reversed, much as guerrilla warfare was used in mainland China until the Chinese
Communists could be sure of winning in positional fighting.72

To be sure, he also listed the balance of power as another reason. However, he first
inferred Chinese caution from its strategic statements, and then he concluded that the current
balance of power was enough to deter China from outright aggression considering China’s
caution. This three-phased analysis—identifying China’s cautious nature, calculating the balance
of power between the United States and China, and then inferring probable Chinese intentions
from the first two factors—suggests that the two factors are both important in his equation. The
significance of this point can be clearer if one compares Rice’s assessment with non-experts’
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one. As discussed in the previous section, in the face of the same balance of power, non-experts
fretted about China’s aggression due to its resolute image. In other words, the different
interpretations of China’s characteristics resulted in the divergent views.
The impact of Rice’s paper on his collogues was far from trivial. James Thomson found
Rice’s paper so “an extraordinary document” that he and his boss Chester Bowles “wanted to
meet and congratulate the author.”73
The series of RAND policy papers written by a group of researchers at the request of the
US Air Force showed a similar view of a cautious China based on its past actions and strategic
statements. Strictly speaking, these papers do not record US officials’ assessments of China;
however, they shed light on how experts assess enemy resolve and intentions because their
assessments of China’s resolve and military doctrine were primarily made by a renowned China
specialist, Alice Langley Hsieh.74 Furthermore, given RAND’s intimate relations with the
government, research undertaken for the government could be considered semi-official
documents.75 Most importantly, these papers eventually influenced State Department
assessments of the threat from a nuclear China, which will be discussed in the next section.
The August 1962 RAND paper observed, “One widespread image of the Chinese use of
force is that they are both inexperienced and reckless and that these factors in the nuclear age
could be catastrophic.” As demonstrated in the previous sections, non-experts exactly thought in
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this way. The paper continued, however, “Our analysis of Chinese actions indicates that this
image is not consistent with actual Chinese behavior. Their doctrine recognizes force as only one
of the instruments of policy. It is not the final resort when all political means fail, but only one of
the tools of the political struggle.” The most significant part of the report is its three hypothetical
case studies of Chinese aggression and its conclusions about China’s probable course of action.
Having considered hypothetical cases of a nuclear exchange between China and the United
States, the paper observed, “U.S. nuclear campaigns against China . . . would present the Chinese
with heavy losses.” The paper then concluded, “The willingness of the Chinese to accept such
losses is not in line with our view of the traditional caution with which they employ military
force.”76 What is striking here is the paper’s three-phased analysis similar to Rice’s. The paper
first identified the balance of power and Chinese risk intolerance learned from China’s past
actions and then concluded that aggression was unlikely given the two factors. This suggests that
assessments of balances of power and enemy resolve are two different endeavors, and the two
factors are both important in estimating enemy intentions.
In December, a follow-up report by the same RAND team elaborated on the above
assessment. The report’s conclusion about case studies was the same. It concluded,
“Examination of a series of hypothetical nuclear and non-nuclear campaigns shows that a
Chinese military confrontation of U.S. forces in the area could involve very high risks for the
Chinese. In view of past Chinese rationality and caution in their use of force, it is unlikely that
the Chinese will consider such risks acceptable.” The memorandum elaborated, “In 1954,
Chinese decisions not to press the war in Indochina nor to push the Taiwan Strait crisis appeared
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to be based on a more realistic estimate of what conflict with a nuclear-armed United States
might involve. In the 1958 Quemoy crisis, Chinese operations remained at a low level of
violence. Apparently, Peiping was anxious to minimize the risk of a direct clash with U.S.
forces.”
Furthermore, Mao’s strategic statements also helped shape the paper’s assessment of the
cautious nature of China. It observed:
The key to Mao’s military thinking lies in the primacy he grants to the political elements.
He established an integrated doctrine whereby a weak force could hope to succeed
against a militarily stronger enemy. Mao expressed it in 1936 as: “Our strategy is to pit
one against ten, while our tactic is to pit ten against one.” By 1948 this formula was
translated into his famous dictum of “strategically despise, tactically respect” the enemy.
By this Mao meant that the trend of historical development was with the forces of
socialism even though the strength of the capitalist or imperialist enemy might have to be
acknowledged in specific situation. In effect, this was a reaffirmation of his contention
that force was an instrument to be used cautiously and rationally, depending on the
politico-military balance.

In other words, “Mao holds that force is not to be used in the adventurist sense, but only when
the political situation favors or requires it, when opportunities exist, or when the expectation of
success is high.”77
As predicted by my theory, China’s attack against India in the fall of 1962 did not
significantly change the cautious view of China among experts. As opposed to non-experts’
concern with nuclear China’s aggression, experts had a sober view by inferring from China’s
past actions and strategic statements. In December 1962, a month after the Chinese attack, a draft
for a National Intelligence Estimate observed, “We do not believe that the Chinese acquisition of
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a limited nuclear capability will significantly alter its willingness to take military risks. On its
other hand, we believe it would not lead to a general policy of open military aggression.”78
A series of INR memoranda also refereed to Chinese historical caution and strategic texts
to predict future Chinese behavior. Since these memoranda were about Chinese policies in Asia,
a view by Whiting as the head of INR’s far eastern section and a China specialist must have been
predominant. In February 1963, INR denied the possibility that “The Imperatives of the SinoSoviet dispute compel Peiping to show itself more successfully militant than Moscow.” This is
because “as a general proposition, the Chinese, despite their public expressions of militancy,
have acted with considerable prudence.”79 A memorandum of May 1963 by INR also concluded
that China will probably eschew “rash military actions.” As with Rice’s and RAND’s
memoranda, both the balance of power and China’s caution learned from its past actions
contributed to the assessment. The memorandum observed, “the primary deterrent to Peiping’s
use of its nuclear capability will be the likelihood of effective US counteraction either locally or
against vital mainland targets.” The reason for this assessment was China’s past actions and
strategic texts. It continued:
Mao’s admonition to “strategically despise and tactically respect the enemy” has so far
operated as a restraint on the Chinese Communist willingness to confront United States
force directly, and is likely to govern Chinese Communist military behavior through the
remainder of this decade. It is ritualistically instilled into all levels of military and civilian
indoctrination. It has served Chinese Communist armies well in exploiting situations of
opportunity without suffering catastrophic reverses, whether in the struggle for victory
during the civil war or in military forays outside traditional Chinese territory since
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winning power in 1949. It conforms with classical Chinese doctrine, with basic Bolshevik
belief, and with the circumstances of United States military superiority.

Thus, the memorandum concluded, “rash adventurism is unlikely to accompany or follow
Peiping’s acquisition of a nuclear capability, assuming that United States policy is sufficiently
clear and consistent that Peiping is not confused about the consequences of employing force.”80
A series of the intelligence community’s coordinated estimates also reached a similar
conclusion. A National Intelligence Estimate in May observed, “Peiping’s military policy has
always been characterized by caution in undertaking initiatives in the face of superior power.
Hence the decline in the relative effectiveness of its military equipment and weapons [due to its
split with the USSR] is likely further to temper Peiping’s policy, especially in circumstances
where it might confront US armed power or US-equipped Asian air forces [emphasis added].”81
Here, as with the case with other documents discussed above, China’s past caution exercised its
influence on the estimate independently from the relative decline of Chinese armed forces as a
balance of power factor.
Two months later, another National Intelligence Estimate observed, “Even though the
Chinese are especially perturbed at the present moment [due to the USSR move toward detent
with the West during the height of the Sino-Soviet quarrel], we do not believe that they will act
recklessly or run very great risks, such as a renewal of the Korean War or even a major invasion
deep into India.” The estimate continued to explain the reason for the assessment, one of which
was China’s past actions: “Over the past few years, in spite of their warlike oratory, they have
followed a generally cautious policy.” Another factor was the balance of power. “China’s leaders
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probably now consider that the deepening Sino-Soviet dispute has decreased the chances of
Soviet support for any Chinese adventurism, and that this in turn raises the chances that the US
would react vigorously to any extreme Chinese initiatives.” Then, the memorandum harkened
back to China’s past actions: “The Chinese have thus far shown marked respect for US power,
and we do not expect them to change this basic attitude.”82
In January 1964, a special report on Chinese military doctrine by the CIA followed suit.
According to the report, China’s past behavior and strategic statements both suggested cautious
policy in the future. It observed:
In another notable contradiction between Chinese propaganda and Chinese action,
Peiping claims that the US will never dare to use nuclear weapons, but it has been careful
since the Korean war to avoid situations where a direct confrontation with US military
power would arise. In this way the Chinese remain true to Mao’s dictum, “despise the
enemy strategically, but respect him tactically.” They can continue to claim that the US is
a “paper tiger” without testing whether or not it has teeth.83

One can find similar observations in National Intelligence Estimates well into 1965. In
March 1965, a National Intelligence Estimate observed, “Despite their defiant oratory, since
Korea the Chinese Communists have avoided direct military conflict with the US. In our view
this reflects Peiping’s awareness of its military and economic weaknesses and of the risks of
provoking major US attack.”84 Two months later, another National Intelligence Estimate stated:
An important concept which helps sustain the Chinese will in the face of indefinitely
protracted struggle is expressed in Mao’s admonition to have contempt for the enemy
strategically but to respect him tactically. This means that the weaker force must have
complete confidence in ultimate victory—it must have contempt for the will and staying
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power of the enemy. But in all actual engagements with the enemy on the road to that
ultimate victory, the weaker force must be constantly conscious of the immediately
superior strength of the enemy. Following this line, Peiping’s foreign policy has grand
and dangerous ambitions but is almost always cautious and realistic in practice
[emphasis added].85

In short, unlike their counterparts, experts considered China cautious enough not to
militarily attack US interests by inferring from its past actions and strategic statements that
matched the implications of the former. Furthermore, as opposed to non-experts, the effect of the
Sino-Indian War on China’s intentions was limited, and cautious China’s image remained and
even thrived. In these estimates, the balance of power surely mattered; as demonstrated above,
however, experts often attributed an independent causal effect to China’s past actions and
strategic statements that matched the implication of the former.

The Influence of Experts’ Views on Non-Experts
The foregoing discussion showed the divergent views of Chinese resolve and intentions to use
force between non-experts and experts. Nevertheless, there are some instances in which nonexperts assessed China’s intentions by using China’s cautious past actions and strategic
statements as experts did. As this section shows, however, these non-experts’ views had been
influenced by experts. This is because (1) these observations were made only after experts
expressed these views, (2) these non-experts’ formal posts were close to those of experts,
suggesting their exposure to experts’ analyses, and (3) some non-experts explicitly admitted that
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they were influenced by experts’ views. Thus, as predicted by my theory, these non-experts
inferred Chinese intentions in the way experts did because they adopt the latter’s assessments.
One important set of policy memoranda about Chinese threat in this period is the series of
memoranda written by Policy Planning Council’s staff Robert Johnson on China’s nuclear
weapons. In his memoranda, the familiar theme of a historically cautious China prevalent among
experts appeared multiple times. This is not surprising because Johnson admitted that he had
conducted his study “on the basis of contribution from various offices in State and Defense.”86
Although he did not specify one of those offices was INR, the May 1963 INR memorandum
heavily relying on China’s past actions and strategic statements—discussed in the previous
section—made clear that the memorandum was a contribution to Johnson’s report.87
Furthermore, William Burr and Jeffrey Richelson argue that Johnson’s view was influenced by
the INR paper on the basis of their interview with him.88 Johnson also admitted that his paper
“draws extensively upon studies preprepared by RAND.”89 This most likely referred to the
papers discussed above—the ones heavily indebted to a China expert Alice Langley Hsieh. In
short, Johnson’s view expressed in his reports, to which I will turn now, were significantly
influenced by experts.
In June 1963, Johnson’s over 200-page thorough analysis of Chinese nuclear weapons
concluded, “A primary deterrent to Peiping’s use of force—including use of its nuclear
capability—will continue to be the possibility of U.S. counteraction against either local or
mainland targets.” The balance of power and military logic surely mattered, but part of the
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reason for this conclusion was China’s past actions. The paper observed that the analysis “relies
upon a projection of past Chinese Communist behavior” and concluded, after admitting some
qualifications, that “major departures from past Chinese military caution are possible, but not
very probable.” Furthermore, the paper drew attention to the “inconsistency between such risky
behavior [as triggering a general war] and Chinese views and past actions.” In this light, his
observation that “Peiping tends to exaggerate all indicators of U.S. military intentions and to see
all U.S. political-military relations as preparations for a vast coordinated attack against mainland
China” suggested that China could be deterred because its historically cautious nature would
translate into its exaggerated sensitivity to US military intentions.90
In October, a more condensed version (still over 100 pages) of the above paper made the
reasoning behind the previous report clearer. It observed, “Past Chinese Communist prudence in
the use of military force reinforces conclusions that emerge from military logic. Peiping is very
sensitive to possible indications of a U.S. intent to attack the mainland [emphasis added].” It also
noted that like the Soviet Union, China was unwilling to assume “large military risks by
undertaking inter-state aggression.” The memorandum continued, “there is implicit in the
Chinese position a double standard—they appear to be urging greater militancy upon the USSR
as the more powerful Communist state while recognizing the limitations of their own power and
the risks of too aggressive a Chinese policy.”91 According to a State Department memorandum,
the report was “favorably commented upon as a fine example of creative and imaginative
thinking” in Rusk’s policy planning meeting.92
90

“A Chinese Communist Nuclear Detonation and Nuclear Capability,” June 17, 1963, The National Archives at
College Park, RG 59, Records of Policy planning Council, 1963-1964, box 276, S/P papers June-July 1963. The
quotes are from 5, 34, 49,
91
Policy Planning Council, “A Chinese Communist Nuclear Detonation and Nuclear Capability.” The quotes are
from 11, 12
92
Highlights From Secretary of State Rusk’s Policy Planning Meeting, Oct 15, 1963, FRUS, 1961-1963, 22, doc.
191.

189

Director of Policy Planning Council Walt Rostow also adopted the view of a historically
cautious China and employed Chinese strategic statements as a source of Chinese caution, but
this is not surprising because Robert Johnson was his subordinate. Furthermore, although PPC
member Edward Rice’s memorandum that inferred Chinese caution from Mao’s strategic
statements was released a month before Rostow took over as Chairman of the Policy Planning
Council in November 1961, it is likely Rostow read the paper after he took the office as PPC’s
latest view of China. Finally, estimates based on Mao’s strategic statements had been already
circulated by the CIA. Therefore, in his memorandum of April 1964 to LBJ, Rostow repeated a
very similar view to Johnson’s, Rice’s, and CIA’s papers:
Past Chinese Communist prudence in the use of military force reenforces conclusions
emerging from military logic. Historically the ChiComs have consistently followed
Mao’s well-known dictum to “strategically despise but tactically respect” the enemy;
have been very sensitive to the possibility of attack upon the mainland; and have sought
to avoid actions which might provoke major military confrontation and thus increase the
likelihood of such attack. . . . When the Chinese have a nuclear capability they are likely
to remain aware of their relative military inferiority though they will attempt to create the
impression that the balance of power in Asia has shifted.93

Another example of non-experts who inferred Chinese resolve and intentions as experts
did was Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Roger Hilsman. Again, this is not
surprising from my theory’s perspective because he used to be the head of INR and he was the
one who headhunt Allen Whiting. His trust in the analytical capability of Whiting, “a real hot
shot” in Hilsman’s words, was obvious. In other words, he had plenty of opportunities to
familiarize himself with experts’ views in the intelligence community. This influence persisted
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after he became Assistant Secretary. In his speech of December 1963, he stated, “First and
foremost, the Chinese Communist leaders have shown themselves to be dangerously
overconfident and wedded to outdated theories but pragmatic when their existence is
threatened.”94 About a week later, he privately wrote to Adlai Stevenson to explain the rationale
for his speech. He wrote, “China’s leaders, despite their intensive dogmatism, have shown a
tendency to pull back and become pragmatic in the face of serious internal or external
resistance.”95 In short, the evidence strongly suggests that these non-experts who assessed in a
manner experts did had borrowed their idea from the latter.
Although most historians have not paid attention to the divergent views of China between
non-experts and experts, those who have done so agree with my interpretation. Noam Kochavi
argues that there were revisionist groups in the Kennedy administration, whose views of China
differed from the top policymakers’. He writes, “Having been predicated on the premise of
China’s relative weakness vis-à-vis the United States, it [the revisionist groups’ attitude toward
China] departed from the alarmist line that had previously dominated much American China
policy from at least the Korean War onward.” Although Kochavi overlooked the critical effect of
China’s past actions and strategic statements independent of the effect of the balance of power as
demonstrated above, his interpretation generally agrees with my analysis.96
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In short, although there were some non-experts who assessed China’s resolve and
intentions as experts did, the evidence strongly suggests that as my theory predicts, they did so
due to the influence of experts around them.

Evaluations of the Rival Theories
Both the current calculus theory and the past actions theory performed poorly compared to my
theory. The current calculus theory failed to explain why the two groups reached opposite
conclusions about Chinese intentions despite that they had the same information available to
them, whereas the past actions theory failed to predict why these two groups used different past
actions to judge Chinese intentions.
As predicted by the current calculous theory, the balance of power played an important
role among non-experts and experts alike. Both groups used the US-China balance of power as
one important factor to infer China’s intentions to use force on its periphery. However, although
the two groups were faced with the same balance of power, their conclusions about China’s
intentions differed. This divergence was caused by the different manners in which these two
groups employed China’s past actions to infer Chinese resolve and intentions. This suggests that
a given balance of power without considering a state’s cost and risk tolerance does not matter
much in considering the state’s intentions to use force. In assessing the balance of power and
enemy intentions, foreign policy officials consciously or unconsciously take into account an
enemy’s cost and risk tolerance because, with a given balance of power, resolute and irresolute
states may make different decisions on the use of force. As a rationalist theory, the current
calculous theory’s answer to this puzzle is that states only use force when the expected costs are
“reasonable,” and all foreign policy officials use the same standard to determine what is
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reasonable for enemies. My empirical analysis contradicted this position by showing the
different manners through which non-experts and experts use past actions to infer enemy resolve.
Since the current calculous theory does not give any credit to past actions in explaining how
foreign policy officials infer enemy intentions, the theory performed poorly in this respect.
On the other hand, the past actions theory performed better partly because it correctly
predicted past actions mattered in estimating enemy resolve and intentions, but also because,
unlike the current calculous theory, it does not deny the causal effect of other variables such as
power not covered by the theory. However, the past actions theory failed to predict the different
manners in which non-experts and experts used China’s past actions to infer China’s resolve and
intentions. Like the current calculous theory, past actions theory adopts rationalist and state-asunitary assumptions. This position predicts US officials would use China’s past actions roughly
in the same manner. However, the empirical analysis demonstrated that there was a clear pattern
of how non-experts and experts differently used China’s past actions. In particular, as predicted
by my theory, non-experts tended to use only aggressive uses of force that aligned with the
negativity bias such as the Korean adventure and the Sino-Indian War to infer Chinese resolve
and intentions. In so doing, however, non-experts paid scant attention to China’s cautious
behavior such as backing down in the Taiwan Straits. Experts, however, employed past actions
in a more balanced way by looking at both types of actions and inferred China’s cautious nature
from them. Thus, the past actions theory failed not because it ignored the effect of past actions
but was not specific enough in its predictions.
Of course, if experts’ assessments eventually prevail in most cases with relatively a short
time lag, my theory’s added value to the past actions theory would be deminished. However, the
empirical analysis demonstrated that the divergent views between non-experts and experts
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persisted during the first half of the 1960s. About four years in policymaking should not be
treated as mere “a time lag.”
Furthermore, neither the current calculous theory nor past actions theory predicts the
effect of Chinese strategic statements that matched Chinese past actions on US assessments of
resolve and intentions found in the empirical analysis. This does not fare against these two
theories, especially the current calculous theory, because the effect of the statements is beyond
their scope conditions. However, given that the statements’ intimate relations with the effect of
past actions and their significant effects on experts, and sometimes even non-experts, it would be
desirable if theories that explain the effect of past actions are capable of predicting their effects
as well.

Summary
In short, how the US officials assessed China’s resolve and intentions to use force in the first half
of the 1960s is generally in line with my theory’s predictions. Despite China’s backing down in
the Taiwan Strait twice, non-experts did not update their assessments of China’s resolve and
were fixated on its resolute reputation acquired from the Korean adventure. Furthermore, nonexperts reinforced their view of a resolute and reckless China in the wake of China’s attack
against India across the Himalayas in the fall of 1962. In the meantime, experts updated their
estimates of China’s resolve in response to China’s behavior during the Taiwan Strait crises and
China’s bluffs that were not reported to top echelon officials to avoid a crying wolf phenomenon.
Also, they did not take China’s decision to attack India as informative for assessing China’s
resolve to use force against a superior power. In addition, experts used Mao’s strategic
statements that matched China’s past actions as additional evidence of China’s caution. The fact
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that in the face of the same balance of power, these two groups reached a different conclusion
about China’s intentions to use force due to their diverging estimates of China’s resolve indicates
the significant and independent effect of past actions and strategic statements.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion

This chapter summarizes the findings of this dissertation. Then, it provides a few additional
pieces of evidence outside the cases this dissertation examined to suggest that the theory has
wider applicability. After that, I discuss this dissertation’s scholarly contributions, theoretical
implications, and further research. I end this chapter and dissertation by discussing this project’s
policy implications.

Summary of the Findings
This dissertation introduced the amount of policy officials’ knowledge of enemies as a novel
variable to explain how they assess adversaries’ resolve and intentions. I argued that the extent to
which foreign policy officials use past behavior to estimate enemy intentions varies based on
their level of enemy-specific knowledge. Psychologists have found that negative things produce
a stronger and lasting effect on judgment and decision-making than positive things. This bias, the
negativity bias, aligns well with worst-case thinking in international relations. Furthermore,
recent findings in psychology, law, and economics suggest that trained professionals are resistant
to some biases. Building on these findings, I argued that relatively free from the negativity bias,
experts with rich knowledge about enemies (i.e., intelligence analysts and country specialists)
engage in less worst-case thinking and make more nuanced assessments about enemy intentions
than non-experts (e.g., top policymakers and political appointees).
My theory generated five hypotheses. First, Non-experts infer the worst possible resolve
and intentions from what enemies can do militarily to their country, whereas experts combine
assessments of capabilities and those of resolve learned from other indicators to infer enemy
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intentions. Second, in inferring enemy resolve from past actions, non-experts learn from resolute
actions but ignore the implications of irresolute actions, whereas experts give more equal
consideration to the implications of both resolute and irresolute actions. Third, non-experts have
a lower threshold of interpreting enemy past actions as resolute than experts. Fourth, when the
implications of adversaries’ history of the use of force (do not) match the implications of their
statements on strategy, experts (do not) use statements as additional evidence to estimate
adversaries’ resolve. Fifth, when non-experts assess enemy intentions as experts do, their
assessments are likely to be the result of their exposure to experts’ assessments.
The three case studies provided the theory with empirical support. The first case, the US
assessments of Soviet intentions (1945-1950), demonstrated that both non-experts and experts
judged the Soviet Union as not intending to use force, but they employed different indicators to
reach the conclusion. Here, non-experts almost exclusively relied on the US atomic superiority
and war potential to infer Soviet reluctance to use force for expansion. On the other hand, experts
also took into account the balance of power, but they heavily relied on Soviet past actions and
strategic texts whose implications matched those of past actions to infer Soviet reluctance to use
force. This case successfully showed that these two groups used information differently.
However, since all the important variables are in the same causal direction, the chapter was not
able to show how strongly past actions and strategic texts shaped experts’ estimates. Nor was it
able to completely rule out the possibility that even for experts, the balance of power was the
predominant factor and past actions and strategic texts were mere secondary ones.
The second case, the US assessments of Chinese intentions (1950-1954), demonstrated
that past actions have an independent and significant causal effect, and when an enemy
unambiguously demonstrated its resolve, both non-experts and experts use the resolute action to

197

update their estimates of the enemy’s resolve. Despite the comparable values of all the
theoretically important variables on the eve of the Chinese intervention in Korea and during the
Dien Bien Phu crisis, the United States assessed China’s intervention in Korea as unlikely,
whereas it assessed the possibility of a similar intervention likely in the Dien Bien Phu crisis.
Here, one important variable that differed between these two occasions was the record of China’s
past actions. On the eve of the Chinese intervention in Korea, US officials had no information
about relevant Chinese past actions because the Chinese regime was just established a year
earlier. By the time of the Dien Bien Phu crisis, however, China had demonstrated its resolve to
attack a superior power over border security by attacking the US forces in Korea and fighting
them to a stalemate despite its mounting costs. Given the comparable values of the other
important variables between the two occasions, this semi-controlled analysis suggests that it was
China’s past actions that had caused the divergence.
This conclusion was further strengthened by conducting process tracing to show how
policy officials had updated their estimates of Chinese resolve after the Chinese intervention.
This analysis showed that both non-experts and experts had updated their estimates of Chinese
resolve and intentions to use force upward due to the resolve China demonstrated in Korea.
Given the variety of countervailing factors against Chinese willingness to intervene in Dien Bien
Phu, the magnitude of the causal impact of Chinese past actions was significant. Furthermore, as
opposed to chapter 3 where experts interpreted Soviet strategic texts aligned with Soviet past
actions as further evidence of the Soviet cautious nature in challenging a superior power, this
chapter showed that experts had not used Chinese strategic texts urging caution because the
implications of the texts did not match China’s resolve demonstrated in Korea.
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The third case, the US assessments of Chinese intentions (1961-1965), demonstrated that
non-experts and experts even reach opposite conclusions about adversaries’ intentions by using
their past actions differently. Despite China’s backing down in the Taiwan Strait twice, nonexperts in the first half of the 1960s did not update their assessments of China’s resolve
downward and were fixated on China’s resolute image formed by its Korean adventure.
Furthermore, following the Sino-Indian War of 1962, non-experts reinforced their estimates of
China’s resolve even though the Chinese attack was against a weaker power, and its information
value was questionable in assessing China’s intentions to challenge a stronger power like the
United States. In the meantime, experts updated their estimates of China’s resolve downward in
response to China’s cautious behavior demonstrated in the Taiwan Strait crises. In so doing,
China’s strategic texts urging caution in challenging a superior power helped experts interpret
the implications of China’s past actions. Furthermore, they did not take China’s decision to
attack India as informative for assessing China’s resolve to use force against a superior power.
This case strongly demonstrated that experts’ use of cautious behavior by enemies and their
strategic texts urging for caution is not mere a rationalization for experts’ estimates based on the
balance of power because faced with the same balance of power, non-experts and experts
reached different conclusions about Chinese intentions. In short, the three cases showed that
experts are the key policy officials to spread a cautious image of enemies in response to cautious
past actions, whereas experts’ knowledge is not necessary to update enemy resolve upward when
enemies behave resolutely.
One may question the generalizability of my theory due to the limited number of the
cases examined. I must say that skepticism at this point is valid. This dissertation’s purpose is to
propose a novel theory and provide evidence enough to think it is plausible. Case study
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researchers sometimes tend to oversell the difficulty of their tests, probably because they are
self-conscious of the limitations on the generalizability of their findings. However, testing a
theory is a lengthy and not straightforward endeavor that takes generations of research, and
findings based on one method have almost always limitations. Therefore, if this dissertation’s
findings are plausible enough to encourage further research, it satisfies its goal.
Nevertheless, let me provide a few pieces of additional evidence found outside the cases
examined in this dissertation, which suggest that experts use past actions, especially cautious
behavior, to infer enemy resolve and intentions. To be sure, they are anecdotal when they are
seen in isolation; however, when they are seen along with the findings of this dissertation, they
suggest that my dissertation’s findings have wider applicability than the cases examined.
As noted above, an expert George Kennan assessed Soviet resolve and intentions by
heavily relying on its past actions. Let me cite his typical analysis one more time. He addressed
privately in May 1947:
Let us remember that the Soviet Union has been in existence now for thirty years. It has
attacked other nations. The war against Finland (1939-1940) is an instance. The nations
attacked were always immeasurably smaller in military potential than Russia herself. If
Finland had been as powerful in resources and manpower as she was in preparation for
war (and she was powerful in preparation for war) there would never have been a Russian
attack. Russia did not attack Germany; on the contrary, the people in Moscow went very
far to accommodate themselves to Germany’s desires. . . . the Russians are a very
cautious people in the military sense. I believe that the military and political planners in
Moscow would insist upon a tremendous preponderance of straight military forces before
wandering into a military venture than would any other even half-way major military
power in the world.1

1

Russia’s National Objectives,” George Kennan Papers, Public Policy Papers, Department of Rare Books and
Special Collections, Princeton University Library (Kennan Papers), 1947 May 12, 12,
https://findingaids.princeton.edu/catalog/MC076_c03118.
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More than ten years later, another famous Soviet specialist made a similar assessment about the
Soviet Union. The CIA analyst Raymond Garthoff wrote in February 1961,
It is noteworthy that in the areas beyond the shadow of Soviet military power, efforts to
extend their power were very few, generally cautious, and invariably failed. . . . Even
when challenged internally by the defection of Yugoslavia the communist bloc did not
resort to military force. . . . Offensively, beyond the bloc’s borders, while pressure was
exerted in the Berlin blockade in 1949-50 [sic], it stopped short of military
involvement. . . . Direct employment of military force . . . has been used only when
Soviet policy was pressed in extremis, and had no other alternative to preserve a
threatened position already held. The suppression of the East German revolt of June,
1953, and the Hungarian revolution of October, 1956, were the only such cases of resort
to military force. In the case of Poland in October, 1956, and until Hungary passed a
point of no return by withdrawal from the bloc, the Soviets preferred even to accept
setbacks rather than to use naked military might. . . . Thus the trend of the current period
in Soviet foreign policy has been marked by limited, indirect, political exploitation of
their great military power [emphasis original].

It is difficult to miss the analysis’s commonality with Kennan’s. The note attached to Garthoff’s
papers by the chief of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) at the State Department
Roger Hilsman, another expert according to this dissertation’s definition, wrote, “Mr. Garthoff is
one of the foremost students of Soviet military policy and doctrine in the United States. INR
fully subscribes to what he says in these papers.”2
Once again, over ten years later, another well-known Soviet specialist made an
assessment similar to the first two. The historian Richard Pipes, who eventually headed Team B
at the CIA, wrote in 1973,
Russian leaders regard military force as a weapon to be used only in extreme
contingencies when there is no alternative and the risks involved appear minimal. There
2

Roger Hilsman to Dean Rusk, “Limited War in Soviet Policy,” Feb 20, 1961 in RG 59 Central Decimal Files 19601963, box 1362, 661.00/2-2061, NARA. Its enclosure is composed of two papers written by Garthoff, and the quote
is from “The Instruments of Russian Diplomacy: Military Influences and Instruments, 1860-1960.”
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are many reasons to account for this caution, the main one probably being lack of
confidence in their own troops, especially when engaged outside Soviet borders. They
much prefer to use military force as a means of blackmail. The reluctance to commit their
military forces abroad distinguishes Soviet expansionism from the German. . . . The
Russians are quite prepared to pull back when resistance on any one sector of the enemy
front turns out to be stronger than anticipated: there are always other sectors which are
less staunchly defended and where one’s force can be applied to better advantage.3

Although Kennan and Garthoff were known as doves, Pipes was well-known hawk. These three
renowned Soviet specialists, apart from each other in time and place, with different orientations
for policy, made similar assessments of Soviet resolve and intentions primarily based on Soviet
past actions. The fact that Soviet military power had grown substantially from Kennan’s time
through Garthoff’s and Pipes’ times suggests the strong causal impact of Soviet past actions on
their estimates. These additional pieces of evidence suggest that my theory has applicability to
other cases not examined in this dissertation.

Scholarly Contributions, Theoretical Implications, and Further Research
The findings of this dissertation carry implications for both international relations theory and
history. First, this dissertation bridged the gap between reputation proponents and reputation
skeptics by showing that each roughly describes different styles of threat assessments by two
groups of foreign policy officials. The reputation skeptics have argued that policy officials do not

3

Richard Pipes, U.S.-Soviet Relations in the Era of Détente (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1981), 26, 27. The quote
is part of the essay prepared for Pipes’s appearance before US Senate in 1972. Although he guessed in this essay that
the Soviet Union’s foreign policy might become more militaristic in the immediate future, this guess was based on
Pipes’ view that the Soviet Union’s mode of expansion that had worked so well against what he viewed nonaggressive western nations would not work against its rival Communist China, which he believed inherently more
aggressive than the western nations. In other words, he surmised that a cautious reputation the Soviet Union
acquired through its interactions with the West would not be transferable to the Sino-Soviet relations in the coming
years. See Pipes, 19, 44–45.
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make reputational inferences about adversaries’ future behavior or at least do not attribute a
reputation for lacking resolve to adversaries. On the other hand, the reputation proponents have
argued that both resolute and irresolute past actions by adversaries affect how policy officials
assess their future behavior. My dissertation showed that the skeptics roughly describe the way
non-experts assess threats and the proponents roughly describe the way experts assess threats.
However, this dissertation’s endeavor also yielded a new question: which group’s
assessment is more likely to prevail, especially when they reached opposite conclusions like
chapter 5. Although chapter 3 showed that non-experts and experts had used different indicators
to assess Soviet intentions, their conclusions about Soviet intentions were the same: The USSR
would not risk war with the United States. Nevertheless, non-experts used past actions to infer
enemy intentions less often, less consistently, and less confidently than experts. Chapter 5’s
finding also suggests that when non-experts and experts disagreed on their assessments, nonexperts’ assessments persisted even though experts’ assessments challenge them. Keren YarhiMilo also concludes that the assessments made by decisionmakers (roughly overlapping with
what I call non-experts) eventually prevail over intelligence community’s views in estimating
adversaries’ political intentions.4 At this point, I would like to avoid making a definitive
conclusion about this issue, but a tentative conclusion based on the above finding leans toward a
view that non-experts’ views are more likely to prevail over experts’ views. Nevertheless, given
that the number of cases examined is still small, and there are neither large-N studies or
experimental studies on this puzzle, more research is needed to reach a definitive conclusion.
Second, the findings of the three case studies contribute to the historiography of the Cold
War. Chapter 3 on the US assessments of Soviet intentions demonstrated how Soviet past actions

4

Yarhi-Milo, Knowing the Adversary.

203

and strategic texts had played a role in US policy officials’ estimates of Soviet intentions. To be
sure, historians have extensively documented US threat assessments and policies toward the
Soviet Union in the early Cold War. In so doing, however, they stopped short of explaining how
the record of Soviet past actions had affected US policy officials’ threat assessments. Given the
extensive use of Soviet past actions and strategic texts among experts and the significance of this
historical period for world politics, they were worth scholarly attention. Chapter 3 accomplished
this.
Chapter 4 on the US assessments of Chinese intentions demonstrated how the Chinese
intervention in Korea affected the subsequent US assessments of Chinese resolve and intentions.
As noted, some historians have pointed out this fact. However, they have done so through welleducated guesses and stopped short of describing the process through which the intervention had
affected subsequent US views of China. Nor have they compared the effect of China’s past
actions with that of alternative factors that may also explain the US assessments. Furthermore, to
my best knowledge of the literature, only one historian has discussed in passing how the Chinese
intervention in Korea had affected US estimates of the likelihood of Chinese intervention in Dien
Bien Phu.5 Given the long-standing scholarly interest in the use of historical analogy in
policymaking among historians, the process through which an analogy of the Korean War was
used in the Dien Bien Phu crisis was worth exploring.6 Chapter 4 accomplished this.
Finally, along with chapters 3 and 4, Chapter 5 corrected an important mistake Gordon
Chang’s otherwise brilliant work on US-China relations has made. Chang argues that US

5

George McTurnan Kahin, Intervention: How America Became Involved in Vietnam (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1986), 46.
6
Ernest R. May, “Lessons” of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1973); Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the
Vietnam Decisions of 1965 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); Hal Brands and Jeremi Suri, eds., The
Power of the Past: History and Statecraft (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2015).
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officials in the 1950s felt more threatened by China than the Soviet Union because of racism
toward the Asians in the United States.7 These three chapters, however, demonstrated that it was
how the Soviet Union and China had used or not used force in the past that affected US views of
these two countries. To be sure, racism might have reinforced perceived China’s reckless and
fanatical reputation derived from their past actions; however, the main driving force for Soviet
and Chinese reputations was not the racism in the United States but their past actions.
In this respect, it should be noted that the objects of American racism were not limited to
the Chinese but also extended to the Russians as “Orientals.” For example, Kennan once said
that Russian government had an atmosphere of “Oriental secretiveness and conspiracy.” In
discussing whether to share the atomic secret with the Soviets in a cabinet meeting, James
Forrestal compared the Russians with the Japanese, who had been an ally of the US in World
War I but afterward broke the naval agreements with the United States. He then said, “the
Russians, like the Japanese, are essentially Oriental in their thinking, and until we have a longer
record of experience with them on the validity of engagements . . . it seems doubtful that we
should endeavor to buy their understanding and sympathy.” Elsewhere, Walter Bedell Smith also
told Forrestal that the Russians “have the Oriental habit of misunderstanding the Western
mind.”8 These suggest that American racism was equally applicable to the Russians as well as
the Chinese, which further reinforces the persuasiveness of my interpretation over Chang’s.
Taken together, setting aside their contribution to international relations theory, these
three case studies made an untrivial contribution to the Cold War historiography.

7
8

Chang, Friends and Enemies, 170–73.
Forrestal, The Forrestal Diaries, 95, 137, 495.
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Policy Implications
Finally, I end this chapter and dissertation by saying a word about this dissertation’s policy
implications.
First, this dissertation’s finding that only experts are likely to attribute a reputation for
caution or lacking resolve to adversaries suggests that states may not have to be so worried about
the consequences of cautious behavior such as backing down when militarily challenged by their
adversaries. Of course, this implication depends on how much access experts have to top
policymakers in a government. However, given the discussion above about which group’s
assessment eventually prevail, non-experts may be more likely to prevail. As a result, a
reputation for lacking resolve or caution is less likely to be formed than a reputation for resolve,
on which both non-experts and experts tend to agree, especially when the use of force is
unambiguously costly. This may be especially the case for personalist regimes, where strongmen
have a predominant control over policies. Yet one should be cautious on this point because other
dynamics unique to personalist regimes may counteract against this prediction. Nevertheless, the
finding that a reputation for resolve is likely to be formed among broader policy officials than a
reputation for lacking resolve or caution should draw policymakers’ attention.
Second, this dissertation implies that letting experts on an enemy have a say about how to
assess its threats might be a good way to prevent threat inflation. It should be noted that this
dissertation does not argue that either non-experts or experts are better predictors of actual
enemy resolve and intentions. My study’s argument is that they have different styles of threat
assessments, and experts’ style of threat assessments tend to result in milder threat perceptions
than non-experts’ method of threat assessments. After the September 11 attacks and the Iraq
War, the negative effect of threat inflation has drawn scholarly attention and new literature has
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emerged.9 My dissertation’s findings suggest that threat inflation may be partly driven by the
negativity bias and one possible solution to the bias may be ensuring and promoting
professionalism in assessing threats. Although there are many other sources of threat inflation,
training experts and designing policy making system in which experts have access to top
policymakers would be one way to tackle the problem.

9

Chaim Kaufmann, “Threat Inflation and the Failure of the Marketplace of Ideas: The Selling of the Iraq War,”
International Security 29, no. 1 (2004): 5–48; John E. Mueller, Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism
Industry Inflate National Security Threats, and Why We Believe Them (Simon and Schuster, 2006); Jane Kellett
Cramer, “Militarized Patriotism: Why the U.S. Marketplace of Ideas Failed Before the Iraq War,” Security Studies
16, no. 3 (2007): 489–524, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636410701547949; Michael C. Desch, “America’s Liberal
Illiberalism: The Ideological Origins of Overreaction in U.S. Foreign Policy,” International Security 32, no. 3
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